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Chapter 1: General Introduction and Overview 
 
Sustaining economic growth and pursuing a development agenda require considerable 
domestic resource mobilization as well as external finance. With limited and hardly 
predictable public flows, private capital flows have a major role in financing 
development needs. Private flows to developing countries help smoothing spending 
throughout the business cycle by financing saving gaps. Private flows also increase 
investments, contributing to higher economic growth and economic development in 
the recipient countries. For instance, a major component of private capital flows, the 
foreign direct investment is recognized to have beneficial effects on local firms and the 
economy at large. FDI gives more resources, facilitates technological and managerial 
knowledge transfers to the host countries, develops their international import and 
export network, creates job opportunities, and promotes economic growth. Policy 
makers often seek to attract external resources to finance savings gaps but also for 
their potential to generate growth and promote economic development (Dornbusch, 
1998). This is an important issue in economics, business, and politics which calls for 
further analysis of the forces driving private flows and their potential consequences on 
the recipient economies. 
Beyond their expected benefits, capital inflows also create important challenges for 
policy makers because of their potential to create macroeconomic instability and 
weaken the financial system. During the last three decades, the international economy 
has been largely marked by financial crises. The national and international economic 
environment contributed to these episodes of economic stagnation, but the destination 
and composition of private capital flows were also important factors. For instance, the 
lending boom following capital inflows episodes could reinforce the vulnerability of 
the financial system through bubbles in asset prices. Macroeconomic overheating 
following capital inflows could be in the form of an acceleration of economic growth 
and inflation, or a loss of competitiveness associated with the appreciation of the real 
exchange rate. Real exchange rate appreciation jeopardizes export competitiveness, 
widens the current account deficit, and increases the vulnerability to financial crises.  
Developing countries often implement various policies to avoid the negative impact of 
private capital flows; for instance policies aiming to dampen the real appreciation of 
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the exchange rate due to capital inflows. The available policy responses include 
macroeconomic policies such as sterilization, exchange rate flexibility, and fiscal 
tightening as well as more structural policies such as capital controls, trade 
liberalization, and better regulation and supervision of the financial system.  
All these issues remain contentious and the solutions offered in the empirical literature 
are inconclusive, raising the importance to reassess them. Within this framework, this 
dissertation aims to analyze empirically the forces driving private capital flows, their 
consequences on recipient countries’ competitiveness, and an effective policy response 
to manage capital inflows. Before dealing with each of these issues (chapter 2 to 
chapter 5), the following sections briefly present the main data issues on capital flows, 
some stylized facts on these flows, and the outline and main results of this dissertation. 
1. Data issues 
There are two main data sources on external flows. A database can be constructed 
using borrowers or lenders data. On one hand, the main databases compiled by the 
IMF -the World Economic Outlook (WEO) and the Balance of Payments Statistics 
Yearbook (BOPSY)- come from the data reported by debtor countries. On the other 
hand, aid flows published by the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and 
Development (OECD) originate from the Development Agency Committee (DAC) 
members, which are the creditors. In its publication Global Development Finance 
(GDF), the World Bank mixes the two different data sources. Public and publicly 
guaranteed debt data are provided by member countries (the debtors) through the 
Debt Reporting System, while the short-term debt of some countries are derived from 
creditor sources (such as data on officially guaranteed suppliers’ credits compiled by 
the OECD) and lending from multilateral institutions and government lending 
agencies are confirmed by creditors’ statements and reports. The provision and the 
related-recording of debt relief in national accounts complicate the manipulation of 
data. Debt relief can be recorded in various ways depending on the creditors’ choice of 
the vehicle to provide it and the methodological choice of the authorities. Thus, it is 
critical to understand how debt relief is treated to ensure that the database covers all 
debt relief flows to derive net transfers on debt accurately. All theses complexities lead 
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to different definitions and estimations of external public flows across databases (box 
1). 
The nature and composition of private sector flows are less subject to different 
treatment, definition, or interpretation (box 1). Most databases capture the net position 
of the main aggregates -liabilities are deducted from assets. Even though some 
discrepancies persist1, private capital flows are relatively homogeneous across 
databases. Dorsey et al. (2008) show that correlation coefficients between private 
liabilities are above 0.6 during the period 1990-2000. During the same period, the 
authors also find that the correlation across databases is the highest for FDI flows 
(between 0.97 and 1). The correlation for other private flows (portfolio investment and 
other investment) is between 0.7 and 0.82. The BOPSY/IFS data are severely plagued 
by missing observations while the GDF and WEO databases include much more 
information. This is because these two databases (WEO and GDF) use staff estimates 
to complete some missing observations. This dissertation focuses on the analysis of 
private capital flows and uses the WEO and GDF databases. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 Some datasets focus on long-term capital flows, while others expand the spectrum of flows and 
include short-term flows. 
2 See Dorsey et al. (2008) for a comprehensive analysis of private capital flows consistency across 
different databases. 
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Box 1. Definition and Coverage of External Financing Across Databases 
The databases include the IMF World Economic Outlook (WEO) database, Balance of 
Payments Statistics Yearbook (BOPSY) database, and International Financial Statistics (IFS) 
database; the World Bank Global Development Finance (GDF) database; and the 
Development Agency Committee (DAC) of the OECD database.  
Net inflows to the public-sector can be derived using: 
WEO: Net debt flows to the public sector are estimated by summing up net liabilities to 
official debtors, debt forgiveness, and official debt securities, and deducting interest 
payments on external debt. Aggregated flows can be derived by adding current public 
transfers to net debt flows.  
BOPSY: Public flows are calculated by adding current public transfers, debt forgiveness, 
official debt securities (being the sum of portfolio net liabilities to monetary authorities 
and the general government in form of bonds and notes and money market instruments) 
and net liabilities to official debtor (being the sum of other investment net liabilities in 
form of trade credits, loans and other liabilities to the general government; and other 
investment net liabilities in form of loans, currency and deposits, and other liabilities to 
monetary authorities).  
GDF: This database provides disaggregated data on net resources flows on debt (loan 
disbursements minus principal repayments) and net transfers on debt (net resources flows 
on debt minus interest payments) by types of creditors. Grants (excluding technical 
cooperation grants) can be added.  
DAC: It compiles Official Development Assistance (ODA) flows provided by DAC 
members. The flows are the sum of net ODA loans disbursements and ODA grants 
disbursements (the provision of debt relief is recorded through grants).  
Net inflows to the private-sector can be derived using: 
WEO: External financing to the private sector is the sum of direct investment in 
reporting economy, foreign purchases of equities of domestic companies, debt 
instruments issued by the domestic private sector, other investment liabilities to the 
private sector, and private current transfers. 
BOPSY/IFS: Estimates of flows to the private sector are derived by adding direct 
investment in the reporting economy, portfolio investment liabilities (in form of equity 
and debt securities to the private sector), other private investment liabilities (the 
difference between other investment liabilities and net liabilities to the official debtors), 
and private current transfers.  
GDF: Private sector flows are calculated by adding foreign direct investment, portfolio 
equity flows, bank and trade related lending, and workers’ remittances. 
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2. Stylized facts of private capital flows to 
developing countries 
Since the Second World War, developing countries experienced three major episodes 
of surge in private capital inflows. The first one is associated with the oil price boom of 
the 1970s and the subsequent significant foreign investment in form of bank loans 
from oil exporting countries. It has been followed by a crisis of national debt in the 
beginning of the 1980s; the consequence of borrower countries unable to pay back 
their loans. The second surge in private capital inflows occurred in the aftermath of the 
debt crisis, during the second half of the 1980s. This second episode ended with two 
main financial crises: the Mexican crisis in 1994 and the Asian crisis in 1997. The third 
wave of private capital inflows is a shorter one. This wave started in the beginning of 
the 2000s and is expected to end with the current global financial and economic crisis 
triggered by the US mortgage market and the collapse of major financial institutions 
such as Lehman Brothers.   
Figures 1.1 and 1.2 illustrate the evolution of private capital inflows to developing 
countries in absolute value and as a percentage of GDP, using WEO data.  
Figure 1.1: Private capital flows to developing countries (in billion of US$) 
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Figure 1.2: Private capital flows to developing countries (in percent of GDP) 
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Figure 1.1 indicates that private capital flows3 to developing countries have risen from 
an almost null value to approximately 100 billion US dollar during the first wave (from 
1970 to the beginning of the 1980s). In relative term, this represents a rise from 0.4 
percent of GDP to almost 4 percent of GDP (figure 1.2). During this episode, private 
flows are mainly in form of banks loans. The observed decrease of private flows at the 
beginning of the 1980s illustrates the effects of the debt crisis.  
Shortly after the debt crisis, developing countries observed a second wave of private 
capital inflows during the middle of the 1980s with private flows growing from 
approximately 1 percent of GDP of the recipient countries to almost 7 percent of 
GDP in 1997. During this second wave, FDI flows became the major component of 
private flows, rising from less than 1 percent of GDP to almost 3 percent of GDP and 
banks loans represented less than 1 percent of GDP. Portfolio investments are the 
major element determining this second episode of capital flows. Indeed, from almost 0 
                                                 
3 Private capital flows in this section are defined as the sum of FDI, portfolio investment, bank loans, 
private transfers, and other private flows. 
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percent of GDP during the 1980s, these flows grew steadily to reach almost 3 percent 
of GDP before the Mexican crisis and 2 percent of GDP before the Asian crisis. The 
deceleration of capital inflows observed in 1994 is the effect of the Mexican crisis that 
was largely restricted to countries in the region and affected mainly portfolio 
investments. Following the Mexican crisis, a new crisis hit the Asian countries in 1997. 
Although portfolio investments decreased sharply during this crisis (due to the 
contagion between short-term capital markets), the Asian crisis was mainly due to a 
collapse in private debts. During these two crises, FDI and private transfers pursued a 
robust growth.  
The figures illustrate the beginning of a third wave of private capital inflows starting in 
the beginning of the 2000s. This wave is particularly dominated by a surge in FDI and 
private transfers that are relatively stable flows. Portfolio investment and private debt 
also participate in this new episode. The current financial and economic crisis is 
expected to mark the end of this wave of private flows. 
Beyond the evolution of private flows to developing countries, the distribution of these 
flows among the recipient countries is also important. In the developing world, some 
countries succeed in attracting foreign capital while others remain marginalized. Figure 
1.3 illustrates rather well this unequal distribution of private flows across developing 
regions.  
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Figure 1.3: Distribution of private capital flows across developing region 
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Most of countries in Europe and Central Asia were independent after 1990; thus 
interpreting the data for these countries makes more sense after this date. Although 
some caution is necessary because we interpret absolute values, a general view shows 
that Sub-Saharan African countries receive the lowest volume of private flows followed 
by countries in the Middle East and North Africa region. Latin American countries 
attracted the main part of private flows before the debt crisis. After this crisis, East 
Asia and Pacific countries became the major recipients of private flows. In the 
aftermath of the Asian crisis, private capital flows remained mainly directed to 
countries in East Asia and the Pacific but European and Central Asian countries 
became the second major recipients, followed by Latin American and the Caribbean 
countries.  
Private capital flows have been relatively volatile, albeit decreasingly so during the 
recent years. Volatility is estimated using the normalized standard deviation of de-
trended inflows. Normalization is performed using the average flows during the period 
and the Hodrick-Prescott filter with a smoothing parameter of ten is used to de-trend 
the series. This method controls for the increasing trend of private flows during the 
last decades. Figure 1.4 illustrates the difference of volatility according to the forms of 
private flows.  
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Figure 1.4: Volatility of private capital flows 
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Except commercial bank loans, there is an evidence of decreasing volatility of other 
private flows during the last three decades. FDI and private transfers exhibit the lowest 
volatility level. Commercial bank loans and other private flows (trade credits, deposits, 
etc.) are in average twenty times more volatile than FDI and private transfers are 
during the 1990s and the 2000s4. Portfolio investments are also relatively volatile, 
averaging at least six times the volatility level of FDI and private transfers. The 
volatility of capital flows complicates their management for recipient countries. It 
contributes to a more instable macroeconomic environment and a higher vulnerability 
of economies due to the pro-cyclicality of capital inflows, particularly in developing 
countries. 
The increasing volume of private capital inflows to developing countries, coupled with 
their unequal distribution across countries and region as well as the high instability of 
some forms of private flows raise a number of questions to which this dissertation 
aims to provide some insights. Why do some developing countries succeed better than 
                                                 
4 The significant volatility of commercial bank loans and other private flows during the 1980s is due to 
the succession of inflows and significant outflows -which started in the context of banking crises in 
1990. 
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others in attracting foreign capital? What are the potential consequences of private 
capital flows for recipient countries competitiveness? How could developing countries 
attract capital flows while avoiding the associated negative effects?  
3. Outline and main results 
This dissertation deals with the previously addressed questions through an empirical 
analysis. The first part of the dissertation analyzes the macroeconomic determinants of 
two forms of private flows: foreign direct investment (FDI) and portfolio investment. 
This analysis is completed by a firm-level study of the determinants of FDI in the 
manufacturing sector. In the second part, the dissertation analyzes the consequences of 
foreign capital for local economies. This is done through two main channels: the 
positive impact of foreign investment on aggregate productivity and the negative effect 
of capital inflows on countries’ competitiveness captured by the appreciation of the 
real exchange rate. This second part concludes with the analysis of a main policy 
response to dampen the real appreciation of the exchange rate stemming from capital 
inflows. The next sections summarize the main findings of this dissertation. 
Combining the classical “push-pull factors” and the “Lucas paradox” theoretical 
approaches, and controlling for the relationship between two forms of private capital 
flows -through Three Stage Least Square (3SLS) estimations-, the second chapter 
shows that physical infrastructure and financial development positively affect FDI and 
portfolio investment using a sample of 58 developing countries. The analysis highlights 
the importance of non-linearity when assessing the role of financial development for 
portfolio investment inflows. Indeed, a lax monetary policy and excessive credit 
provision could weaken the financial system and significantly reduce portfolio 
investment flows. This indicates the importance of sound monetary policy and strong 
oversight of the financial system. The results also show that for Sub-Saharan African 
countries, better physical infrastructure attracts more FDI.  
The third chapter supports the second one by analysing (with disaggregated data) how 
investment climate constraints jeopardize FDI in developing countries. Using 
manufacturing firm-level data for 77 developing countries, this chapter provides the 
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first empirical analysis of the importance of the investment climate for FDI with a 
large sample of developing countries. FDI is characterized by the presence of at least 
10% of foreign ownership in firms’ capital, following the IMF standard definition. 
Investment climate constraints are defined by two principal factors: first, physical and 
financial infrastructure problems, and second, human capital constraints and 
institutional problems. The main results show that physical infrastructure problems, 
financing constraints, and institutional problems discourage FDI. An innovative 
breakdown analysis between exporter and non-exporter firms shows that foreign firms 
that supply foreign markets are more affected by physical infrastructure problems but 
financing constraints affect more foreign firms that supply local markets. Exporter 
foreign firms are also more constrained in their activity by the lack of skilled workers 
compared to firms supplying the domestic market. Corruption and tax rate represent 
obstacles for FDI but trade and customs regulations encourage FDI. This last finding 
follows the theory of horizontal FDI according to which foreign firms aiming to 
supply the local market may look for protected countries with high trade barriers, 
giving them price advantages. The results also highlight the importance of institutional 
quality for FDI in Sub-Saharan African countries. Finally, tax incentives in the 
manufacturing sector are relevant for developing countries other than the African 
ones.  
While most of studies focus on the effect of aggregated or specific form of capital 
inflows on the real exchange rate with mixed results, the fourth chapter proposes a 
comprehensive analysis of the impact of different forms of private capital flows on the 
real exchange rate. This chapter also assesses the flexibility of the exchange rate as a 
hedge against the real appreciation. Based on a sample of 42 developing countries, the 
chapter uses the newly developed panel co-integration method (the pooled mean group 
estimator) that allows short-run heterogeneity while imposing long-run homogeneity of 
the real exchange rate determination across countries. The results show that aggregated 
capital inflows as well as public and private flows appreciate the real exchange rate. 
Among private flows, portfolio investment has the highest appreciation effect on the 
real exchange rate, almost seven times the appreciation level due to FDI or banks 
loans. FDI and bank loans are relatively more related to an increase in the productive 
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capacity compared to portfolio flows. Private transfers (mainly remittances) lead to the 
lowest appreciation of the real exchange rate compared to the other forms of private 
flows. This suggests more counter-cyclical remittances aiming to smooth consumption 
during economic slowdown. Countries often implement various policies to offset or 
avoid the loss of competitiveness associated with the appreciation of the real exchange 
rate following capital inflows. This chapter assesses the effectiveness of one of the 
main macroeconomic tools: the exchange rate policy. Using for the first time a de facto 
measure of exchange rate flexibility (in a real exchange rate framework), we find that 
allowing higher flexibility of the exchange rate dampen the appreciation of the real 
exchange rate stemming from capital inflows. 
With a particular attention to foreign ownership, the last chapter analyzes productive 
performances of the manufacturing industry by considering the “one step” stochastic 
frontier approach where production technology and efficiency determinants are 
simultaneously estimated. Using manufacturing firm-level data for a sample of five 
developing countries, we find that average productivity scores broadly reflect 
international per capita GDP differences and foreign firms are more productive than 
local companies. Differences in infrastructure quality, in access to finance, in the 
availability of skilled labor, as well as in institutional quality significantly explain 
productivity disparities. We propose for the first time differences in the investment 
climate faced by foreign and local companies as major factors contributing significantly 
to the higher productivity of foreign firms. Indeed, foreign companies could positively 
influence their investment climate or locate where the investment climate is better. 
Adjusting efficiency to the best investment climate in each country -the investment 
climate faced by foreign firms- highlights efficiency gains ranging from less than 10% 
in South Africa to about 25% in Pakistan. In contrast with former studies that estimate 
spillovers effects at sector-level, we propose an innovative way to address this issue. 
We use, for the first time, the share of each firm’s sales to multinationals located in the 
country to assess the importance of vertical spillovers. The results show that firms, 
particularly local and small-local firms selling higher part of their production to foreign 
companies are more productive. This illustrates the existence and the importance of 
vertical spillovers through backward linkages in our sample countries.  
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The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows: The first part analyzes the 
determinants of private capital flows using macroeconomic and firm-level data (chapter 
2 and chapter 3). The second part investigates the consequences of private capital 
flows on countries’ competitiveness measured by the real exchange rate and firms’ 
aggregate productivity (chapter 4 and chapter 5). The last part proposes the general 
conclusion. 
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1. Introduction  
According to the neoclassical economic theory -assuming free capital markets and 
diminishing returns-, capital should flow from capital abundant countries (developed 
countries) to capital scarce countries (developing countries) leading to the equalization 
of marginal returns to capital. In reality, this theoretical prediction is not observed, 
leading to an important paradox in international macroeconomics: the “Lucas 
paradox”. Private capital flows are important in financing development, especially in 
the context of insufficient and unstable aid, which makes it crucial to understand why 
the neoclassical theory is not observed. Why does capital not flow to developing 
countries where their marginal return is higher? Answering this question requires the 
study of the determinants of private capital flows. For foreign private capital, we 
consider net flows of FDI, portfolio investments and debts.  
Following the Asian crisis, a number of studies on the determinants of private capital 
flows emerged. These studies were generally based on an approach that distinguishes 
between external determinants (exogenous to the economy receiving capital, or “push 
factors”) and internal determinants5 (under the recipient economy’s control, or “pull 
factors”). The analysis of external factors explains how the economic conditions of 
capital-exporting countries (developed countries) influences capital inflows in 
developing countries. These external factors reflect the opportunity cost of investment 
in these countries. The international interest rate and world growth rates, generally 
approximated by those of the United States, are the most influential factors. Low profit 
in developed countries is a significant cause of capital flows to developing countries 
where profits’ prospects can be more promising. One of the first analyzes of private 
capital flows determinants was made by Calvo, Leiderman and Reinhart (1993). Using a 
sample of 10 Latin American countries over the period 1988-1991, they find that 
                                                 
5 Studies also focus on contagion during episodes of surges in private capital flows between large 
countries and their smaller neighbours who benefit from externalities resulting from the high 
attractiveness of the large countries (Calvo et al.. 1996, Hernandez, Medallo, and Valdes 2001). A 
competition between countries of the same area for better attractiveness to private capital flows could 
also happen (Kang and al., 2003). 
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capital flows are mainly influenced by the external factors, namely the growth rate and 
the interest rate of developed countries. Many authors showed the importance of the 
external factors (international interest rate and international growth rate) in 
determining private capital flows (Calvo et al., 1996; Fernandez-Arias, 1996; Montiel 
and Reinhart, 1999; Kim, 2000; Ying and Kim, 2001; Ferrucci et al., 2004). A greater 
number of studies revealed the dominant role of internal factors (macroeconomic 
conditions of the recipient country) in the explanation of private capital inflows (Root 
and Ahmed, 1979; Schneider and Frey, 1985; Fernandez-Aria, 1996; Ahn et al., 1998; 
Gastanga et al., 1998; Asiedu, 2002). Internal factors are the macroeconomic 
conditions of the recipient country that influence private capital flows to this country. 
A stable macroeconomic environment is favourable to investment decisions, creation 
of value added, and productivity. Internal factors include economic growth rate, 
inflation, trade openness, education, and political stability, which can be influenced by 
national-level policies. Studies that are more recent use the “Lucas paradox” to explain 
the determinants of private capital flows6. Following Lucas, these studies differentiate 
the determinants of capital flows into economic fundamentals with the ability to affect 
the production structure (education, institutions, and so forth) and capital market 
imperfections (mainly informational asymmetry). Alfaro et al. (2006a, 2006b), through 
a cross-sectional study, find that the “Lucas paradox” is explained by the quality of 
institutions, education, inflation and financial development. According to Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2004), the “Lucas paradox” exists because of political risk and credit market 
imperfections. Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) argue that the reduction of credit market 
imperfections through better institutions would allow externalities, in particular those 
related to the human capital, to play a more significant role. Recent studies also 
illustrated the importance of business environment for private capital flows (Martin 
and Rose-Innes, 2004; Asiedu, 2006; Naudé and Krugell, 2007; Bénassy-Quéré et al. 
2007; IMF, 2007; IMF, 2008). 
                                                 
6 A very recent approach, applied to emerging countries, consists in the estimation of a model of 
supply and demand of capital flows. Then using the maximum likelihood method, this approach 
estimates the probability of disequilibrium between supply and demand of capital (Mody and Taylor, 
2004). 
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All of these studies lead to different conclusions about the factors which significantly 
influence private capital inflows to a country. Another crucial element to attracting 
FDI is building industrial capacity. This includes developing infrastructure and human 
capital; strengthening institutional capabilities and economic openness; and promoting 
sound macroeconomic policies (low inflation, strong and sustainable economic 
growth). The purpose of this study is to extend the “Lucas paradox” approach (which 
considers only the economic fundamentals7 and capital market imperfections), by 
integrating external factors from the traditional approach (“push-pull factors”). 
Emphasis will be given to physical infrastructure and financial development that have 
received insufficient attention in the literature (especially for financial development) 
given the importance of their contribution for countries attractiveness to private capital 
flows. We will analyze aggregated private capital flows and their components. 
Breaking-up aggregate private capital flows allows the differentiation between short-
term and long-term flows, which can have some common determinants while other 
factors are specific to certain flows. Contrary to past studies, this paper, for the first 
time, takes into account the relationship between different components of private 
capital and non-linearity effects of physical infrastructure and financial development.  
The rest of the paper is organised in two main sections: the first section analyzes the 
theoretical relation between private capital flows, physical infrastructure and financial 
development and describe a simple model based on the “Lucas paradox” approach. 
The second part of the study is devoted to the empirical analysis of the determinants of 
private capital flows followed by robustness checks. The last part concludes.  
 
 
                                                 
7 The economic fundamentals include industrial capacity main determinants. 
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2. Physical Infrastructure and Private Capital Flows 
A large number of studies (The World Bank, 1994; Temple 1999; Demurger, 2001; 
Willoughby, 2003) highlight the role of infrastructure (telecommunications, electricity, 
etc.) for economic growth and development. Beyond its direct effect on economic 
growth, infrastructure also affects growth by increasing private investment8. A greater 
availability of infrastructure increases the output of private investment by reducing 
transactions costs and enabling firms to get closer to their customers and suppliers, 
making it possible for the firms to increase their potential markets and thus their 
opportunities for profit. Well-developed telecommunications infrastructure, for 
example, can help firms to access financial resources through financial markets. Firms 
that do not have access to modern telecommunication services, reliable provision of 
electricity, or developed road systems invest less and have less productive investments 
(regardless of whether they are local or foreign). When the provision of well-
functioning infrastructure fails, firms are sometimes forced to pay the costs of 
providing infrastructure themselves, such as electricity through power generating units, 
in order to continue their activities. This type of provision is generally more costly than 
traditional infrastructure provision. In addition to these high costs of provision, firms 
also support other costs due to damages caused by power outages. 
The determinants of FDI may vary according to their type. FDI in manufacturing, 
services or in oil, gas and mineral extraction may have different determinants. 
Moreover, variables such as infrastructure, education or inflation may have different 
effects depending on the destination of FDI. 
In previous studies, the importance of physical infrastructure in determining the 
attractiveness of foreign private capital essentially focused on FDI. Loree and 
Guisinger (1995) find that countries with developed infrastructure (measured by a 
multidimensional index of infrastructure) receive more FDI from United States. 
Wheeler and Mody (1992) and Mody and Srinivasan (1998) find similar results. Kumar 
(2002), with a sample of 66 countries over 1982-1994, finds that the development of 
                                                 
8 See Blejer and Khan (1984), Greene and Villanueva (1991), Serven and Solimano (1993). 
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infrastructure, measured by a composite index, has a positive effect on FDI inflows. 
Ngowi (2001), Asiedu (2002) using a sample of African countries, and Jenkins and 
Thomas (2002), using a sample of Southern African countries, obtain similar results. 
The limited resources of public sector in developing countries, coupled with profitable 
opportunities in some infrastructure projects (electricity, telecommunications, etc.), 
lead to the provision of infrastructure by the private sector. Given the high cost of 
infrastructure investments, private corporations carrying out this type of investment 
are generally foreign. Sader (2000) finds that between 1990 and 1998, 17% of FDI 
flows received by developing countries were directed to infrastructure projects. 
According to Ramamurti and Doh (2004), FDI financing infrastructure represents one 
third of capital inflows to developing countries in the beginning of the 1990s.  
3. Financial Development and Private Capital 
Flows 
Financial development may increase private investments due to better access of firms 
to capital9. With the emergence of financial intermediaries, financial development 
reduces transactions costs through lower informational asymmetry and better risk 
management and coverage. The reduction of informational asymmetry through 
financial intermediaries has a considerable effect on foreign capital and investments. In 
fact, in addition to the informational asymmetry supported by the local entrepreneurs, 
the distance between foreign investors and local markets generally increases this 
already existing information asymmetry. Foreign investors know neither the 
opportunities nor the risks of the local market as well as local investors do. Financial 
intermediaries can provide information about local market risks, providing more 
credibility to potential profit in the country. This stimulates the entry of new investors, 
in particular foreign investors, in the local market. Huang (2006), focuses only on 
domestic investment, but suggests an empirical model for the importance of financial 
development on investment. Using a sample of 43 developing countries over 1970-
1998, he finds that financial development significantly and positively affects private 
                                                 
9 See Levine (1997, 2003) for a review of the theoretical and empirical literature.  
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investment. The author also concludes that private investment has a positive and 
significant effect on financial development. A developed financial sector also facilitates 
interactions between foreign and local firms and their suppliers and clients. The 
importance of financial intermediaries could also vary according to the type of private 
flows. Indeed, even if financial development significantly explains countries’ 
attractiveness to FDI and debts, financial intermediaries’ contribution for portfolio 
investments is more significant. Portfolio investments generally require the pre-
existence of a stock market and thus a relatively developed financial sector. Financial 
development, itself, can imply the entry of new banks or new actors in the local 
market. The process of financial liberalization with bank privatization implies 
acquisitions in the form of FDI or portfolio investment, increasing of foreign private 
capital inflows. The importance of financial development for FDI could however be 
reduced with the entry of multinational banks which tend to follow their corporate 
clients. 
As mentioned by Levine (1997), studies on financial development and investments 
generally do not distinguish domestic investments from foreign investments. Focusing 
only on foreign capital, this study enriches the scarce literature on this topic. To the 
best of our knowledge, very few studies deal specifically with the effect of financial 
development on private capital flows, precisely FDI. Hausmann and Fernandez-Arias 
(2000) find that countries with the least developed capital markets tend to have more 
FDI inflows. According to the authors, FDI can be alternative financing for the firms 
which do not have access to capital markets. However, using a sample of 81 foreign 
firms based in Southern African countries, Jenkins and Thomas (2002) show that 
South Africa attracts relatively more FDI than other African countries because of its 
developed financial system. Montiel (2006), in a theoretical analysis, argues that Africa 
does not attract enough foreign private capital to finance sectors with high potential 
profits because of Africa’s human capital weakness, lack of infrastructure, and bad 
institutional quality. Montiel (2006) underlines that when African countries are 
relatively well endowed in these factors; financial underdevelopment explains their low 
attractiveness to foreign capital. 
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4. The Theoretical Model 
The “Lucas paradox” is derived from a simple neoclassical growth model assuming a 
common technology to all economies. Let us consider a Cobb-Douglas production 
function with constant return to scales, representing a small open economy in which 
the production (Y) is obtained from the combination of capital (K) and labor (L). 
Yt = At F (Kt, Lt) = At Kt α Lt1 –α      with F' (.)>0, F'' (.)<0, F(0)=0                                (1)  
A is the productivity factor and reflects the technological level which can be stock of 
human capital (Lucas, 1990). Assuming a common technological level in all economies 
and perfect capital mobility, capital will flow from most endowed economies (in 
capital) to the least endowed countries because of the property of diminishing returns. 
That would lead to a convergence and equality of the interest rates. Considering two 
economies i and j, the interest rate rt would be defined as follows: 
At f' (kit) = rt = At f' (kjt)                                                                                             (2)  
However, the prediction of interest convergence is not observed, leading to the “Lucas 
paradox”. According to Lucas, this paradox is mainly due to capital market 
imperfections (mostly informational asymmetry) and differences in economic 
fundamentals between countries, implying a difference of the technological factors 
(At). A could reflect for instance, available infrastructure, which is generally external to 
the firm. If i is a more developed country than j, then Lucas supposes that Ait is higher 
than Ajt which explains the fact that country i attracts more capital than the country j 
(kit > kjt) since the return of the capital is higher there. Giving-up the assumption of 
common technology between countries, the real return of capital becomes:  
  Ait f' (kit) > Ajt f' (kjt)                                                                                                (3)  
With more detail, equation (3) can be rewritten as followed:  
  (Ait+ Iit)f' (kit) > (Ajt+ Ijt)f' (kjt)                                                                                  (4)  
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With Iit and Ijt, the infrastructure available in country i and j during the period t. Ait and 
Ajt represent other technological factors such as human capital, institutions, and 
macroeconomic conditions.  
5. Empirical Analysis  
5.1. Data and variables  
The data cover the period 1970-2003 (subdivided into five periods of five years) and 
we retain for the regressions 58 developing countries.10 The variables for private capital 
flows are FDI, portfolio investments, debts, and private capital -defined as an 
aggregate of the three types of private capital11. For the econometric analysis, we will 
only retain FDI and portfolio investments as variables of capital inflows for several 
reasons. After the debt crisis, data on debts suffer from significant measurement errors 
(Alfaro et al., 2006a, 2006b). The principal reason is the lack of data on debts existing 
exclusively between private agents (debt data used here are issued by private economic 
agents but can be contracted by private or public sector)12. These debts, contrary to the 
FDI and portfolio investments, reflect not only market incentives but also 
government’s decisions; the objective of this chapter being to analyze market 
                                                 
10 Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC) are not taken into account in the regressions since 
the majority of these countries was created after 1990 whereas one of our objectives is to evaluate a 
differentiated effect before and after the 1990’s financial crises. 
11 Foreign direct investment is net inflows of investment to acquire a lasting management interest (10 
percent or more of voting stock) in an enterprise operating in an economy other than that of the 
investor. It is the sum of equity capital, reinvestment of earnings, other long-term capital, and short-
term capital as shown in the balance of payments. Portfolio investment flows are net and include non-
debt-creating portfolio equity flows (the sum of country funds, depository receipts, and direct 
purchases of shares by foreign investors). Bank and trade-related lending covers commercial bank 
lending and other private credits. (WDI 2005). 
12 We checked the specificity of debt compared to FDI and portfolio investments by adding to our 
system of two equations an equation of debt. The results (available upon request) show that physical 
and financial infrastructure does not increase debt inflows.  
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incentives. After the debt crisis for instance, the government of developing countries 
contracted a significant share of private debt. 
Since 1970, developing countries have seen three episodes of massive surge in capital 
flows13. Beyond the evolution of private capital flows, their repartition is largely 
unequal, highlighting a marginalisation of Sub-Sahara African countries.  
We use the proportion of the subscribers of fixed and mobile phone service in the 
population and the electric consumption per capita as the proxies for physical 
infrastructure. Although these variables approximate well the infrastructure available in 
a country, an addition excellent proxy for physical infrastructure would be the density 
of the road network in each country. Data missing problem do not allow the use of 
this last variable. Financial development is captured by three variables: the ratio of 
liquid liabilities to the GDP (M3/GDP), the ratio of bank credit to the private sector 
over the GDP, and the ratio of financial system deposits to the GDP. In accordance 
with the theoretical and empirical literature, we control for other important variables. 
Appendix 1 gives the list, definitions and sources of all variables.  
5.2. Estimations  
Although the objective of this chapter is not to test the existence of the “Lucas 
paradox,” but rather its explanation, it is interesting to investigate whether this 
paradox, so far established between developed and developing countries can also be 
observed among developing countries. In other words, are countries with higher 
income level among developing countries receiving more private capital flows? The 
results, in appendix 5, show that among developing countries, private capital are more 
directed towards countries with higher GDP per capita, confirming the existence of 
“Lucas paradox” among developing countries.  
                                                 
13 The general introduction (chapter 1) presents a comprehensive analysis of the trends, composition, 
and repartition of private capital flows to developing countries. 
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The analysis of the effects of physical infrastructure and financial development on 
private capital inflows is based on the following equation. It includes capital market 
imperfections and economic fundamental variables to explain the “Lucas paradox” and 
variables specific to capital exporters’ countries in accordance with the “push-pull 
factors” approach: 
jt j jt jt jt t jtCi Inf Fin Xφλ β δ λ ε+ += + + +                                                                      (1) 
Cijt, is a type i of private capital flow received by the country j in year t.  Infjt is the 
variable of physical infrastructure and Finjt the variable of financial development. Xjt is 
the matrix of the control variables. The country and time fixed effects are respectively 
λj and λt while εjt is the error term. Because our sample is only made up of developing 
countries, the time fixed effects capture external factors (“push factors”). The growth 
rate or the interest rate of the developed countries, important variables in the 
determination of short-term capital flows (particularly portfolio investments), represent 
common shocks to all developing countries that are captured by the time fixed-effects. 
Capital market imperfections, which can be approximated by the distance between 
countries, reflecting informational asymmetry (Coval and Moskowitz, 1999, 2001), are 
taken into account in the country fixed effects.  
The two equations of capital inflows could be estimated with standard fixed effect 
method. However this would suppose that the amount of the FDI received by a 
country is independent of the amount of portfolio investments received by this 
country (in other words, error terms of the two equations are not correlated). This 
rather restrictive assumption is not verified since a high number of identical variables 
explain the two components of capital flows. For instance, significant inflows of FDI 
in a country can stimulate the inflows of portfolio investments. It is thus important to 
consider the correlation of error terms that can affect the significance of the 
coefficients. The empirical model for estimation will be a system of equations as 
follows:  
1 1 1
2 2 2
jt j jt jt jt t jt
jt j jt jt jt t jt
FDI Inf Fin
PORT Inf Fin
X
X
φ
φ
λ β δ λ ε
λ β δ λ ε
+ +
+ +



= + + +
= + + +
                                                        (2) 
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FDIjt and PORTjt represent net inflows of FDI and portfolio investments in country j 
in year t, respectively. The definition of the other explanatory variables remains 
identical to those given in equation 1. The use of Seemingly Unrelated Regression 
(SUR) would be more efficient than the standard fixed effect model (Arellano, 1987) 
since SUR takes into account the correlation between the errors terms. It is very likely 
that private capital flows received by a country affect its financial and physical 
infrastructure development. This potential reverse causality, as explained in the 
theoretical section, can be a source of endogeneity. In order to solve this problem, 
which is confirmed by the Nakamura-Nakamura test, we define three instruments: the 
lagged value of physical infrastructure variable, the lagged value of financial 
development variable, and the regulation of credit market as financial development 
variable instrument.14 Instruments diagnostic with first-stage regressions statistics 
(partial R², Shea partial R², partial F-test, Cragg-Donald Statistics) reject the hypothesis 
of weak instruments (table 1).  
Table 2.1 First-stage equation 
 FDI Portfolio I. 
Excluded Instruments Telephone M3/GDP Telephone M3/GDP 
Telephone_1 2.010 -0.133 2.010 -0.136 
 (26.81)*** (0.72) (26.72)*** (0.73) 
M3/GDP_1 -0.015 0.549 -0.015 0.548 
 (0.60) (9.12)*** (0.61) (9.08)*** 
Regulation -0.041 0.841 -0.041 0.839 
 (0.21) (1.76)* (0.21) (1.75)* 
Weak instruments diagnostics 
 Shea Partial R²  0.83 0.33 0.83 0.33 
Partial R² 0.83 0.33 0.83 0.33 
Partial F 268.19 27.72 266.41 27.49 
          p-values 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 Cragg-Donald F stat.                    27.66                    27.42 
 Stock and Yogo Critical values 
        10%                    13.43                    13.43 
        15%                    8.18                    8.18 
       20%                   6.40                   6.40 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
                                                 
14 This variable of credit market regulation indicates governments’ constraints or incentives in term of 
control of interest rates on deposits and bank loans. An instrument for financial development, 
commonly used in the literature is the legal origin. This instrument cannot be used in our case since it 
is already included in the country fixed effects. 
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For the estimations, we use three stage least squares (3SLS) which, like two stage least 
squares (2SLS), deals with the endogeneity problem but also takes into consideration 
the correlation between the errors terms of the equations like SUR method. Under the 
null assumption of good specification of all equations in the model, 3SLS is more 
efficient since it deals with the correlation of different equations’ error terms. 
However, when at least one equation in the system is misspecified, this 
misspecification extends to all systems by the correlation of error terms, leading to 
biased and less consistent coefficients. In this case, the 2SLS estimator, although less 
efficient, is preferable since there is no correlation in error terms and it is consistent, 
even in the case of the misspecification of one equation in the system. Although results 
obtained by the 2SLS do not differ significantly (appendix 8), a Hausmann test 
confirms the preference for 3SLS.  
5.3. Results   
We first consider an index of physical and financial infrastructure obtained with 
principal components analysis that avoids colinearity problems between infrastructure 
variables. A second method of aggregation used is the standardisation of variables. 
This method is similar to principal component analysis but it gives an equivalent 
weight to each variable in the calculation of the index. The indexes include five 
variables: the proportion of subscribers of fixed and mobile phone, the electric 
consumption per capita, the ratio M3/GDP, the credit to private sector, and the 
deposits in financial institutions. The following table gives the results of estimations 
with aggregated indexes. 
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Table 2.2: Estimation with physical and financial infrastructure index 
 Dependent Variables 
 Private 
capital 
FDI Portfolio I. Private 
capital 
FDI Portfolio 
I. 
Explanatory 
Variables 
2SLS 3SLS 3SLS 2SLS 3SLS 3SLS 
Infrastructure1 0.541 0.331 0.189    
 (2.56)** (1.87)* (2.04)**    
Infrastructure2    0.283 0.205 0.070 
    (2.88)*** (2.48)** (1.62) 
Control -1.289 -1.050 -0.127 -1.222 -0.982 -0.128 
 (2.38)** (2.31)** (0.53) (2.28)** (2.18)** (0.54) 
Growth 0.193 0.167 0.056 0.189 0.171 0.048 
 (3.73)*** (3.93)*** (2.46)** (3.84)*** (4.24)*** (2.23)** 
Inflation -0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 
 (0.80) (2.18)** (1.72)* (1.02) (2.29)** (1.44) 
Openness -0.716 -0.390 -0.584 -0.695 -0.578 -0.395 
 (0.69) (0.45) (1.28) (0.72) (0.71) (0.92) 
Education -0.004 -0.004 0.001 -0.002 -0.002 0.001 
 (0.33) (0.36) (0.21) (0.18) (0.22) (0.28) 
Property -0.041 -0.061 0.010 -0.035 -0.063 0.017 
 (0.41) (0.73) (0.24) (0.36) (0.75) (0.38) 
Natural 
resources 
-0.103 -0.084 0.013 -0.098 -0.079 0.013 
 (0.71) (0.69) (0.20) (0.68) (0.65) (0.20) 
Crisis -0.708  -0.152 -0.705  -0.148 
 (3.21)***  (1.58) (3.25)***  (1.57) 
R2 0.69 0.74 0.22 0.70 0.75 0.24 
Sargan Stat.  0.01 0.28 0.53 0.02 0.06 0.49 
(p-value) (0.95) (0.40) (0.53) (0.89) (0.19) (0.52) 
Observations 197 197 197 197 197 197 
Countries 45 45 45 45 45 45 
z statistics in parentheses. 
All regressions include time and country fixed effects. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
1 Infrastructure index by principal component analysis 
2 Infrastructure index by standardization 
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Before interpreting the results obtained with the infrastructure index, we separately 
estimate the equations with individual variables of infrastructure in order to address 
criticisms generally made to aggregate indicators that cannot distinguish the partial 
contribution of each variable. The following table gives the results of estimations 
considering a proxy for physical infrastructure (the proportion of fixed and mobile 
phone subscribers) and another one for financial development (M3/GDP) separately.  
Table 2.3: Estimation (3SLS) with differentiation of physical and financial 
infrastructure  
 Dependent Variables 
Explanatory Variables FDI Portfolio I. 
Telephone 0.031 -0.006 
 (2.53)** (0.92) 
M3/GDP -0.016 0.017 
 (1.06) (2.10)** 
Control -1.080 -0.083 
 (2.65)*** (0.40) 
Growth 0.084 0.048 
 (2.29)** (2.52)** 
Inflation -0.002 0.000 
 (3.73)*** (1.87)* 
Openness 1.286 -0.532 
 (1.65)* (1.32) 
Education -0.003 0.001 
 (0.34) (0.22) 
Property -0.008 0.009 
 (0.11) (0.23) 
Natural resources -0.079 0.015 
 (0.94) (0.35) 
Crisis  -0.128 
  (1.55) 
R2 0.88 0.19 
Sargan Stat. 0.14 0.29 
(p-value) (0.29) (0.41) 
Observations 239 239 
Countries 58 58 
z statistics in parentheses. 
All regressions include time and country fixed effects. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Beside the instrument diagnostic tests which reject the hypothesis of weak instruments, 
the Sargan overidentification test does not reject the validity of the instruments. 
Control variables have almost identical effects when considering the index of 
infrastructure or individual variables of infrastructure and financial development. The 
macroeconomic instability, characterised by a high inflation or a banking crisis 
negatively affects FDI and portfolio investments respectively (table 2.2). Inflation 
positively affects portfolio investment. This result could illustrate the fact that Latin 
American countries, which attract an important part of portfolio investment in the 
sample, have higher inflation, particularly during the Mexican crisis of 1994. Capital 
controls15 have a negative effect on private capital inflows and a good economic 
performance characterised by a high growth rate positively influences private flows. 
Countries that are more open also receive more FDI.16  
Concerning the two variables of interest, the index of physical and financial 
infrastructure, either obtained by the principal components analysis or by the 
standardisation method, positively and significantly affects private capital flows and 
each of its components (FDI and portfolio investments). Physical and financial 
                                                 
15 The measure of capital control is the average of proxies of government restrictions that affect capital 
mobility (capital account restrictions, current account restrictions, presence of multiple exchange rates 
and repatriation requirements for export proceeds). There is a structural break in capital account data 
series in 1996 when the IMF started to report more details on capital account -permitting a measure of 
the intensity of capital account restriction - instead of the dichotomous variable. That makes the data 
before and after 1996 not entirely comparable. Quinn (1997) and Mody and Murshid (2005) have 
constructed single data series using the IMF publications. Chinn (2004) finds also that Quinn index 
explain 71 percent of the four variables we used to construct our index before 1996. As Mody and 
Murshid (2005), a robustness check using a truncated sample (before 1996) does not change our 
results.  
16 Education does not affect significantly private capital flows to developing countries. According to 
the type of FDI (vertical FDI or horizontal FDI), multinational firms will look for unskilled cheap 
labor or skilled more expensive labor force. Urata and Kawai (2000) find that skilled labor availability 
discourages Japanese FDI. After a breakdown analysis, the authors show that skilled labor positively 
affects FDI in developed countries but the effect is not significant for developing countries.  
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infrastructure have a stronger impact on FDI than on portfolio investments, but this 
result gives no indication of the respective importance of physical or financial 
infrastructure in the attractivity of FDI or portfolio investments. Table 2.3 deals with 
this question by underlining the fact that physical infrastructure only affects FDI 
inflows while financial infrastructure only has a significant effect on portfolio 
investments. Indeed, a rise of 1 percentage point in the number of fixed and mobile 
phone subscribers increases FDI inflows by 0.03 percentage point. This result 
illustrates the existence of a minimal condition in order to guarantee prosperity of 
investments and thus attract FDI. A large number of economic activities (especially 
industrial ones) require a minimum of communication infrastructure (telephone, roads) 
allowing or facilitating the access to raw and intermediate materials but also the access 
to markets, reducing production costs. The government usually provides financing for 
infrastructure since firms can hardly support the cost. The existence of infrastructure 
thus creates a favourable business environment, encouraging investments, particularly 
foreign investments. 
Portfolio investments are more volatile and relatively scarce in developing countries. 
Of the two infrastructure variables, only financial development significantly and 
positively affects portfolio investment flows to developing countries. A rise of 1 
percentage point of liquidity liabilities increases portfolio investments by 0.02 
percentage point. Inflows of portfolio investments require a high level of financial 
development since this form of capital flow is most frequently negotiated in stock 
markets. By improving information sharing, developed financial markets reduces 
transaction costs and the potential risk taken by investors.17 
                                                 
17 The analysis shows that FDI and portfolio investments are mostly explained by identical 
determinants. It is important to pinpoint that some specific determinants of portfolio investments 
relate to the international economic situation, mainly the international interest rate and growth rate, 
approximated by those of the developed countries. As mentioned above, these important variables in 
the determination of portfolio investments are captured by time fixed-effects. 
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5.4. Robustness check and African specificity  
5.4.1. Alternative explanatory variables 
The literature suggests several variables that capture the physical infrastructure or 
financial development of a country. We considered the percentage of subscribers of 
fixed and mobile phone service in the population as a proxy for physical infrastructure 
and liquid liabilities (M3/GDP) as a proxy of financial development. The results can be 
influenced by the choice of these variables. As a robustness check, we estimate the 
system of equations with electric consumption per capita to reflect physical 
infrastructure and credit to private sector (in percentage of the GDP) as the financial 
development variable. The results are robust to the use of these alternative variables 
(table 2.4).  
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Table 2.4: Robustness checks (3SLS) 
 Dependent Variables 
Explanatory 
Variables 
FDI Portfolio I. FDI Portfolio I. 
Electricity 0.002 -0.000   
 (3.86)*** (1.60)   
Credit 0.098 1.644   
 (0.08) (2.58)***   
Telephone   0.036 -0.007 
   (2.80)*** (0.98) 
M3/GDP   -0.014 0.016 
   (0.93) (2.04)** 
Control -1.027 -0.259 -0.989 -0.096 
 (2.39)** (1.10) (2.38)** (0.45) 
Growth 0.138 0.062 0.088 0.048 
 (3.45)*** (2.72)*** (2.38)** (2.46)** 
Inflation -0.001 0.000 -0.002 0.000 
 (3.20)*** (2.04)** (3.67)*** (1.85)* 
Openness -0.160 -0.546 1.169 -0.518 
 (0.20) (1.25) (1.47) (1.26) 
Education 0.002 -0.001 -0.004 0.001 
 (0.17) (0.10) (0.45) (0.25) 
Property -0.052 0.028 -0.014 0.010 
 (0.66) (0.64) (0.18) (0.25) 
Natural resource -0.093 0.019 -0.083 0.016 
 (0.80) (0.30) (1.00) (0.36) 
Crisis  -0.121  -0.127 
  (1.28)  (1.54) 
Change   -0.336 0.048 
   (1.09) (0.30) 
R2 0.77 0.23 0.88 0.19 
Sargan Stat. 5.40 6.02 0.24 0.33 
(p-value) 0.98 0.98 0.37 0.44 
Observations 197 197 239 239 
Countries 45 45 58 58 
z statistics in parentheses. 
All regressions include time and country fixed effects. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Since portfolio investments are short-term flows, high variability in exchange rates 
could cause uncertainty in the return on these investments. Exchange rate variability 
may also negatively affect long-term flows such as FDI by increasing uncertainty in 
returns. Considering the exchange rate variability variable, the main results remain 
robust (table 2.4). 
5.4.2. Non-linear relationship 
Up to this point, we have only tested linear relations whereas the physical 
infrastructure may have a congestion effect. Even if the number of subscribers to 
telephone service or electric consumption per capita has a positive effect on capital 
inflows, it would be possible that this positive effect vanishes above a certain level of 
telephone subscribers. For a given level of income, excessive number of telephone 
subscribers could illustrate high telecommunication cost that forces subscribers to hold 
one mobile phone for each of the main mobile companies operating in the country. 
This phenomenon could be observed in African countries such as Côte d’Ivoire or 
Nigeria. The interaction between infrastructure and other limited factors such as the 
stock of human capital could also explain the congestion effect. An increase in credit 
or liquid liabilities can be a signal of a financial development but an excessive supply of 
money or private credit could also indicate a bad management of the monetary policy 
or be the precursory sign of a financial crisis. Table 2.5 shows the results considering 
possible thresholds for the impact of infrastructure and financial development18.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
18 The Ramsey-Reset test confirms the non-linearity suspected for the variables of physical and 
financial infrastructure. 
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Table 2.5: Non linearity check (3SLS) 
 Dependent Variables 
Explanatory Variables FDI Portfolio I. 
Telephone 0.099 0.029 
 (2.04)** (1.08) 
M3/GDP 0.054 0.069 
 (1.31) (3.04)*** 
Telephone^2 -0.001 -0.000 
 (1.34) (1.07) 
M3/GDP^2 -0.001 -0.001 
 (2.03)** (3.48)*** 
Control -0.641 0.203 
 (1.38) (0.79) 
Growth 0.078 0.027 
 (2.38)** (1.47) 
Inflation -0.001 0.001 
 (1.98)** (2.56)** 
Openness 1.116 -0.084 
 (1.57) (0.22) 
Education -0.001 0.002 
 (0.12) (0.51) 
Property -0.006 0.023 
 (0.08) (0.59) 
Natural resources -0.065 0.026 
 (0.79) (0.60) 
Crisis  -0.024 
  (0.28) 
R² 0.89 0.15 
Sargan Stat.  0.41 4.85 
(p-value) (0.48) (0.97) 
Observations 239 239 
Countries 58 58 
z statistics in parentheses. 
All regressions include time and country fixed effects. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Telephone^2 and M3/GDP^2 are the squared values of Telephone and M3/GDP 
The main results are confirmed and the effects of physical and financial infrastructure 
on FDI and portfolio investment inflows become higher. Once we have allowed for 
non-linearity, the results show significant a threshold effect for financial development. 
This highlights the importance of good management of the monetary policy and the 
negative impact of excessive money supply. 
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5.4.3. Structural Break and African Specificity 
Private capital inflows, particularly FDI to developing countries, have risen 
exponentially since 1990 with a peak prior to the Asian crisis (chapter 1). Important 
reforms in the liberalization of current and capital accounts were undertaken by 
developing countries at the beginning of the 1990s within the framework of the 
Washington Consensus in order to attract more private capital. A temporal Chow test 
before and after 1990 enables us to show stability of the coefficients during the two 
periods. There is no differentiated effect on the determinants of private capital due to 
the reforms, and no specificity before and after the 1990s crises.19 The analysis of 
private capital inflows to developing countries also shows a marginalisation of Sub-
Saharan African countries (chapter 1). Analysis of the Sub-Saharan African sample 
shows an African specificity which is confirmed by the Chow test. Considering only 
Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries, the results show that physical infrastructure 
positively and significantly affects FDI inflows.20  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
19 Data availability does not allow the test of other dates of potential ruptures or an Andrews-Quandt 
test that would enable to determine the break point. The choice of the break period, although imposed 
to us by the data is also justified theoretically 
20 Given the low level of portfolio investment in Sub-Saharan African countries and the fact that South 
Africa is the main destination of these portfolio investments, we consider only FDI for the estimation 
on SSA countries. The specificity of SSA countries is confirmed with the introduction of a dummy in 
the full sample. The results obtained for the SSA countries sample are similar after a standardization of 
the coefficients.  
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Table 2.6: Sub-Saharan Africa specificity (3SLS) 
 Dependent Variables 
 Total Sample Restricted Sample1  Restricted Sample1 SSA2 
 
FDI 
Portfolio 
I. 
FDI 
Portfolio 
I. 
FDI 
Portfolio 
I. 
FDI 
Telephone 0.031 -0.006 0.030 -0.009 0.099 0.029 0.043 
 (2.53)** (0.92) (2.36)** (1.44) (1.97)** (1.14) (2.31)** 
M3/GDP -0.016 0.017 -0.016 0.023 0.053 0.084 -0.030 
 (1.06) (2.10)** (1.00) (3.03)*** (1.30) (3.92)*** (1.35) 
Control -1.080 -0.083 -1.052 -0.097 -0.605 0.239 0.437 
 (2.65)*** (0.40) (2.50)** (0.49) (1.26) (0.97) (0.74) 
Growth 0.084 0.048 0.087 0.057 0.081 0.033 0.078 
 (2.29)** (2.52)** (2.31)** (3.13)*** (2.40)** (1.85)* (2.20)** 
Inflation -0.002 0.000 -0.002 0.000 -0.001 0.001 0.007 
 (3.73)*** (1.87)* (3.60)*** (2.13)** (1.93)* (2.99)*** (1.04) 
Openness 1.286 -0.532 1.220 -0.650 1.061 -0.130 2.203 
 (1.65)* (1.32) (1.52) (1.71)* (1.46) (0.35) (3.31)*** 
Education -0.003 0.001 -0.003 -0.002 -0.001 -0.000 0.013 
 (0.34) (0.22) (0.33) (0.45) (0.09) (0.01) (1.62) 
Property -0.008 0.009 -0.009 -0.011 -0.002 0.008 0.188 
 (0.11) (0.23) (0.11) (0.30) (0.02) (0.20) (1.93)* 
Natural 
resources 
-0.079 0.015 -0.078 0.023 -0.065 0.034 0.046 
 (0.94) (0.35) (0.91) (0.56) (0.77) (0.81) (0.68) 
Crisis  -0.128  -0.086  0.042  
  (1.55)  (1.09)  (0.49)  
Telephone^2     -0.001 -0.000  
     (1.30) (1.17)  
M3/GDP^2     -0.001 -0.001  
     (2.02)** (4.30)***  
R2 0.88 0.19 0.88 0.10 0.89 0.10 0.89 
Sargan Stat.  0.14 029 0.09 0.34 0.50 6.03 1.24 
(p-value) (0.29) (0.41) (0.24) (0.44) (0.52) (0.98) (0.74) 
Observations 239 239 226 226 226 226 70 
Countries 58 58 55 55 55 55 22 
z statistics in parentheses. 
All regressions include times and country fixed effects. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Telephone^2 and M3/GDP^2 are the squared values of Telephone and M3/GDP 
1 Restricted sample is the total sample without some major developing countries: Brazil, India and South Africa 
2 SSA indicates Sub-Saharan African countries 
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A rise of 1 percentage points in the number of subscribers to fixed and mobile phone 
service increases FDI inflows to SSA countries by 0.04 percentage points. These results 
may be explained by the fact that most SSA countries have a relatively low level of 
infrastructure development. On average, over the period 1970-2003, only 2 percent of 
the population in SSA countries were telephone subscribers compared to 5 percent for 
Asian countries and 12 percent for Latin America countries. A simple simulation 
shows that if SSA countries were to reach the same level of physical infrastructure 
development as Asian countries, FDI inflows would increase by 6.5 percentage points. 
This simulation reveals the importance of physical infrastructure in attracting FDI for 
SSA countries attractiveness. The estimation for the sub-sample of SSA countries also 
highlights the importance of trade openness, economic growth and property rights 
protection in increasing attractiveness for FDI. It is also important to note that the 
results are robust to potential influential countries (Brazil, India and South Africa) 
since these countries attract an important part of FDI and portfolio investments 
received by developing countries. 
6. Conclusion  
This chapter has analyzed the determinants of private capital flows in developing 
countries, with particular attention to physical infrastructure and financial 
development. Based on two theoretical approaches (Lucas paradox and push-pull 
factors) and after controlling for interaction between components of capital flows 
(with 3SLS), this study finds that physical infrastructure only fosters FDI inflows while 
financial development has a positive effect on portfolio investments. The results 
highlight the importance of non-linearity -particularly for financial development- in 
analyzing the determinants of foreign private capital. This indicates the importance of 
sound monetary policy and stronger oversight in the financial system. Indeed, lax 
monetary policy and excessive credit provision could weaken the financial system and 
significantly reduce portfolio investment inflows. It is thus important that policies 
aiming to attract more private capital consider also the possible negative effects such as 
sudden stops or reversal of short-term capital flows by maintaining an adequate 
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monetary policy and improving the supervision and the regulation of the financial 
system. 
A study of African specificity underlines the important role of physical infrastructure in 
attracting FDI inflows. Development of infrastructure should attract more private 
investments, in particular from abroad. Programs such as the NEPAD (New 
Partnership for Africa’s Development) in Africa aim to find more funds for 
infrastructure. This study encourages this type of initiative for a continent which 
should benefit considerably from the development of its infrastructure by attracting 
private capital, in particular FDI. Beyond their effects on private capital flows, the 
development of infrastructure also promotes economic growth by increasing the 
productivity of the economy. 
To give more credit to these findings, the next chapter will analyze deeply the 
determinants of FDI using disaggregated firm-level data in the manufacturing sector.  
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Appendices 
Appendix 2.1: List of variables 
Variables Definitions Sources 
FDI 
Foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of 
GDP) 
Global Development 
Finance (2005) PORTFOLIO I. Portfolio investment, equity (% of GDP) 
DEBT Bank and trade-related lending (% of GDP) 
M3/GDP Liquid liabilities (M3) as % of GDP 
Financial Structure 
Dataset (2006) 
Credit 
Domestic credit provided by banking sector (% 
of GDP) 
Deposit Financial System Deposits (% of GDP) 
Telephone 
Fixed line and mobile phone subscribers per 100 
inhabitants 
World Development 
Indicators (2005) 
Electricity Electric consumption per capita  
Growth Economic growth rate 
Inflation Inflation rate 
Openness 
Sum of exports and imports of goods and 
services as a share of gross domestic product 
Change Exchange rate variability (standard deviation)  
Control 
Capital control indicator : average of four 
dummies: Exchange arrangements, payments 
restrictions on current transactions and on capital 
transactions, and repatriation requirements for 
export proceeds 
Milesi Ferretti (1970-
1997) and Annual 
Report on Exchange 
Arrangement and 
Exchange 
Restrictions (1998-
2003) 
Crisis Financial crisis dummy 
Caprio and Klingebel 
(2003) 
Education Gross primary enrollment rate 
UNESCO Statistics 
(2004) 
Natural resources Log of oil, gas, metal and mineral rents World Bank (2002) 
Regulation Credit market regulation 
Fraser Institue (2005) 
Property Property right Protection 
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Appendix 2.2: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Observation Mean Standard D. Min Max 
Private capital 239 1.90 2.77 -3.32 31.72 
FDI 239 1.79 2.67 -3.32 31.72 
Portfolio I. 239 0.11 0.52 -0.78 5.82 
Telephone 239 7.80 11.94 0.06 75.46 
Electricity 197 813.87 839.78 26.20 3961.69 
M3/GDP 239 36.42 21.39 9.86 124.90 
Credit 235 0.46 0.29 0.06 1.57 
Deposit 239 29.71 19.84 0.05 116.38 
Growth 239 1.13 2.81 -7.89 8.24 
Inflation 239 34.13 189.34 -18.78 2414.35 
Openness 239 0.62 0.30 0.13 2.16 
Control 239 0.61 0.27 0.00 1.00 
Education 239 95.49 20.70 25.00 148.67 
Property 239 4.46 1.30 1.58 7.06 
Natural resources 239 18.99 3.96 7.73 24.33 
Crisis 239 0.42 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Regulation 239 5.94 2.15 0.00 9.85 
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Appendix 2.3: Evolution of variables 
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Appendix 2.4: Illustration of Lucas paradox among developing countries 
 Dependent Variable: Private Capital per capita 
Explanatory Variables Fixed Effect 2SLS 
GDP per capita 0.065 0.061 
 (11.68)*** (6.43)*** 
Constant -5.301 -15.896 
 (0.46) (0.78) 
Observations 668 571 
Countries 106 106 
R² 0.25 0.29 
 t statistics in parentheses  
All regressions include time and country fixed effects. 
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
The regression is based on a large sample of developing countries including the countries retained for the rest of 
the analysis. 
 
 
 
Appendix 2.5: Correlation between the main variables 
 FDI Portfolio I. Telephone Electricity M3/GDP Credit Deposit 
FDI 1       
Portfolio I. 0.0812   1      
Telephone 0.2401*  0.0587 1     
Electricity 0.3146*  0.2042* 0.6613* 1    
M3/GDP 0.1080*  0.1006* 0.3543* 0.2998* 1   
Credit -0.0276   0.2246* 0.2933* 0.4181* 0.7031*  1  
Deposit 0.1849*  0.1408* 0.4365* 0.4170* 0.9506*  0.7109*  1 
* significant at 1% 
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Appendix 2.6: Eigenvalue and variance with principal components analysis  
Principal 
components 
Eigenvalue Proportion of variance 
Cumulative 
Variance  
1 3.07 0.61 0.61 
2 1.19 0.24 0.85 
3 0.42 0.09 0.94 
4 0.27 0.05 0.99 
5 0.05 0.01 1.00 
 
 Eigenvectors 
Variable  1 2 3 4 5 
M3/GDP 0.50 -0.36 -0.31 -0.23 0.69 
Deposit 0.53 -0.25 -0.26 -0.28 -0.72 
Credit 0.47 -0.26 0.60 0.59 -0.01 
Telephone  0.34 0.63 -0.49 0.50 0.02 
Electricity 0.37 0.59 0.49 -0.52 0.09 
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Appendix 2.7: 2SLS Estimation with physical and financial infrastructure 
index 
 Dependent Variables 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Private 
capital 
FDI Portfolio I. Private 
capital 
FDI Portfolio I. 
Infrastructure1 0.541 0.327 0.191    
 (2.56)** (1.84)* (2.05)**    
Infrastructure2    0.283 0.207 0.071 
    (2.88)*** (2.50)** (1.63) 
Control -1.289 -1.051 -0.136 -1.222 -0.980 -0.137 
 (2.38)** (2.31)** (0.57) (2.28)** (2.18)** (0.58) 
Growth 0.193 0.166 0.054 0.189 0.171 0.046 
 (3.73)*** (3.92)*** (2.35)** (3.84)*** (4.25)*** (2.12)** 
Inflation -0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 
 (0.80) (2.20)** (1.76)* (1.02) (2.28)** (1.48) 
Openness -0.716 -0.377 -0.564 -0.695 -0.590 -0.373 
 (0.69) (0.43) (1.24) (0.72) (0.73) (0.87) 
Education -0.004 -0.004 0.001 -0.002 -0.002 0.001 
 (0.33) (0.36) (0.18) (0.18) (0.22) (0.26) 
Property -0.041 -0.061 0.011 -0.035 -0.063 0.017 
 (0.41) (0.72) (0.25) (0.36) (0.76) (0.40) 
Natural 
resources 
-0.103 -0.084 0.010 -0.098 -0.078 0.010 
 (0.71) (0.69) (0.16) (0.68) (0.65) (0.16) 
Crisis -0.708  -0.195 -0.705  -0.192 
 (3.21)***  (2.01)** (3.25)***  (2.01)** 
R2 0.84 0.86 0.25 0.84 0.87 0.27 
Sargan Stat.  0.01 0.27 0.33 0.02 0.06 0.28 
(p-value) 0.95 0.60 0.57 0.89 0.80 0.59 
Observations 197 197 197 197 197 197 
Countries 45 45 45 45 45 45 
z statistics in parentheses. 
All regressions include time and country fixed effects. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
1 Infrastructure index by principal component analysis 
2 Infrastructure index by standardization. 
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Appendix 2.8: Sample for estimation 
Sub-Saharan Africa Latin America and 
Caribbean 
Asia 
Benin Argentina Algeria* 
Botswana Barbados Bangladesh  
Burundi Bolivia Egypt* 
Cameroon Brazil India 
Central African Republic Chile Indonesia 
Chad Colombia Iran  
Congo, Rep. Costa Rica Jordan 
Cote d’Ivoire Dominican Republic Malaysia 
Ghana Ecuador Oman  
Kenya El Salvador Pakistan 
Madagascar Guatemala Papua New Guinea 
Niger Honduras Philippines 
Nigeria Jamaica Sri Lanka 
Rwanda Mexico Syrian Arab Republic 
Senegal Nicaragua Thailand 
Sierra Leone Peru Turkey 
South Africa Trinidad and Tobago Tunisia* 
Tanzania Venezuela Vietnam 
Togo   
Uganda   
Zambia   
Zimbabwe   
*Three North African countries are considered in the group of Asian countries because of their similarity to 
Middle East countries more than to Sub-Sahara African countries. 
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1. Introduction 
A complete and often-used conceptualization of FDI determinants is the Eclectic 
paradigm (Dunning, 1980, 1993). This paradigm provides a framework that groups 
micro and macro level determinants in order to analyze why and where Multinational 
Enterprises (MNEs) invest abroad. This framework is based on Ownership, Location and 
Internalization advantages, known as OLI. This chapter focuses on the second aspect of 
the OLI framework according to which MNEs invest in a foreign country in order to 
get advantages based on location (lower factor cost, lower trade cost, etc.). According 
to the OLI framework, firms invest abroad to look for three types of location 
advantages. The first one is to exploit and export natural resources and resource-based 
products. The motivation of these resource-based investments is mainly the availability 
of resources. The second reason is to supply the domestic market of the recipient 
country through an affiliate: Horizontal FDI (HFDI). In this case of market-oriented 
investment, gains in trade costs and strategic advantages (intangible assets) should be 
important compared to the cost of setting up a new plant. The third reason of FDI is 
to delocalize all or a portion of the production process (production of components, 
and increasingly service activities such as call centers) in order to benefit from low 
costs: Vertical FDI (VFDI). This kind of FDI often occurs when firms can break down 
their production process into different parts and different locations according to factor 
costs in these locations. The determinants of vertical and horizontal FDI thus differ, 
and the effects of identical variables could also be different according to the type of 
FDI. A typical example is that trade costs increase HFDI but reduce VFDI. Since it is 
very difficult to divide data into VFDI and HFDI, most studies use the aggregate FDI. 
Our study follows this pattern firstly and then distinguishes the two types of FDI. 
The analysis of the determinants of FDI can be done using a macroeconomic approach 
that assesses how country level determinants affect foreign capital (chapter 2). The 
analysis can also be based on firm-level data or provides a more complete picture that 
interacts firm and country characteristics. In complement to chapter 2, based on 
country-level data, this chapter uses firm-level data, while controlling for some 
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country-level factors. The following literature review is therefore mainly based on 
studies using disaggregated data and firms’ strategic considerations. 
The analysis of the determinants of FDI already received much attention in the 
literature. Intangible assets, measured by advertising or Research and Development (R&D) 
intensities can affect firms’ decision to invest abroad. Brainard (1997) finds that 
advertising intensity positively affects affiliate sales. Market size is an important 
determinant of MNEs location, particularly in the case of Horizontal FDI (Carr et al., 
2001; Markusen and Maskus, 2002). Urata and Kawai (2000) show a positive role of 
market size in attracting Japanese Small and Medium Entreprises (SMEs). They also 
conclude that the importance of market size is more significant for developed 
countries compared to developing countries. Disdier and Mayer (2004) find that 
market size, approximated by the GDP, positively and significantly affects the location 
of French MNEs in 19 Eastern and Western European countries between 1980 and 
1999.  
Factor cost differences also affect the location of foreign investment. A number of studies 
have tested whether lower wages determine FDI in developing countries. Urata and 
Kawai (2000) find that lower wages positively and significantly affect the probability of 
SMEs location in general; but this result is not significant for developed countries21. 
Disdier and Mayer (2004) find that low wages increase the probability of French 
MNEs to set-up new plants in Eastern and Western Europe. Trade costs, including 
transport costs and trade barriers (tariffs and non-tariffs) are also important factors 
explaining FDI. According to the type of FDI (vertical or horizontal), trade costs can 
increase or discourage FDI. Carr et al. (2001) and Yeaple (2003) find that FDI 
(measured by foreign subsidiaries sales) increases with higher trade costs in the case of 
horizontal FDI. However, Hanson et al. (2001) show that trade cost discourages 
vertical FDI by increasing the global production cost.  
                                                 
21 As predicted by some theories, MNEs are attracted by lower wages in developing countries, but not 
in developed countries.  
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There is no clear-cut evidence on the effect of taxes on FDI but many countries try to 
promote FDI by providing generous tax incentives to MNEs. A number of recent 
studies (particularly in developed countries) conclude that tax incentives affect the 
location of MNEs but not their decision to invest (Devereux and Griffith 1998, 2002). 
De Mooij and Ederveen (2003), in their literature survey based on 25 studies, find a 
median of the elasticity of FDI to tax of -3.3. However, the impact of taxes on FDI 
varies according to the taxation system (tax type, double taxation issue, etc.). In the 
particular case of developing countries, tax incentives or subsidies cannot compensate 
for structural problems of infrastructure, institutions, and market access. Studies also 
point-out additional factors explaining the FDI such as exchange rate, inflation, 
unemployment rate, and agglomeration effect (Bloningen, 1997; Urata and Kawai, 2000; 
Disdier and Mayer, 2004).  
Most of the studies on FDI location using micro-level data focus on variables such as 
R&D, factor cost differences, advertising expenditures, wages, trade costs, market size 
or taxation. These predictors are intuitive, as these studies have focused on developed 
countries (except China). For instance, the availability of cheap labor or a large local 
market could be important factors attracting foreign investment. However, these 
factors are not necessarily the most important ones in developing countries given the 
presence of deficient infrastructure, high financing constraints, weak institutions, or 
lack of skilled labor.  
Good institutions play a crucial role in attracting FDI to developing countries.  The 
probability that foreign investors get return on their investments is fundamental in 
their decision to invest in a country or not. Secure property rights, political stability, 
and lack of corruption allow markets to function properly, therefore attracting MNEs. 
Using a composite measure of risk factors including institutional variables such as 
corruption, political instability, and the quality of the legal system, Wheeler and Mody 
(1992) find that institutions do not affect the location of US MNEs in 42 developed 
and developing countries. Based on the analysis of Japanese SMEs, Urata and Kawai 
(2000) find that better institutions (measured by the weighted average of five 
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indicators22) increase the probability for a developing country to host a Japanese FDI 
but the result is not significant for developed countries. Disdier and Mayer (2004) also 
find that the quality of institutions positively affects the location of French 
multinational in Western and Eastern Europe. Based on the inclusive value of their 
nested logit regression, they show that institutional quality is a key variable explaining 
the difference between Eastern and Western Europe for the location of French MNEs. 
Using the data of 6288 affiliates of U.S. MNEs located in the different regions of 
China from 1993 to 2001, Du et al. (2007) show that regions with better institutions 
(protection of property rights, contract enforcement, lower government intervention in 
business, and low corruption) attract more affiliates. Other authors find similar 
conclusion (Wei, 2000; Daude and Stein, 2007).  
It is generally believed that the availability of skilled workers positively affects 
developing countries’ attractiveness to foreign capital. In reality, depending on the 
form of FDI (Vertical FDI or Horizontal FDI), MNEs look for unskilled cheap labor, 
or skilled, more expensive labor force23. Yeaple (2003) finds that U.S. MNEs that 
invest in skilled labor-abundant countries are skill-intensive industries while countries 
with a low-skilled labor force receive more non-skilled intensive MNEs. Urata and 
Kawai (2000) find that the availability of skilled labor force does not attract Japanese 
FDI. A breakdown analysis by development level shows that the availability of skilled 
labor positively affects FDI in developed countries but the effect is not significant for 
developing countries. These results suggest that Japanese SMEs that invest in 
developing countries look for low-skilled, low-wage labor force but those investing in 
developed countries use high-skilled labor force. Fung et al. (2002) analyze FDI from 
the United States, Japan, and the group of other investing countries in China over the 
period 1991-1997. They find that the quality of labor in Chinese provinces, expressed 
as the share of higher education students in the total population, positively and 
                                                 
22 The five indicators are government repudiation of contracts, risk of expropriation, corruption, law 
and order tradition, and the bureaucratic quality. 
23 The host country skilled labor can be cheaper than skilled labor in the home countries. This is the 
case for most of the call centres which look for relatively cheap skilled labor force. 
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significantly affects FDI from the U.S and Japan. Using four measures of labor quality 
(derived from educational attainment) over the period 1996-1999, Gao (2005) finds 
that the quality of labor force does not affect aggregated (for all source countries) FDI 
in Chinese provinces. However, labor quality positively and significantly affects FDI in 
Chinese provinces with bilateral data.  
Most studies of FDI determinants that use firm-level data in developing countries have 
focused on China. This chapter introduces firm-level data for a large sample of 
developing countries in order to assess the determinants of FDI with a focus on 
infrastructure, institution and human capital. By contrast with other studies (except 
studies on US affiliates), this chapter considers foreign affiliates located in developing 
countries. The main results show that physical infrastructure problems, financing 
constraints, and institutional problems discourage FDI to developing countries, and 
particularly to Sub-Saharan African countries.  
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows: the first part reviews the 
theoretical relationship between physical infrastructure, financial development and 
FDI. The second part presents descriptive and statistical analyses. The third part is 
devoted to econometric analyses and results. The last part concludes.  
2. Physical Infrastructure and FDI 
Infrastructure availability is one of the key elements needed to run efficient business. 
Well-developed infrastructure is essential to attract foreign capital and promote 
economic growth. In the manufacturing or service sector, a good provision of 
infrastructure reduces transaction costs by allowing entrepreneurs to connect easily 
with their suppliers and customers. By improving market access and thus increasing the 
real size of the available market, good infrastructure is particularly important for 
foreign firms, attracted in general by large markets. A large number of studies in 
developing countries have shown the importance of infrastructure for FDI using 
aggregated country-level data (Asiedu, 2002; Ngowi, 2001, Wheeler and Mody, 1992). 
Most of the studies that use disaggregated data to explore how infrastructure affects 
FDI in developing countries have focused on China and its provinces. Cheng and 
Chapter 3: Investment Climate and FDI in Developing Countries: Firm-Level Evidence 
 
 
58
Kwan (2000) use panel data from 1985 to 1995 and show that good infrastructure 
positively and significantly affects FDI location in 29 Chinese regions. Hongxin 
and Gangti (2000) use FDI location in 50 areas of China to underline the importance 
of infrastructure as a determinant of FDI. They define a composite measure of 
infrastructure using the average road per km², the number of post offices per capita, 
and the number of telephone lines per capita. Sun et al. (2002) find a similar result for 
30 Chinese provinces over the period 1986-1998. With aggregated and firm-level data 
on Korean and Japanese foreign affiliates located in China, Kang and Lee (2004) find 
that infrastructure (measured as the kilometers of railways per km²) encourages Korean 
FDI in China, but not Japanese FDI. Based on 120 cities and 12,400 firms in China, a 
World Bank (2006) report indicates that infrastructure constraints (measured by port 
costs) negatively and significantly affect FDI.  
A small number of studies include developing countries other than China. The 
importance of infrastructure such as a reliable provision of electricity is probably more 
crucial for small and medium firms. In fact, large firms could be able to finance their 
own power-generating units. Using the level of electricity generation per capita as a 
proxy for infrastructure, Urata and Kawai (2000) find that infrastructure is an 
important determinant of the location of Japanese SMEs. They also highlight the 
higher importance of infrastructure for developing countries compared to developed 
countries. According to the authors, good provision of infrastructure is particularly 
relevant for SMEs working in sectors such as textile, general machinery and electric 
machinery. Based on a sample of 293 foreign firms in Turkey during 1995, Deichmann 
et al. (2003) approximate infrastructure development by the share of paved roads in 
each region and find that good infrastructure increases the probability to receive a 
foreign firm. Although firms in service sectors use dominantly intangible products that 
do not necessary need roads for transportation, the availability of paved roads in a 
region is positively and significantly associated with the location of affiliates in the 
sector of services in Turkey.  
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3. Financial Development and FDI 
In addition to physical infrastructure, do foreign firms need locally developed financial 
services? In the current literature, little attention has been paid to this question 
compared to other determinants of FDI (wages, market size, etc.). The importance of 
financial services for foreign firms is two-fold. Like local firms, foreign firms can use 
financial services for overdraft facilities, loans, or payments to their suppliers of 
intermediate goods. Developed financial services also facilitate financial transactions 
between foreign firms and their customers and employees in the host country. More 
generally, financial development is an engine of economic growth, providing better 
business opportunities for customers and firms. Few studies have linked FDI location 
to financial development. With a sample of 81 foreign firms in Southern African 
countries, Jensink and Thomas (2002) show that South Africa attracts more FDI than 
the other countries in the region because of its better developed financial market. 
Deichmann et al. (2003) use the share of bank credits in the total economic activity as a 
proxy for financial development and find that this measure positively and significantly 
affects FDI in Turkey’s regions. The authors conclude that financial development has 
the highest significance level among the determinants of FDI in the sector of services. 
Except for firms from Asia, financial services remain a significant determinant for the 
location of foreign firms from all regions. Financial development is also an important 
factor for the location of foreign firms in joint venture with Turkish companies or fully 
owned by MNEs24. Other studies have shown the complementarities between FDI and 
financial development in explaining economic growth (Alfaro et al., 2006; Alfaro et al. 
2008).  
Dollar et al. (2006) analyze the importance of the investment climate on export and 
FDI probability for eight Latin American and Asian countries using firm-level data. 
Their conclusions are drawn for all investment climate variables (which include 
                                                 
24 Smith et al. (1997) linked foreign ownership of Slovene firms during the early years of privatization 
(1989-1992) to financial development measures (long/short term domestic/foreign credit). They find 
that firms with greater access to foreign credit (long-term and short-term credit) have higher 
participation of foreign firms in their capital. 
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physical and financial infrastructure variables) without giving the specific effect of a 
particular variable. The authors conclude that better investment climate in general 
encourages FDI. 
4. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
The data are drawn from enterprise surveys25 in developing countries conducted by the 
World Bank. The surveys collect data on production variables, firms’ characteristics, 
and quantitative and qualitative (perception-based) indicators of the investment 
climate. The survey in each country has been carried out between 2000 and 2006. This 
analysis considers 77 developing countries and 33,604 firms including 4,660 foreign 
firms. Firms’ characteristic variables include information on the share of foreign 
ownership in firm capital but information such as the volume of foreign investment is 
not available26. The dependent variable (FDI) takes the value one if at least 10% of the 
firm’s capital is foreign (following the IMF standard of FDI definition) and zero 
otherwise. The explanatory variables of first interest (physical and financial 
infrastructure) include firm’s judgement of their constraints in transport, electricity, and 
access to finance constraints. They also account for financial under-development 
through the share of informal sources of financing (money lender, family and friends) 
in firms’ working capital (accounts receivable, inventories and cash). As physical 
infrastructure variables, we also retain firms’ access to e-mail and internet in their 
interactions with clients and suppliers. In accordance with the theory, control variables 
(institutional problems, lack of skilled workers, agglomeration, and firms’ age and size) 
are included27. Appendix 3.1 gives the name and definition of all variables.  
                                                 
25 Enterprise surveys (Investment Climate Analysis: ICA and the Business Environment and Enterprise 
Productivity Survey: BEEPS) are harmonized surveys of large and random samples of firms. 
26A comprehensive discussion on ICA databases and their limits is presented in section 4 of chapter 5. 
27 Explanatory variables have been chosen for their economic relevance but also according to their 
number of non-missing values. 
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The proportion of foreign investors varies depending on the sector28 (figure 3.1). High 
value sectors such as electronics, metal and machinery, chemicals and pharmaceutics 
attract more foreign investors compared to other sectors. Beyond the expected profits 
in these sectors, they require a large amount of investment during the set-up and 
operation. In this sample, 43% of firms in the electronics sector and 19% in the 
chemicals and pharmaceutics sector are partly or fully owned by foreign investors. 
Other sectors have on average 13% of foreign firms except the leather sector where 
96% of firms are owned locally. 
Figure 3.1: Share (%) of Foreign Firms by Sector 
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On average, foreign firms are larger (appendix 3.3) and export29 more (particularly in 
the electronic sector, appendix 3.4). This is consistent with the theory of vertical FDI 
that states that firms break down their production processes in order to gain 
                                                 
28 The sectors include in this analysis are textile, leather, garment, agroindustry (including food and 
beverage), metal & machinery (including automobile), electronics, chemicals & pharmaceutics, wood & 
furniture (including paper), non-metallic & plastic materials, retails & wholesale trade and services 
(excluding retail). 
29 Exporter firms are defined as firms exporting at least 10% of their sales. 
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advantages from low production costs in different locations and then export or re-
export their productions.  
Foreign and local firms in developing countries face many constraints when investing, 
operating or expanding their business. Based on firms’ perception, financing problem 
is ranked as the most important investment climate constraint for firms (local and 
foreign) and foreign firms locate more where financing constraints are lower (figure 3.2 
and 3.3). The analysis of sector-level data reveals that the severity of the constraints 
varies across sectors but foreign firms have on average the same constraints whatever 
their sector of activity. Problems of access to finance are ranked as the first constraint 
in all sectors. Firms in manufacturing and services sectors suffer from electricity 
problem but this constraint is more important for firms in the manufacturing sector.  
Figure 3.2: Ranking of Investment Climate Constraints 
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Figure 3.3: Foreign Ownership and Financing Constraint 
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Variables of interest (physical infrastructure constraints approximated by 
telecommunication problems and financing constraints approximated by the use of 
informal finance) are more objective variables compared to enterprises perceptions 
used in figure 3.2 and 3.3. Using these “more objective” variables, the following graphs 
(figure 3.4 and 3.5) highlight that foreign firms (FDI) locate less where 
telecommunication problems are higher and where firms rely more on informal source 
of financing (friends, family) for their business. 
Figure 3.4: Telecom Problems and FDI Figure 3.5: Informal Finance and FDI 
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 Although these figures reveal surface level information about where foreign 
firms prefer to locate, a deeper analysis based on econometric estimations and 
including control variables is needed to go beyond these basic findings. 
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5. Econometric Analysis  
5.1. Estimation 
Contrary to classic FDI location studies that consider the different possible location of 
affiliates for each MNE, our study considers all affiliates in a country. In former 
studies, the dependent variable takes the value of one if the MNE chooses the country 
as the location of its affiliate and zero for other alternative locations. Most of the time, 
alternative locations are restricted to a group of countries because of data availability or 
the purpose of the study. This implies the exclusion of some alternative locations 
leading to potential bias. In this study, we consider the entire sample of firms in one 
country and estimate the probability for each firm to be foreign, given the 
characteristics of the different regions in the country. The chapter thus analyzes the 
stock of foreign firms relatively to the stock of total firms in a location and relates this 
measure to the local investment climate which is also a stock variable. We expect that 
countries, and within a country, regions with a better investment climate attract 
relatively more foreign firms. The empirical equation can be written as:  
1 2 3 4ijk ijk ijk i j ijkFDI X Z V Uβ β β β ε= + + + +                                                          (1) 
FDIijk indicates whether firm k in country i and sector j is foreign owned or local.  Xijk 
is a matrix including structural constraints (physical and financial infrastructure 
problems, lack of human capital and low quality of institutions). Zijk is a matrix of other 
determinants of firm location (agglomeration effects, taxes, trade regulations or firms’ 
specific factors such as size or age).  By including Vi and Uj that are respectively 
country and sector fixed-effects, we explain the regional variation.  
Explanatory variables are firstly based on objective information and use secondly 
firms’ perception of investment climate constraints. Firm-level data can be the source 
of measurement errors. More productive or efficient firms (foreign firms) can also 
have a smaller feeling of investment climate constraints compared to less productive 
firms (local firms). Identical investment climate can then be assessed differently 
according to firms’ performances and resources. These potential measurement errors 
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and reverse causality could lead to endogeneity. We define instruments that are the 
sector-region averages for each endogenous variable30. We also consider the sector-
region average of the fact that firms’ annual financial statements are reviewed or not by 
an external auditor as an instrument for the financial infrastructure variable. Identical 
procedure of instrumentation has been used by Aterido et al. (2007) and Honorati and 
Mengistae (2007). Since only 14% of firms’ capital is foreign-owned, location-average 
of variables are dominated by small-local firms and are thus partly exogenous by 
definition (Dollar et al., 2005; Lall and Mengistae, 2005). The agglomeration variable is 
defined as the number of foreign firms by region in a specific sector and captures the 
average attractiveness of each region. The inclusion of this variable helps to control for 
the direct effect of the regional investment climate on FDI. The impact of location-
average of the investment climate variables on FDI should be mainly through the firm-
level information -as highlighted by the correlation between location-average variables 
and firm-level variables. This reduces the endogeneity stemming from the identifying 
exclusion restriction. A set of tests of validity of the instruments are performed in the 
following section. 
Enterprises surveys include many variables explaining identical phenomena. For 
instance, variables related to financing constraints include access to finance as collateral 
requirement and, access to finance as the share of firms’ working capital coming from 
friends and informal sources. Simultaneous introduction of these variables in a single 
regression could lead to a colinearity problem. A solution is the generation of 
aggregated indices or the choice of a single variable per phenomenon. We use Principal 
Component Analysis (PCA) and standardization methods to generate aggregated 
indices31.  
                                                 
30 We make sure to get sufficiently large number of firms for each region in each sector. 
31 Standardization method is similar to PCA but it gives the same weight to all components of the 
index. Physical infrastructure index includes firms’ perception of transport and electricity problems as 
well as telecommunication opportunities (captured by firms’ access to e-mail and website in their 
interaction with clients and suppliers). Financial development index includes firms’ perception of their 
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5.1.1. Results 
Firstly, we estimate the impact of the index of physical and financial infrastructure on 
the probability to receive FDI (1). We then consider the physical infrastructure index 
separately from the financial infrastructure index (2) and finally we use a single 
objective variable for each type of infrastructure (3). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
problems to access finance and the share of firms’ financing from informal sources (money lender, 
family and friends) in firms’ working capital. 
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Table 3.1: Basic model with infrastructure variables 
 Dependent variable : FDI 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 2SLS IV FE Logit 2SLS IV FE Logit 2SLS IV FE 
Logit 
Age -0.002 -0.002 [0.98] -0.002 -0.002 [0.98] -0.002 -0.002 [0.98] 
 (8.09)*** (12.83)*** (8.33)*** (13.55)*** (7.42)*** (11.04)*** 
Size (20-99 employees) 0.043 0.047  [1.63] 0.044 0.049  [1.66] 0.028 0.033  [1.43] 
 (5.53)*** (9.16)*** (5.11)*** (9.75)*** (3.30)*** (6.05)*** 
Size (>=100 employees) 0.153 0.140  [3.33] 0.163 0.156  [3.73] 0.129 0.110  [2.69] 
 (9.57)*** (18.75)*** (9.41)*** (20.87)*** (7.74)*** (12.93)*** 
Agglomeration 0.000 0.000  [1.00] -0.000 0.000  [1.00] 0.000 0.000  [1.00] 
 (0.34) (1.53) (0.04) (0.31) (0.27) (1.95)* 
Infrastructure problems -0.136 -0.123 [0.25]     
 (11.10)*** (18.79)***     
Physical Infrast. problems   -0.265 -0.235 [0.07]   
   (9.91)*** (16.38)***   
Financial Infrast. problems   -0.026 -0.026 [0.74]   
   (2.60)*** (3.81)***   
Telecom problems     -0.246 -0.218 [0.09] 
     (9.68)*** (18.37)*** 
Informal finance     -0.001 -0.001 [0.98] 
     (3.15)*** (3.85)*** 
Observations 33604 33604 33604 33604 33604 33604 
Number of countries 77 77 77 77 77 77 
R²/Pseudo R² 0.05 0.10 0.05 0.11 0.05 0.10 
% of correct prediction  70.63  70.71  70.62 
Weak instrument diagnostic 
Infrastructure/Physical Infrast.       
   Partial R² 0.10 0.03 0.11 
   Shea partial R² 0.10 0.03 0.11 
   Partial F 3247.4 190.4 2822.65 
   [p-value] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Financial Infrast.       
   Partial R²   0.08 0.08 
   Shea partial R²   0.08 0.08 
   Partial F   1672.8 61309.5 
   [p-value]   [0.000] [0.000] 
   Cragg-Donald Stat. 1972.6  374.0  987.6  
   Critical value (10%) 19.93  13.43  13.43  
Clustered z statistics (absolute value) at country level in parentheses. 
All regressions include country and sector fixed effects. The reference for size dummies is small size (less than 20 employees). 
For logit regression, bootstrapped (with 100 replications) z statistics clustered at country level in parentheses. 
Coefficients reported for logit regression are marginal effects. Next to marginal effects, odds ratios are reported in brackets. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
First-stage regressions (not reported for conciseness) are available upon request. 
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Estimation methods include a linear probability model with instrumentation and a 
fixed-effect logit with instrumentation. The instrumental logit fixed-effect (IV FE logit) 
estimations imply two-stage procedures leading to consistent parameters but incorrect 
estimated variances. Through resampling based on the sample data, we approximate 
standard errors by the bootstrap method and obtain proper standard errors that are 
reported. Attention is also given to the linear probability model (Two-Stage Least 
Squares: 2SLS) which, despite some disadvantages, provides a good approximation of 
the logit specification and allows a better handling of the unobservable heterogeneity 
and weak instruments diagnostic. Since the explanatory variables include firms’ 
perceptions or are based on firms’ answers, the endogeneity issue is a serious concern 
as discussed above. The validity of the results depends on the quality of the 
instruments32. As instruments diagnostic tests, we rely mainly on some statistics of the 
first-stage estimations (partial R², Shea partial R², partial F-statistic, and Cragg-Donald 
weak instrument test). The correlations between endogenous variables and excluded 
instruments are confirmed by the values of partial R² values, which are above zero. 
Since we have more than one endogenous variable in some cases, comparison between 
the standard partial R² and Shea partial R² -which controls for the correlation between 
instruments- can be relevant. These two statistics are similar in this study, indicating 
low correlation between instruments and therefore no concern as indicated by Baum, 
Schaffer and Stillman (2003). In addition, we obtain large and significant F statistics in 
the first stage regressions33. A growing test of weak instruments in the literature is the 
comparison of Cragg-Donald statistics to critical values computed by Stock and Yogo 
(2004). Cragg-Donald statistics in this chapter are far higher than the Sotck and Yogo 
critical values, indicating the absence of the weak instruments problem.  
Including only firm-level determinants (age and size) and the agglomeration variable, 
basic regressions linking infrastructure constraints (aggregated indices as well as 
                                                 
32 We validate the over-identification tests that we consider as minimum requirements. 
33 These statistics are more relevant for the first two estimations in which only one variable is 
endogenous. 
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individual variables) to FDI show a strong negative relationship34. These regressions 
include only variables of first interest but the theoretical background underlined the 
importance of other structural factors such as institutional quality and the availability of 
skilled workers. The following estimations control for these additional factors. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
34 The results are similar using firms’ perception of their constraints of infrastructure. Gelb et al. 
(2007), after controlling for country and sector fixed-effects show that firms’ perceptions are 
significantly correlated with objective variables of enterprises surveys and external measures of the 
investment climate (doing business). 
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Table 3.2: Basic model including other structural factors 
 Dependent variable : FDI 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 2SLS IV FE Logit 2SLS IV FE Logit 2SLS IV FE Logit 
Age -0.002  -0.002 [0.98] -0.002 -0.002 [0.98] -0.002 -0.001 [0.98] 
 (7.92)*** (13.00)*** (8.03)*** (12.5)*** (7.48)*** (11.33)*** 
Size (20-99 employees) 0.040  0.044  [1.59] 0.038 0.043  [1.57] 0.028 0.033  [1.42] 
 (4.91)*** (7.89)*** (4.44)*** (7.64)*** (3.25)*** (5.90)*** 
Size (>=100 employees) 0.147  0.133  [3.18] 0.150 0.138  [3.31] 0.128 0.109  [2.69] 
 (9.08)*** (14.64)*** (8.95)*** (17.28)*** (7.78)*** (12.96)*** 
Agglomeration 0.000  0.000  [1.00] -0.000 -0.000 [1.00] 0.000 0.000  [1.00] 
 (0.31) (1.04) (0.10) (0.83) (0.33) (2.05)** 
Infrastructure problems -0.138  -0.125 [0.25]     
 (11.15)*** (17.51)***     
Physical Infrast. problems   -0.254 -0.225 [0.08]   
   (10.13)*** (19.52)***   
Financial Infrast. problems   -0.038 -0.036 [0.67]   
   (3.88)*** (5.65)***   
Telecom problems     -0.251 -0.223 [0.08] 
     (9.62)*** (15.80)*** 
Informal finance     -0.001 -0.001 [0.99] 
     (3.21)*** (3.30)*** 
Skilled labor problems  0.019  0.013  [1.16] 0.043 0.036  [1.49] -0.002 -0.006 [0.94] 
 (1.76)* (2.64)*** (3.30)*** (6.37)*** (0.23) (1.11) 
Crime and disorder 0.000  0.001  [1.01] 0.031 0.027 [1.36] -0.022 -0.019 [0.80] 
 (0.05) (0.11) (2.88)*** (4.88)*** (2.48)** (3.96)*** 
Observations 33604 33604 33604 33604 33604 33604 
Number of countries 77 77 77 77 77 77 
R²/Pseudo R² 0.05 0.10 0.05 0.11 0.05 0.11 
% of correct prediction  70.60  70.78  70.75 
Weak instruments diagnostica 
Infrastructure/Physical Infrast.       
Partial R² 0.11 0.05 0.12 
Shea partial R² 0.11 0.04 0.11 
Partial F 1610 163 1687 
[p-value] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Financial Infrast.       
Partial R²   0.08 0.08 
Shea partial R²   0.08 0.08 
Partial F   1099 38206 
[p-value]   [0.000] [0.000] 
Cragg-Donald Stat. 790.9   271.8  590.1  
Clustered z statistics (absolute value) at country level in parentheses. 
All regressions include country and sector fixed effects. The reference for size dummies is small size (less than 20 employees). 
For logit regression, bootstrapped (with 100 replications) z statistics clustered at country level in parentheses.  
Coefficients reported for logit regression are marginal effects. Next to marginal effects, odds ratios are reported in brackets. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
a Weak instruments tests of other variables (skilled worker problems and crime or disorder) not reported here give partial R² and Shea 
partial R² between 0.08 and 0.10 and large F-statistics (far above 10). The latter statistics may not be very relevant for weak instrument 
diagnostic in this context. Stock and Yogo critical values are available for up to three endogenous regressors.  
First-stage regressions (not reported for conciseness) are available upon request. 
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Controlling for institutional problems and human capital constraints, the results are 
similar for the variables of interest (physical and financial infrastructure). We consider 
firms’ perception of crime, theft and disorder as a proxy for institutional quality and 
firms’ perception of the availability of skilled workers as a proxy for human capital. To 
address the endogeneity issue explained above, these variables are instrumented by 
their sector-region averages.  
The results show that on average, larger and younger firms are more likely to be 
foreign. The agglomeration effect, which captures the positive or negative externalities 
of foreign firms in a specific region and sector, has no effect35. With respect to the 
main variables, we find that the index of constraints in physical and financial 
infrastructure negatively and significantly affects FDI. The results are similar using one 
index by form of infrastructure (physical and financial) or single variables. The results 
are also robust to estimation methods (instrumental variables with fixed-effect logit 
and simple instrumental variables approach). Regions with better access to 
telecommunications, or formal credit (through the banking system for instance) attract 
more foreign investments. Indeed, a marginal increase in infrastructure constraints 
reduces the odds of receiving FDI by 75%. A breakdown of the aggregate 
infrastructure index shows that a marginal increase in physical infrastructure problems 
decreases the probability of receiving FDI by 92% while the same increase in financing 
constraints reduces the probability of attracting FDI by 33%. Single variables of 
infrastructure (physical and financial) also lead to similar conclusion. The availability of 
roads and transport facilities, a reliable provision of electricity, and a well-functioning 
telecommunication system allow and encourage economic activities, particularly 
industrial activities, thereby attracting foreign firms. Financing opportunities for firms 
and consumers in local credit markets also encourage foreign firms’ activities during 
setting up, operation, or expansion.  
Additional structural factors (availability of skilled workers and institutional problems) 
also affect attractiveness to FDI. The lack of skilled workers has a negative effect on 
                                                 
35 Non-linearity tests of the agglomeration effect are not significant. 
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FDI using aggregated infrastructure indices. Even if this finding is not robust to 
different specifications (with non-aggregated infrastructure variables), the vertical FDI 
theory which states that firms look for cheap low-skilled workers in developing 
countries support this result. The effect of institutional problems (crime, theft, and 
disorder) is not stable across specifications. We will return to these two variables 
(human capital and institution) in the robustness checks. 
5.1.2. Deeper analyses and robustness checks36 
FDI theory defines two major forms of FDI (vertical and horizontal) with different 
motives and therefore different determinants. Using the share of exports in firms’ 
sales, a breakdown analysis between exporting and non-exporting firms helps to get a 
deeper understanding of the importance of infrastructure for each form of FDI. 
According to the structure of ownership, foreign firms’ criteria to invest in a country 
could differ. Foreign firms may prefer a joint venture with local partners in order to 
reduce risks when investing in a foreign country (Smarzynska and Wei, 2000). Local 
partners have likely more and better information on the host country. The criteria to 
invest abroad may also vary with the degree of foreign ownership in a joint venture. 
Beyond the inclusion of sector fixed-effects in all regressions, a breakdown analysis by 
sector gives a more complete picture of the importance of infrastructure for the 
manufacturing sector, compared to services or the effect of infrastructure across 
different manufacturing activities. Another robustness check assesses the validity of the 
results after the inclusion of additional explanatory variables reflecting institutions, 
taxes, regulation policies and market size. The last analysis in this section compares the 
poorest group of countries (Sub Saharan Africa) to other developing countries and 
investigates the heterogeneity in the impact of structural variables across countries. 
Breakdown by export status: Exporter versus non exporter firms 
This breakdown allows testing for the difference between local market-oriented FDI 
(horizontal FDI) and export-oriented FDI (vertical FDI) and assesses how investment 
                                                 
36 Only results of 2SLS regressions, which are similar (sign and significance) to those obtained with 
logit specification are reported in this section. 
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climate affects horizontal FDI versus vertical FDI37. As suggested by the theory, 
horizontal FDI should be more affected by market potential and vertical FDI by factor 
costs (mainly unit labor cost or wages). Considering the breakdown by form of FDI, 
results show that physical infrastructure is important for attracting foreign firms 
whether they export or sell their production locally (appendix 3.10). These results 
indicate that infrastructure problems are serious obstacles. For instance, 
telecommunication problems could impede interactions between firms’ suppliers and 
their foreign customers. More specifically, foreign firms exporting their production are 
statistically more affected by telecommunication problems compared to firms 
supplying the local market. This result illustrates that infrastructure problems, with the 
typical example of telecommunication problems, are obstacles that are more serious for 
firms supplying their foreign customers and interacting with them by phone or 
internet. Financial under-development affects firms and the economy in general as 
explained in the theoretical section. Empirical results show that foreign firms selling 
their productions locally are more affected by financing constraints compared to firms 
exporting their production. Indeed, exporter and non-exporter foreign firms suffer 
from financing constraints during the production process but non-exporter firms are 
also affected by the broader financial under-development of the economy that affects 
their clients38. Exporting firms are also statistically more affected by a shortage of 
skilled worker compared to firms supplying the local market. This suggests that 
exporter firms are engaged in more skilled intensive activities compared to non-
                                                 
37 The breakdown of exporter versus non-exporter firms does not allow a complete separation of 
vertical and horizontal FDI. This paper has the strength to address this issue but some aspects of the 
breakdown (direction of affiliate sales) should also be considered. If the exports of an affiliate are 
mainly for the home country, this type of FDI can be classified as vertical FDI. If the exports are for a 
third country or the production sales domestically, the FDI in this case could be considered as 
horizontal. Our data does not allow this distinction of the destination of exports. Most of the time, it is 
very difficult to distinguish the two types of FDI in the data and both types of investment (vertical and 
horizontal) coexist in general.  
38 This interpretation mainly supposes that financing constraints in the destination country of exporter 
firms are less than financing constraints in the home country (country of production). That is not 
necessary the case. 
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exporter firms. Institutional problems (disorder, crime and theft) affect both groups of 
firms. The results are similar with exporter firms defined as firms exporting at least 
10% of their production or as firms exporting any part of their production.  
Analysis across ownership degree: from local to joint-venture to foreign fully-owned firms 
Factors determining the location of foreign firms may vary with the degree of 
ownership. Previous analyses in this chapter were based on a dichotomous variable. 
This variable captures only the fact that the firm is local or foreign regardless of the 
degree of foreign ownership that can range from local to joint venture to foreign. This 
section assesses how investment climate, particularly physical and financial 
infrastructure could affect the degree of foreign ownership. The hypothesis being that 
the impact of infrastructure varies and is higher with the degree of foreign ownership. 
Foreign firms may look for a local partner in a joint venture when they plan to invest 
in a country with important infrastructure constraints or political instability. Foreign 
firms’ investments through a joint venture aim to reduce information costs on the local 
market (particularly for new firms). To analyze this issue, we use 2SLS and two limit 
Tobit with instrumentation39.  
The results show that physical and financial infrastructure constraints negatively and 
significantly affect foreign ownership. In regions with infrastructure and financing 
constraints, foreign investors participate less in firms’ capital. As predicted, the 
downward bias is observed with the OLS method. The impact of infrastructure 
variables and other control variables are lower with OLS method compared to the 
Tobit estimation. The results also highlight that institutional problems reduce the share 
of foreign participation in firms’ capital (appendix 3.10). 
 
 
                                                 
39 This method is more relevant because of the high number of firms which are fully owned by local 
investors or by foreign investors leading to an important number of observations in the upper and the 
lower limit of the distribution of the foreign ownership variable (which is confined into the interval 
[0,1]). Standard OLS would lead to downward bias in the predicted ownership degree. 
Chapter 3: Investment Climate and FDI in Developing Countries: Firm-Level Evidence 
 
 
75
Breakdown by sector 
FDI determinants could vary across sectors. Firms in service sectors could be more 
attracted by the availability of human capital (skilled workers), whereas manufacturing 
firms could be more attracted by good infrastructure. The manufacturing sector is also 
heterogeneous so that firms in the various industries could be differently affected by 
the same factors. All the regressions included sector fixed-effects in order to take into 
account this heterogeneity. This section helps to check if the aggregated (all sectors 
combined) impact of infrastructure is driven by one sector, or if all sectors show the 
same pattern (appendix 3.11). In most sectors, the availability of well functioning 
infrastructure increases the probability of receiving FDI. Physical and financial 
infrastructure constraints decrease the probability of receiving FDI in four sectors: 
textile, garment, metal and machinery, and retails. FDI in agro-industry, electronics, 
wood & furniture, non-metallic & plastic materials, and services sectors are negatively 
and significantly affected by physical infrastructure constraints while financial 
development affects FDI in the leather sector. Only FDI in the chemical sector is not 
affected by physical infrastructure and financial development. These results show that 
infrastructure problems are important constraints regardless of the sector, and they 
highlight the crucial role of physical infrastructure for developing countries 
attractiveness to FDI. 
Additional control variables 
Explanatory variables have been chosen according to their economic relevance and 
considering their number of non-missing values. This robustness check includes a 
higher number of control variables, leading to more missing values. Firms’ perception 
of crime, theft and disorder in the baseline regressions is replaced by a variable closer 
to the quality of institutions in line with economic activity: property rights protection40. 
Additional control variables are consecutively firms’ perception of labor regulation, 
corruption, customs and trade regulations, tax rates, and wages (appendix 3.12). The 
                                                 
40 The introduction of the variable of property rights protection leads to higher missing values 
compared to the variable of theft, disorder and crime. This is not a concern in this section since the 
additional control variables lead to approximately the same number of missing values. 
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last variable (wages) proxies the labor cost and is measured by sector-region averages 
of wage per employee. To address the endogeneity issue, each variable is instrumented 
by its sector-region average. Additional explanatory variables also help to reduce the 
endogeneity problem due to omitted variables bias. Including additional variables 
cumulatively, physical and financial infrastructure constraints remain significant and 
negatively affect FDI. Corruption and tax rate negatively and significantly affect FDI. 
However, customs and trade regulations increase FDI. This result is supported by the 
horizontal FDI theory. Since horizontal FDI aim to supply the local market, the theory 
suggests that trade barriers could represent indirect protections for firms located in the 
country, giving them price advantages.  
Sub-Saharan Africa specificity 
As mentioned in the literature review, most analyses on developing countries have 
focused on China. Enterprises surveys allow an analysis including an important 
number of African countries, the least developed countries and those with the highest 
investment climate constraints. This study thus gives the first picture of FDI 
determinants in Africa using firm level data41. Physical infrastructure constraints 
negatively and significantly affect FDI in Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries as well 
as in other developing countries. The size of this negative impact is not statistically 
different between the two groups (appendix 3.13). The availability of a well-functioning 
telecommunication system increases the probability of receiving FDI in SSA and in 
other developing countries. Financing problems also discourage FDI in SSA countries 
and in other developing countries. Social instability captured by theft, disorder and 
crime problems is statistically more relevant for SSA countries compared to other 
developing countries. This result is consistent with expectations since compared to 
other developing countries, a larger number of SSA countries suffer from civil war and 
violent protests. As indicated in previous sections, trade and customs regulations 
encourage FDI following horizontal FDI theory. Tax rate discourages FDI in other 
developing countries but not in SSA countries. This finding supports the theoretical 
                                                 
41 We first verify the specificity of Sub-Sahara African countries by including an African dummy 
variable in the whole sample. 
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hypothesis according to which tax incentives should have lower impact in developing 
countries (compared to developed countries), given their structural problems 
(infrastructure, institution, etc.). Indeed, tax incentives or subsidies cannot easily 
compensate structural problems of infrastructure, institutions, and market access in 
developing countries and attract foreign investments, particularly in the manufacturing 
sector. Since SSA countries are among the least developed ones, tax incentives have a 
lower effect in this region compared to other developing countries. 
Appendix 3.14 analyzes the heterogeneity in the impact of structural factors on FDI at 
the country level. This implies running single estimation by country. In almost all 
countries, investment climate constraints (particularly physical and financial 
infrastructure problems) reduce FDI. These findings highlight that a particular country 
or group of countries does not drive the results. 
6. Conclusion 
Attracting foreign direct investment is a key issue in the developing and developed 
world. This paper analyzes how investment climate constraints jeopardize developing 
countries attractiveness for FDI. Using firm-level data for 77 developing countries, it 
provides the first empirical analysis of the importance of the investment climate for 
FDI with a large sample of developing countries. As investment climate constraints, we 
focused on physical and financial infrastructure problems in addition to human capital 
and institutional constraints. The main results show that improving physical and 
financial infrastructure as well as institutional quality increases the probability of 
receiving a foreign firm.  
A breakdown analysis between exporter and non-exporter firms shows that foreign 
firms supplying foreign markets are more heavily affected by physical infrastructure 
problems but financing constraints have a higher effect on foreign firms supplying 
local markets. Exporter firms are also more affected by the lack of skilled workers 
compared to foreign firms supplying the local market. The results are robust to an 
alternative definition of foreign ownership, an analysis by sector, and the inclusion of 
additional explanatory variables. Adding new explanatory variables, we find that 
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corruption and tax rate are among the obstacles for attractiveness to FDI. However, 
trade and customs regulations encourage FDI. This finding follows the theory of 
horizontal FDI, according to which firms aiming to supply the local market may look 
for protected countries with high trade barriers, giving them price advantages. Physical 
infrastructure constraints and financing problems are major constraints for foreign 
firms in SSA and in other developing countries. The results also highlight the 
importance of institutional quality in attracting FDI to developing countries, 
particularly to Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries. The comparison between SSA 
countries and other developing countries also reveal that tax issue is relevant for other 
developing countries but not for SSA countries. 
When designing policies to attract foreign investments, developing countries should 
pay particular attention to infrastructure (physical and financial) and institutions. Given 
the scarcity of public spending in developing countries, this chapter offers some basic 
guidelines to help governments design priorities in their budget with a better awareness 
of which type of investments tend to crowd in FDI, well needed to foster their long-
term growth. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 3.1: List of variables 
Variable Definitions 
FDI Dummy equal 1 if at least 10% of firm capital is foreign 
Age Firm age 
Size Firm Size: 3 categories based on permanent & temporary workers 
Agglomeration Number of foreign firms in same sector and same region   
Telecom problems 1 Access to e-mail for business with clients & suppliers (dummy 
variable) 
Telecom problems 2 Access to website for business with clients & suppliers (dummy 
variable) 
Electricity problems Business constraint: electricity 
Transport problems Business constraint: transport 
Informal finance problems Informal sources of financing in firms’ working capital (%) 
Access to finance problems Business constraint: access to finance (e.g. collateral) 
External auditor Annual financial statement reviewed by external auditor (dummy 
variable) 
Skilled labor problems Business constraint: skills of available workers 
Crime and disorder Business constraint: crime, theft, disorder 
Property right Confident judicial system will uphold property rights 
Labor regulation Business constraint: labor regulations 
Corruption Business constraint: corruption 
Custom and trade Business constraint: customs and trade regulations 
Tax rates Business constraint: tax rates 
Wage Sector-region average wage per employee 
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Appendix 3.2: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum Observation 
FDI 0.14 0.35 0 1 33604 
Telecom problems 1 0.64 0.48 0 1 33604 
Telecom problems 2 0.45 0.50 0 1 33604 
Electricity problems 0.87 1.24 0 4 33604 
Transport problems 0.62 1.05 0 4 33604 
Informal finance problems 5.03 16.72 0 100 33604 
Access to finance problems 1.13 1.34 0 4 33604 
External auditor 0.50 0.50 0 1 33085 
Skilled labor problems 0.92 1.18 0 4 33604 
Crime and disorder 0.95 1.28 0 4 33604 
Property right 3.55 1.45 1 6 23500 
Labor regulation 0.82 1.15 0 4 32226 
Corruption 1.18 1.42 0 4 33145 
Custom and trade 0.85 1.22 0 4 31698 
Tax rates 1.40 1.39 0 4 33491 
Age 17.08 17.50 0 202 33604 
Agglomeration 27.04 28.36 0 144 33604 
Wage 179.65 4554.57 0 400691 15685 
Number of permanent 
workers 
138.26 495.48 0 19047 33471 
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Appendix 3.3: Share of foreign firm by sector and size 
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Appendix 3.4:  Share of foreign firm by sector and export status 
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Appendix 3.5: Ranking of investment climate constraints by sector 
Sector Finance Tax Corruption 
Crime  
and D. 
Skills  
of W. 
Electricity 
Trade 
Regul. 
Labor 
Regul. 
Textile 2,05 1,42 1,42 1,11 1,17 1,31 1,17 0,94 
Leather 2,66 2,19 2,04 1,60 1,50 1,48 1,49 1,30 
Garments 2,02 1,52 1,50 1,25 1,15 1,09 1,06 1,09 
Agroindustry 1,76 1,40 1,18 0,99 0,94 1,10 0,86 0,83 
Metal and M. 1,84 1,59 1,27 0,98 1,11 0,80 1,01 1,03 
Electronics 1,78 1,75 1,75 1,44 1,35 1,64 1,72 1,37 
Chemicals 1,88 1,08 1,07 0,86 0,76 0,84 0,82 0,68 
Wood and F. 2,04 1,79 1,56 1,21 1,28 1,20 0,99 1,09 
Non-metallic M. 1,64 1,25 1,14 0,92 1,00 1,08 0,69 0,73 
Services 1,36 1,26 0,88 0,72 0,71 0,52 0,55 0,65 
Retail and W.  1,51 1,21 0,84 0,67 0,55 0,43 0,68 0,51 
 
 
 
Appendix 3.6: Correlation of physical and financial infrastructure variables 
 
Access to  
finance p. 
Informal  
finance p. 
Electricity 
p. 
Transport 
p. 
Telecom 
p. 1 
Telecom 
p. 2 
Access to finance p. 1.00      
Informal finance p. 0.06* 1.00     
Electricity p. 0.32* 0.01 1.00    
Transport p. 0.34* 0.03* 0.56* 1.00   
Telecom p. 1 0.02* 0.09* 0.05* -0.05* 1.00  
Telecom p. 2 -0.02* 0.08* 0.08* -0.02* 0.61* 1.00 
* significant at 1%.                                                                                                                      p indicates problem. 
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Appendix 3.7: Principal components analysis of physical and financial 
infrastructure variables 
Principal 
components 
Eigenvalue Difference 
Proportion of 
variance 
Cumulative 
Variance 
1 1.83 0.20 0.31 0.31 
2 1.64 0.65 0.27 0.58 
3 0.98 0.25 0.16 0.74 
4 0.73 0.30 0.12 0.86 
5 0.43 0.05 0.07 0.94 
6 0.39 . 0.06 1.00 
 
 Eigenvectors 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Access to finance problems 0.49 -0.08 0.11 0.86 -0.03 0.09 
Informal finance problems 0.08 0.17 0.97 -0.16 -0.04 0.01 
Electricity problems 0.61 -0.03 -0.13 -0.35 -0.69 -0.08 
Transport problems 0.60 -0.15 -0.05 -0.33 0.71 0.01 
Telecom problems 1 0.09 0.69 -0.11 0.10 0.10 -0.70 
Telecom problems 2 0.10 0.68 -0.14 -0.04 0.02 0.71 
Physical and Financial Infrastructure index = 
(0.31/0.58)*Component 1 + ((0.58 -0.31)/0.58)*Component 2 
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Appendix 3.8: Principal components analysis of physical infrastructure variables 
Principal 
components 
Eigenvalue Difference 
Proportion of 
variance 
Cumulative 
Variance 
1 1.63 0.08 0.41 0.41 
2 1.55 1.11 0.39 0.79 
3 0.43 0.04 0.11 0.90 
4 0.39  0.10 1.00 
 
 
Variable 1 2 3 4 
Electricity problems 0.30 0.64 -0.70 0.08 
Transport problems 0.19 0.69 0.70 -0.05 
Telecom problems 1 0.66 -0.25 0.12 0.70 
Telecom problems 2 0.67 -0.22 -0.01 -0.71 
 
Physical Infrastructure index =  
(0.41/0.79)*Component 1 + ((0.79-0.41)/0.79)*Component 2 
 
 
 
Appendix 3.9: Principal components analysis of financial infrastructure 
variables 
Principal 
components 
Eigenvalue Difference 
Proportion of 
variance 
Cumulative 
Variance 
1 1.06 0.12 0.53 0.53 
2 0.94  0.47 1.00 
 
Variable 1 2 
Access to finance 
problems 0.71 0.71 
Informal finance 
problems 0.71 -0.71 
Financial Infrastructure index = Component 1 
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Appendix 3.10: Breakdown by export status and foreign ownership 
 
Dependent variable: FDI 
Dependent variable:  
foreign ownership 
 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS IV Tobit 
                (1)               (2)                (3) 
 Non-
exporterb 
Exporter Non-
exporter 
Exporter   
Telecom problems -0.191 -0.281 -0.187 -0.280 -0.204 -2.843 
 (7.26)*** (4.59)*** (7.25)*** (4.86)*** (8.51)*** (17.70)*** 
Informal finance -0.001 -0.003 -0.001 -0.003 -0.001 -0.017 
 (1.73)* (1.24) (1.58) (1.48) (2.71)*** (3.67)*** 
Skilled labor problems 0.004 -0.048 0.006 -0.037 -0.003 -0.083 
 (0.46) (2.50)** (0.78) (1.95)* (0.33) (1.18) 
Crime and disorder -0.020 -0.030 -0.018 -0.041 -0.017 -0.222 
 (2.86)*** (1.27) (2.47)** (2.09)** (2.29)** (3.28)*** 
Age -0.001 -0.004 -0.001 -0.003 -0.002 -0.018 
 (5.05)*** (7.87)*** (5.89)*** (6.80)*** (7.63)*** (13.66)*** 
Size (20-99 employees) 0.020 0.084 0.019 0.070 0.018 0.392 
 (2.71)*** (4.45)*** (2.57)** (4.34)*** (2.41)** (6.33)*** 
Size (>=100 
employees) 
0.078 0.199 0.068 0.178 0.100 1.171 
 (4.87)*** (9.19)*** (4.14)*** (9.27)*** (6.68)*** (13.51)*** 
Agglomeration 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.003 
 (1.59) (0.50) (1.37) (0.22) (0.39) (3.09)*** 
Observations 26460 7031 24543 9061 33604 33604 
Number of countries 77 77 77 77 77 77 
Weak instrument diagnostica 
Telecom problems 
  Partial R² 
  Shea partial R² 
  Partial F 
  p-value 
 
0.11 
0.10 
1039 
[0.000] 
 
0.08 
0.08 
36 
[0.000] 
 
0.10 
0.10 
884 
[0.000] 
 
0.08 
0.08 
39 
[0.000] 
 
0.12 
0.11 
1687 
[0.000] 
 
0.12 
0.11 
1687 
[0.000] 
Informal finance 
  Partial R² 
  Shea partial R² 
  Partial F 
  p-value 
 
0.08 
0.08 
912 
[0.000] 
 
0.06 
0.06 
27 
[0.000] 
 
0.08 
0.08 
771 
[0.000] 
 
0.07 
0.07 
35 
[0.000] 
 
0.08 
0.08 
38206 
[0.000] 
 
0.08 
0.08 
38206 
[0.000] 
Cragg-Donald Stat. 475.9 77.9 441.6 122.7 590.1  
Clustered z statistics (absolute value) at country level in parentheses. All regressions include country and sector fixed effects 
For tobit regression, bootstrapped (with 100 replications) z statistics clustered at country level in parentheses. The tobit 
regression includes countries and sector dummies. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% The reference for size dummies is small size (less than 20 
employees). 
a  Weak instruments diagnostic tests of other control variables (additional structural factor: skilled worker problems and 
crime or disorder) not reported here give partial and Shea partial R² between 0.08 and 0.10 and large F-statistics. 
Results are confirmed by statistical test of the significance of the difference in the estimated coefficients between exporters 
and non-exporters firms. First-stage regressions (not reported for conciseness) are available upon request.  
b Exporter are defined as firms exporting at least 10% of their sales in (1) and as firms exporting any part of their sales in 
(2). 
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Appendix 3.11: Estimations by sector 
 Dependent variable : FDI 
 Textile Leather Garment Agro Metal  Electronics Chemical  Wood Non-metal. Retails Services 
Telecom problems -0.284 0.097 -0.211 -0.241 -0.224 -0.711 -0.066 -0.132 -0.212 -0.245 -0.363 
 (3.82)*** (1.02) (2.64)*** (5.92)*** (3.88)*** (2.64)*** (0.78) (2.21)** (3.24)*** (6.10)*** (7.11)*** 
Informal finance -0.004 0.004 -0.004 0.000 -0.003 -0.005 0.003 0.001 -0.002 -0.002 0.001 
 (3.92)*** (2.58)*** (5.09)*** (0.14) (2.17)** (0.99) (1.29) (1.19) (0.86) (2.27)** (0.48) 
Skilled labor prob. -0.047 -0.014 -0.009 -0.015 0.026 0.026 0.069 -0.011 -0.016 0.018 -0.039 
 (1.20) (0.41) (0.34) (0.73) (0.83) (0.19) (1.72)* (0.43) (0.53) (0.59) (1.30) 
Crime and disorder 0.039 -0.045 -0.067 0.004 -0.025 0.040 -0.019 -0.020 -0.055 -0.002 -0.039 
 (1.63) (1.71)* (1.98)** (0.29) (0.85) (0.65) (0.41) (1.32) (1.56) (0.08) (1.38) 
Age -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.002 -0.002 
 (2.23)** (0.92) (3.55)*** (3.19)*** (5.41)*** (1.17) (0.38) (2.37)** (0.34) (10.13)*** (5.52)*** 
Size (20-99 empl.) 0.025 0.089 0.010 0.022 0.046 -0.033 0.055 0.061 0.003 0.034 0.032 
 (1.29) (2.84)*** (0.46) (1.21) (2.54)** (0.38) (2.12)** (2.60)*** (0.10) (2.43)** (1.83)* 
Size (>=100 empl.) 0.078 0.125 0.164 0.110 0.187 0.222 0.239 0.147 0.062 0.059 0.059 
 (1.57) (2.27)** (3.89)*** (3.26)*** (6.65)*** (1.62) (4.87)*** (3.62)*** (1.25) (2.52)** (1.87)* 
Agglomeration -0.001 0.004 -0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.002 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (1.43) (2.69)*** (0.30) (1.84)* (1.24) (3.48)*** (0.19) (0.15) (2.49)** (2.84)*** (1.72)* 
Weak instrument diagnostica 
Cragg-Donald Stat.       16.3 3.0 24.0 74.7 38.3 1.5 15.3 37.3 11.5 44.7 50.1 
Observations 1928 494 3702 5638 3642 500 1661 2870 1474 5702 5988 
Number of countries 52 28 62 76 69 9 53 67 54 49 50 
Clustered z statistics (absolute value) at country level in parentheses 
All regressions include country and sector fixed effects 
The reference for size dummies is small size (less than 20 employees) 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
a Weak instruments diagnostic tests give partial and Shea partial R² between 0.04 and 0.10 and large F-statistics. 
First-stage regressions (not reported for conciseness) are available upon request. 
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Appendix 3.12: Estimation with additional variables 
 Dependent variable : FDI 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Telecom problems -0.251 -0.278 -0.281 -0.284 -0.273 -0.270 -0.231 
 (9.62)*** (9.80)*** (10.19)*** (10.22)*** (9.60)*** (9.62)*** (6.59)*** 
Informal finance -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 (3.21)*** (3.03)*** (2.96)*** (2.81)*** (3.08)*** (2.85)*** (4.98)*** 
Skilled labor problems -0.002 -0.018 -0.021 -0.017 -0.026 -0.025 -0.024 
 (0.23) (1.69)* (1.94)* (1.56) (2.25)** (2.16)** (1.81)* 
Crime and disorder -0.022       
 (2.48)**       
Property right  0.005 0.005 0.004 0.006 0.005 0.009 
  (0.64) (0.66) (0.59) (0.76) (0.70) (0.85) 
Age -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 
 (7.48)*** (6.45)*** (6.83)*** (6.84)*** (6.91)*** (6.85)*** (4.24)*** 
Size (20-99 empl.) 0.028 0.027 0.026 0.027 0.025 0.023 0.019 
 (3.25)*** (2.72)*** (2.57)** (2.66)*** (2.70)*** (2.44)** (1.71)* 
Size (>=100 empl.) 0.128 0.119 0.120 0.119 0.113 0.108 0.130 
 (7.78)*** (6.42)*** (6.64)*** (6.84)*** (6.48)*** (6.37)*** (6.02)*** 
Agglomeration 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.33) (0.20) (0.24) (0.22) (0.19) (0.19) (0.80) 
Labor regulation   0.005 0.012 0.003 0.006 0.010 
   (0.44) (0.90) (0.20) (0.41) (0.54) 
Corruption    -0.021 -0.031 -0.027 -0.031 
    (2.24)** (3.28)*** (2.76)*** (3.21)*** 
Custom and trade     0.042 0.048 0.035 
     (4.72)*** (4.95)*** (3.28)*** 
Tax rates      -0.021 -0.015 
      (2.19)** (1.34) 
Wage       -0.002 
       (0.23) 
Weak instrument diagnostica 
Cragg-Donald Stat.       590.1 426.0 329.1 273.9 224.4 198.2 10.8 
Observations 33604 23500 23130 22749 21170 21105 13576 
Number of countries 77 55 55 55 55 55 51 
Clustered z statistics (absolute value) at country level in parentheses 
All regressions include country and sector fixed effects 
The reference for size dummies is small size (less than 20 employees) 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
a Weak instruments diagnostic tests give partial and Shea partial R² between 0.08 and 0.12 and large F-statistics. 
First-stage regressions (not reported for conciseness) are available upon request. 
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Appendix 3.13: African specificity 
 Dependent variable : FDI 
 Sub-Saharan Africa Other developing countries 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Telecom problems -0.238 -0.239 -0.224 -0.248 -0.248 -0.229 
 (3.22)*** (3.26)*** (2.53)** (8.54)*** (8.63)*** (7.86)*** 
Informal finance -0.000   -0.001   
 (0.51)   (3.09)***   
Skilled labor problems -0.019 -0.013 -0.014 0.001 0.006 -0.009 
 (0.73) (0.54) (0.60) (0.10) (0.53) (0.69) 
Crime and disorder -0.038 -0.034 -0.049 -0.020 -0.014 -0.018 
 (1.71)* (1.62) (2.57)** (2.11)** (1.26) (1.34) 
Age -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 (1.00) (1.30) (1.14) (7.78)*** (7.82)*** (8.11)*** 
Size (20-99 employees) 0.065 0.064 0.058 0.022 0.023 0.022 
 (2.12)** (2.12)** (1.55) (2.57)** (2.71)*** (2.58)*** 
Size (>=100 employees) 0.221 0.203 0.194 0.118 0.118 0.110 
 (5.31)*** (4.93)*** (3.96)*** (6.58)*** (6.90)*** (6.68)*** 
Agglomeration -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.57) (0.61) (0.51) (0.40) (0.37) (0.33) 
Access to finance probl.  -0.042 -0.053  -0.027 -0.032 
  (2.00)** (2.23)**  (2.68)*** (3.03)*** 
Labor regulation   -0.039   0.014 
   (1.02)   (0.92) 
Corruption   0.028   -0.012 
   (1.35)   (1.04) 
Custom and trade   0.042   0.058 
   (2.62)***   (5.22)*** 
Tax rates   0.001   -0.020 
   (0.08)   (1.87)* 
Weak instrument diagnostica 
Cragg-Donald Stat.   73.4 75.3 28.5 497.0 489.6 220.2 
Observations 5366 5366 4150 28238 28238 25861 
Number of countries 23 23 22 54 54 54 
Clustered z statistics (absolute value) at country level in parentheses. All regressions include country and sector 
fixed effects. The reference for size dummies is small size (less than 20 employees). The results are confirmed by 
statistical test of the significance of the difference in the estimated coefficients between Sub-Sahara African 
countries and other developing countries. The African specificity is first confirmed by the introduction of a 
dummy variable in the full sample.  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
a Weak instruments diagnostic tests give partial and Shea partial R² between 0.07 and 0.12 and large F-statistics. 
First-stage regressions (not reported for conciseness) are available upon request. 
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Appendix 3.14: Heterogeneity in the impact of major structural problems 
Telecom problems and FDI  Informal finance and FDI  
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Corruption problems and FDI  Skilled labor problems and FDI  
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 These graphs resume coefficients and t-statistics of country level estimations. Each point represents the effect of the structural factors 
(telecom problems, informal finance, corruption problems and skilled labor problems) on FDI for one country. Coefficients are 
reported on the horizontal axis and the absolute value of t-statistics on the vertical axis. All regressions have FDI variable as dependant 
variable and structural factors as explanatory variables. The regressions also include firm characteristics and other control variables and 
deal with endogeneity issue as regressions (3) and (6) of appendix 6 (graphics are country-level illustration of regression (3) and (6) of 
appendix 6). The horizontal dashed line t=1.64 indicates 10% significance level. The vertical dashed line indicates the null value of 
coefficient. The upper-left side of all graphs indicates countries for which structural factor constraints reduce significantly attractiveness 
for FDI. 
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Appendix 3.15: List of countries 
Asia 
Eastern and Central 
Europe 
Latin America and 
Carribean 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
Bangladesh Albania Argentina Angola 
Cambodia Armenia Bolivia Benin 
Indonesia Azerbaijan Brazil Botswana 
Lebanon Belarus Chile Burundi 
Mongolia Bosnia and Herzegovina Colombia Congo. Dem. Rep. 
Pakistan Bulgaria Costa Rica Eritrea 
Philippines Croatia Ecuador Ethiopia 
Sri Lanka Czech Republic El Salvador Gambia 
Thailand Estonia Guatemala Guinea-Bissau 
Vietnam Georgia Guyana Kenya 
 Hungary Honduras Lesotho 
 Kazakhstan Mexico Madagascar 
 Kyrgyz Republic Nicaragua Malawi 
 Latvia Panama Mali 
 Lithuania Paraguay Mauritania 
 Macedonia. FYR Peru Mauritius 
 Moldova Uruguay Namibia 
 Poland  Senegal 
 Romania  South Africa 
 Russian Federation  Swaziland 
 Serbia and Montenegro  Tanzania 
 Slovak Republic  Uganda 
 Slovenia  Zambia 
 Tajikistan   
 Turkey   
 Ukraine   
 Uzbekistan   
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1. Introduction 
Policy makers often seek to attract external resources based on the premise that they 
will finance savings gaps and promote growth and economic development 
(Dornbusch, 1998). However, empirical evidence on the growth potential of capital 
account openness is mixed (Kose et al. 2006). Moreover, significant increases in 
capital inflows can increase the vulnerability of the financial system and provoke 
macroeconomic overheating. Lending booms, which often follow increased capital 
inflows, increase vulnerability in the financial system by exacerbating maturity 
mismatch between bank assets and their liabilities and in some cases the currency 
mismatch between the lending and the borrowing currency of the banks. These 
booms can also increase financial sector vulnerability through associated asset price 
bubbles. Macroeconomic overheating can be stimulated by accelerated economic 
growth and inflation, particularly the appreciation of the real exchange.  
The subsequent loss of competitiveness caused by an appreciated real exchange rate 
is one of the main potential negative consequences associated with capital inflows, 
particularly large inflows (Edward, 1998). Under a flexible exchange rate regime, the 
real appreciation of the exchange rate is due to the appreciation of the nominal 
exchange rate. In the case of a fixed exchange rate, the real appreciation is due to 
higher inflation following the increase of the money supply. The appreciation of the 
real exchange rate jeopardizes export competitiveness, widens the current account 
deficit, and increases the vulnerability to a financial crisis. Significant appreciation of 
the real exchange rate could indeed lead to a drying up or a sudden stop of capital 
flows leading to a sharp adjustment of the current account. Beyond its negative 
effect on the investment, a significant appreciation of the real exchange rate could 
thus create major challenges for macroeconomic stability and management.  
The sharp increase in external finance to developing countries, particularly private 
flows during the last decade and prior to the current financial crisis, sheds some 
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light on the transfer problem42. The spectacular rise in private flows was driven by 
the surge of foreign direct investment (FDI) and current private transfers (mainly 
remittances). While commercial bank loans constituted the main component of 
private capital flows to developing countries during the mid 1980s, foreign direct 
investment and remittances became the two major components, particularly in low-
income countries43. These changes in the landscape of capital flows to developing 
countries raise the importance of reassessing the transfer problem with particular 
focus on private flows and their different components.  
While most studies focus on the effect of aggregated or specific form of capital 
inflows on the real exchange rate, this chapter proposes a comprehensive analysis of 
the impact of different forms of private capital flows (FDI, portfolio investment, 
bank loans, and private transfers) on the real exchange rate. Based on a sample of 42 
developing countries over the period 1980-2006, this chapter uses the new pooled 
mean group estimator that allows short-run heterogeneity while imposing long-run 
homogeneity of the real exchange rate determination across countries. The results 
show that the aggregated capital inflows as well as public and private flows 
appreciate the real exchange rate. Among private flows, portfolio investment has the 
highest appreciation effect on the real exchange rate, almost seven times the 
appreciation due to FDI or banks loans. Private transfers lead to the lowest 
appreciation of the real exchange rate.  
Developing countries often use various policies to dampen the real appreciation of 
their exchange rate following episodes of capital inflows. These include 
macroeconomic policies such as sterilization, exchange rate flexibility, and fiscal 
tightening, as well as more structural policies, such as capital controls, trade 
liberalization, and better regulation and supervision of the financial system. While 
                                                 
42 The transfer problem refers to the impact of the resources’ inflows or outflows on the domestic 
economy -captures mainly through the real exchange rate. 
43 Portfolio investments have represented a significant part of private capital flows to emerging 
countries since the 1990s.  
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sterilization is the most used policy, fiscal tightening and exchange rate flexibility 
remain the most effective ones (IMF, 2007). This chapter uses, for the first time, a 
de facto measure of exchange rate flexibility to conclude that a higher flexibility of the 
exchange rate could effectively offset the real appreciation of the exchange rate 
stemming from capital inflows. 
The chapter is organized as follows: Section 1 discusses the transfer problem and 
stresses the potential heterogeneity according to the type of capital flows. Section 2 
reviews the main macroeconomic fundamentals explaining the real exchange rate. 
Section 3 describes the main trends and compositions of external financing to 
developing countries. The panel co-integration method (the pooled mean group 
estimator) and the data are discussed in sections 4 and 5, respectively. The empirical 
results are presented in the following sections. Based on a de facto measure of 
flexibility of the exchange rate, we assess how the real appreciation of the exchange 
rate due to capital inflows could be offset with higher flexibility of the exchange 
rate. The last section concludes. 
2.  The Transfer Problem 
There is extensive literature on the determinants of the real exchange rate. In the 
case of developing countries, Edwards (1989), Hinkle and Montiel (1999), Edwards 
and Savastano (2000), and Maeso-Fernandez, Osbat, and Schnatz (2004) provide 
comprehensive surveys of the literature. A number of studies focus on the impact of 
capital flows on the real exchange rate, the so-called transfer problem. Capital 
inflows involve stronger demand for both tradables and non-tradables and lead to a 
higher relative price of non-tradables44 and the appreciation of the real exchange 
rate. This is needed for domestic resources to be diverted toward production in the 
non-tradable sector in order to meet the increased demand. Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 
(2004) find that countries with net external liabilities have a more depreciated real 
exchange rate. Based on a sample of 48 industrial and emerging economies, Lee, 
                                                 
44 The price of tradables is internationally determined. 
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Milesi-Ferretti, and Ricci (2008) show that higher net foreign assets appreciate the 
real exchange rate.  
The impact of capital flows on the real exchange rate also depends on the form of 
the flows. Private flows are more directed to investment, increasing the productive 
capacity of the economy. However, public flows finance relatively more government 
consumption mainly in the non-tradable sector (a large part of the governments’ 
budgets is for wages and purchases of domestic services). In developing countries, 
particularly in poor countries, consumption relies more on domestic goods, of 
which their supply capacity is limited. In contrast, the increase of investment may 
lead to higher imports and an improvement of the productive capacity. Capital 
inflows associated with higher consumption should have higher pressure on the 
relative price of domestic goods, leading to more appreciation of the real exchange 
rate compared to capital inflows financing investment growth45. Higher investments 
following increases in public flows could also lead to a misallocation of capital and 
low quality investments with no significant impact on the productive capacity.  
Compared to borrowing from commercial banks, in general, FDI flows lead to less 
credit and money expansion since these flows are less (or shortly) intermediated into 
the local banking system. The inflation potential of FDI can thus be lower than that 
of commercial banks loans. FDI flows are related to investments with the purchases 
of new machineries and equipments that are imported. Higher import associated 
with FDI inflows does not suffer from the constraints in the supply capacity of the 
local economy and thus creates almost no appreciation effect. The spillover effects 
of FDI could also improve the local productive capacity through the transfer of 
technology and managerial know-how. Compared to bank lending and portfolio 
investment, FDI is a more stable capital flow. The appreciation of the real exchange 
rate due to FDI is lower than the real appreciation associated with the more volatile 
private flows not necessarily increasing the productive capacity, such as portfolio 
investments (Lartey, 2007). Portfolio investments are indeed speculative flows, 
                                                 
45 The structure of the consumption also influences its effect on the real exchange rate. A larger 
part of traded goods in public or private consumption affects the real exchange rate differently.  
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looking for higher short-term yields. These flows could not be associated with an 
improvement of the productive capacity, creating short-term instability and 
macroeconomic overheating.  
Remittances can have varying effects on the real exchange rate, depending on 
whether they are pro- or countercyclical. On one hand, remittances can act more as 
a buffer stock, helping to smooth consumption if they rise when the recipient 
economy suffers an economic downturn (Chami et al., 2005). In this case, 
remittances contribute to the stability of recipient economies by compensating for 
foreign exchange losses due to macroeconomic shocks. These countercyclical 
remittances have a limited appreciation effect on the real exchange rate. Remittances 
could, however be for investment purposes and pro-cyclical as other forms of 
foreign investment flows (FDI, portfolio investment, bank loans)46. Pro-cyclical 
remittances represent additional capital inflows and could exacerbate the 
macroeconomic overheating, leading to further appreciation of the real exchange 
rate. For instance, pro-cyclical remittances in the real estate sector could significantly 
increase input prices in the construction sector and appreciate the real exchange 
rate. However, if remittances are disproportionately devoted to spending on traded 
goods (for imported consumer durables, for instance), their effects on the real 
exchange rate tend to be weakened (Chami et al. 2008).  
Empirical evidence on the specific impact of diverse forms of capital flows on the 
real exchange rate is particularly limited, except those focusing on official flows, 
FDI, or recently on remittances. These studies have mixed results.  
                                                 
46 The theoretical determinants of remittances as indicated by Lucas and Stark (1985) in their 
seminal paper that lead to further debate are pure altruism, pure self-interest, and tempered altruism 
or enlightened self-interest. Under a pure altruism assumption, the income needs of migrants’ 
family in home country drive remittances when remittances under pure self-interest remittances are 
driven by investment motive. The in-between case of tempered altruism or enlightened self-interest 
is a situation in which consumption and investment motives determine remittances. 
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A number of analyses highlight the fact that official flows are associated with the 
appreciation of the real exchange rate (Kasekende and Atingi-Ego, 1999; Bulir and 
Lane, 2002; Prati, et al., 2003; Lartey, 2007; Elbadawi et al., 2008). Other studies do 
not conclude to a real appreciation of the exchange rate due to public flows (Li and 
Rowe, 2007; Aiyar et al., 2007). Cerra et al. (2008), for instance find that inflows of 
grants lead to the appreciation of the real exchange rate if they are used to enhance 
productivity in the tradable sector. If grant flows are used to improve productive 
capacity in the non-tradable sector, the authors find evidence of real depreciation of 
the exchange rate.  
The effect of private transfers or remittances on the appreciation of the real 
exchange rate is largely admitted but empirical results are more mixed (Chami et al., 
2008). On the one hand, authors such as Bourdet and Falck (2003), Amuedo-
Dorantes and Pozo (2004), Montiel (2006), and Saadi-Sedik and Petri (2006) find 
that remittance inflows appreciate the real exchange rate. On the other hand, 
Izquierdo and Montiel (2006) and Rajan and Subramanian (2005) do not conclude 
unanimously that remittances are associated with the appreciation of the real 
exchange rate.  
Studies on the impact of other private flows on the real exchange rate are more 
limited and the results are also mixed. Athukorala and Rajapatirana (2003) conclude 
that FDI inflows lead to a depreciation of the real exchange rate while other private 
capital flows are associated with a real appreciation. However, Lartey (2007) finds 
that FDI appreciates the real exchange rate while the aggregate “other capital flows” 
does not affect the real exchange rate. Saborowski (2009) finds that capital inflows 
and particularly FDI lead to a real appreciation of the exchange rate in developing 
countries.  
These studies focus on the impact of the aggregated capital or particular form of 
capital flows (grants, FDI, or remittances) on the real exchange rate and lead to very 
mixed conclusions. Hansen and Tarp (2000, 2001) explain divergences in the effect 
of capital flows on the real exchange rate through misspecification errors in the 
econometric model of some studies. These divergences could also be due to the 
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differences in sample, method, and period across studies. This chapter proposes a 
comprehensive analysis of the impact of different components of private flows 
(FDI, portfolio investment, bank loans, and private transfers) on the real exchange 
rate, while controlling for official flows. Most of the studies focus on a particular 
country or a group of countries by imposing the short-term and long-term 
homogeneity between countries. This chapter considers a sample of developing 
countries and applies a new panel co-integration method that imposes long-run 
homogeneity between countries while allowing the short-run dynamics to differ 
across countries.  
3. External Financing to Developing Countries  
The aggregated total capital flow is the sum of public and private flows from the 
World Economic Outlook. Private capital flows are the sum of four elements. These are 
the Direct Investment in reporting economy from abroad (FDI) including debt-creating 
liabilities to foreign direct investors and direct investment in the form of equity; 
Portfolio Investment (PIL) which is the sum of debt instruments issued by the domestic 
private sector (corporate bonds and other private debt securities) and foreign 
purchases of equities of domestic companies; Current Private Transfers47 (PRT) and 
                                                 
47 Remittances are not adequately defined in the balance of payments (BOP). Remittances are part 
of three items in the BOP with none of these items including exclusively remittances. We use 
private current transfers as a proxy for remittances following Dorsey et al. (2008). Workers’ 
remittances account for three quarters of private transfers in the BOP for low income countries 
(Dorsey et al., 2008). The other items that include a small part of remittances (and are not 
represented in our proxy of remittances) are income credits or net income of the BOP that include 
compensation of employees. Another component of remittances included in the capital account is 
migrants’ transfers. Since the BOP data disaggregate capital transfers only into debt forgiveness and 
other capital transfers, an estimation of migrants’ transfers is very challenging. Private transfers 
could thus underestimate or overestimate the level of remittances according to the importance of 
employee compensation, migrants’ transfers, and part of the private transfers that are not 
remittances. See Reinke (2007) and Dorsey et al. (2008) for a comprehensive analysis of 
measurement and definition issues of remittances using BOP data. 
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Liabilities to Foreign Bank (LFB)48. Public flows are the sum of Official loans (OL) and 
Official current Transfers (OT). Official loans are the sum of official liabilities including 
the use of the IMF credits (BFOLG), debt instruments, such as government bonds 
issued by the domestic public sector (BFPLDG), and debt forgiveness in the capital 
account, including those granted by the IMF (BKFO)49. In order to get a more 
precise picture of the net resource that is effectively transferred in each country, the 
interest paid on the total debt (DSI) could be deduced from the official loans50. In 
the first part of the empirical analysis aiming to assess the composition effect of 
capital flows on the real exchange rate, we use the two definitions of public flows 
(considering or not considering the payment of interest on debt). The rest of the 
empirical analysis refers to the notion of net transfers on debt and considers public 
flows excluding the payment of interests on debt (Net total external financing). 
Private flows Official Loans Net of Debt Forgiveness
Public Flows
Gross total external financing FDI PIL LFB PRT BFOLG BFPLDG BKFO PUT= + + + + + + +
 

 
Private flows NetTransfersonDebt
Public Flows
Nettotal external financing FDI PIL LFB PRT BFOLG BFPLDG BKFO DSI PUT= + + + + + + − +
 

 
                                                 
48 The total private flows also include other liabilities, in the form of other loans, currency and 
deposits which are on average null between 1990 and 2004 in our sample countries. These flows 
consist of net outflows and net inflows according to the countries and the years. 
49 Balance of payments data record debt forgiveness as equivalent to amortization in the financial 
account. The proxy “official loans” captures net lending without being a perfect proxy. Indeed, the 
World Economic Outlook data have a single entry for debt forgiveness that could apply for debt 
forgiveness on official loans or on commercial bank loans, for instance. Thus, netting the entire 
stock of debt forgiveness against official loans may overstate the net lending from official sources 
and understate net lending from other sources to the extent that debt forgiveness is also reflected in 
a reduction in commercial or portfolio investment debts (Dorsey et al. 2008). 
50 Items in the financial account measure net changes in stocks that could be due to new lending, 
amortization, and partly debt forgiveness. 
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Based on the estimations of total external financing, the following section presents 
an overview of the trend and the composition of external financing. It is worth 
noting that the payment of interests on debts, which is represented as the other 
capital inflows for presentation purposes, constitute a capital outflow.   
Figure 4.1: External financing in developing countries 
(sample of 42 countries included in the empirical analysis) 
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Private capital flows have steadily increased since the 1980s, while public flows have 
been decreasing. From less than 2 percent of GDP in the beginning of the 1980s, 
private capital flows represented more than 6 percent of GDP during 2005-2006. 
The increase is even sharper in lower income countries, where private flows 
represent almost 10 percent of GDP during 2005-2006, far from their initial value 
of 1.5 percent of GDP in the beginning of the 1980s. Private capital flows are 
largely dominated by FDI, followed by private transfers (remittances), and portfolio 
investment during the more recent years. In lower income countries, the sharp 
increase in private flows is mainly due to the private transfers, which increased from 
less than 2 percent of GDP in the beginning of the 1980s to more than 6 percent of 
GDP during 2005-2006. FDI also increased from less than 1 percent of GDP in the 
1980s, to almost 4 percent of GDP in lower income countries from 2005 to 200651.  
A favorable macroeconomic environment and investment climate characterized by 
strong economic growth, moderate inflation, and better infrastructure quality 
facilitate productive activities attracting foreign investments (chapters 1 and 2). The 
factors driving the surge in remittances are more complex. The significant increase 
in remittances could be due to changes in the host or home countries economic 
environment, to reductions in transfer fees or simply to improvements in the quality 
of the data (Dorsey et al., 2008).  
Commercial bank loans have become insignificant (particularly in lower income 
countries) since the 1990s and the associated financial crises. Although negligible for 
lower income countries, portfolio investments have been significant for emerging 
economies, particularly during the recent years (appendix 4). Public flows that were 
the main source of capital inflows to lower income countries have been surpassed 
by private flows. While public flows (grants and official loans) decreased sharply in 
all countries, there is an indication of a substitution of loans for grants in lower 
income countries, which is consistent with the donors’ commitments.  
                                                 
51 Using a sample of low-income countries, Dorsey et al. (2008) find the same trend and 
composition of external financing. The similarity is even stronger when the comparison is made 
with our sample of lower income countries. 
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Figure 4.2 describes the trends of the un-weighted means of the real exchange rate 
and the total capital inflows for the sample of 42 developing countries52. Each 
country’s case (Senegal and Turkey in the main text and other selected countries in 
the appendix 4.5) provides more insight into trends of capital flows and REER 
between 1980 and 200653. On average, periods of reduction (increase) of capital 
inflows are associated with depreciated (appreciated) real exchange rate. For 
instance, the significant increase in capital inflows in Turkey during the 2000s is 
associated with a sharp appreciation of the REER while the falling in capital inflows 
during the 1980s in Senegal is coupled with the depreciation of the REER. 
Figure 4.2: Real exchange rate and capital inflows 
The Real Exchange Rate and Total Capital Inflows 
(unweighted mean for a panel of 42 countries) 
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52 Total capital flows are total external financing excluding the payment of interests on debt. 
53 The ten countries’ cases reflect the situation well in the different categories of developing 
countries. 
Chapter 4: Private Capital Flows and the Real Exchange Rate in Developing Countries 
 
 
106
Senegal Turkey 
.
05
.
1
.
15
.
2
.
25
To
ta
l C
a
pi
ta
l F
lo
w
s 
to
 
G
D
P
4
4.
2
4.
4
4.
6
4.
8
Lo
g 
o
f t
he
 
RE
ER
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
year
Log of the REER Total Capital Flows to GDP
-
.
1
-
.
05
0
.
05
.
1
To
ta
l C
a
pi
ta
l F
lo
w
s 
to
 
G
D
P
4.
4
4.
5
4.
6
4.
7
4.
8
4.
9
Lo
g 
o
f t
he
 
RE
ER
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
year
Log of the REER Total Capital Flows to GDP
The following econometric analysis will help to get a stronger picture of the 
potential positive correlation between the REER and capital inflows as shown by 
the graphical analyses.  
4. Econometric Methodology and Model 
There are two common estimation methods used with dynamic panel data models. 
The first one consists of averaging separate estimations for each group in the panel. 
Pesaran and Smith (1995) show that this method (the Mean Group estimator) 
provides consistent estimates of the averages of the parameters. This method allows 
the parameters to be freely independent across groups and does not consider some 
potential homogeneity between groups. The second estimation method of dynamic 
panel models is the usual pooled method, including the random effects or fixed 
effects models or the GMM methods. These models constrain the parameters 
(coefficients and error variances) to be identical across groups, but the intercept is 
able to differ across groups. Pesaran, Shin, and Smith (1999) show that GMM 
estimations of dynamic panel models could lead to inconsistent and misleading 
long-term coefficients. This potential problem is exacerbated when the time 
dimension is large in the panel. Pesaran, Shin and Smith (1999) propose an 
intermediate estimator that allows the short-term parameters to differ across groups 
while imposing equality of the long-term coefficients across groups. The long-term 
movements of the real exchange rate and other macroeconomic fundamentals are 
expected to be identical across countries while short-term movements are expected 
to be influenced by country-specific characteristics. The null hypothesis of the 
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homogeneity in the long-term coefficients can be tested with a Hausman test. The 
dynamic heterogeneous panel model of Pesaran, Shin and Smith (1999) is an 
unrestricted error correction Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) (p,q) 
representation.  
1 1
' '
, 1 , 1 , ,
1 0
p q
it i i t i i t ij i t j ij i t j i it
j j
y y x y xφ β λ δ µ ε
− −
− − − −
= =
∆ = + + ∆ + ∆ + +∑ ∑                                          (1) 
The cross section units (the countries) are denoted by i = 1, 2, …, N and t = 1, 2, 
…, T represent time periods. ity is the dependent variable and itx the matrix of 
regressors. iµ  denotes the fixed effects, iφ  the coefficient on the lagged dependent 
variable, iβ  the vector of coefficients on the explanatory variables, ijλ the 
coefficients on the lagged first-differences of the dependent variable, and ijδ the 
coefficients on the first-differences of the explanatory variables and their lagged 
values. The disturbances itε  are supposed to be normally and independently 
distributed across i and t with zero mean and variances 2 0iσ > . 
With 0iφ < , there is a long-term relationship between ity  and itx  in the form : 
'
it i it ity xθ η= +            i=1, 2, …, N           t= 1, 2, …, T                                           (2) 
'
' i
i
i
βθ φ= −  represents the long-term coefficient and the error terms of the long-term 
relationship ( itη )  are stationary. 
Considering the long-term relationship, equation (1) can be written as  
1 1
'
, 1 , ,
1 0
p q
it i i t ij i t j ij i t j i it
j j
y y xφη λ δ µ ε
− −
− − −
= =
∆ = + ∆ + ∆ + +∑ ∑                                                       (3) 
The error correction term 
, 1i tη −  is derived from the long-term equation (2) and the 
associated coefficient ( iφ ) measures the speed of adjustment to the long-run 
equilibrium.  
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By allowing the short-term coefficients, the intercepts, and the error variances to 
differ across groups, but constraining long-term coefficients to be identical ( 'iθ θ= ), 
the pooled mean group estimator of Pesaran, Shin, and Smith (1999) derives the 
parameters with the maximum likelihood technique. With the pooled likelihood 
estimators defined as 
^
iφ ,
^
iβ , 
^
ijλ , 
^
ijδ , and ˆθ , the pooled mean group estimators are 
given by : 
1
ˆ
ˆ
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i
i
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∑
                                                                                   (4) 
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jPMG N
δ
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ˆ ˆ
PMGθ θ=                                                                                                                 (6) 
More specifically, the long-term relationship between the real exchange rate and 
macroeconomic fundamentals is given by: 
0 1 2 3 4it it it it it itREER TOT PROD TRADE CAPITALθ θ θ θ θ ν= + + + + +                             (7) 
i = 1, 2,…,N           t = 1, 2, …,T 
Where REERit is the real effective exchange rate, TOTit represents the term of trade, 
TRADEit is the ratio of export and import over the GDP, PRODit reflects the 
productivity gap, and CAPITALit is the ratio of total external financing over the 
GDP.  
The Real Effective Exchange Rate (REER) in the analysis is a CPI-based real 
exchange rate defined as a weighted geometric mean of bilateral nominal exchange 
rate and consumer price indices. An increase of the REER indicates an appreciation 
and, hence, a potential loss of competitiveness. The REER of a country i is defined 
as: 
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With REERi, NEERi, and NBERi representing the real effective exchange rate, the 
nominal effective exchange rate, and the nominal bilateral exchange rate of country i 
respectively. CPIi and CPIj denote the consumer price index of country i and 
country j. wj is the weight of the j-th partner in the bilateral trade of the country i. 
The weights represent for each country i, the average share of trade with its main 
partners j during the period 1999-2003. The analysis considers the ten main trade 
partners and excludes oil-exporting countries (those for which petroleum related 
products represent at least 50% of the exports). Weights are calculated at the end of 
the period of observations in order to focus on the competitiveness diagnosis for 
the most recent years. This choice allows taking the significant increase of the 
weight in international trade of some large emerging countries into account, such as 
China, India or Brazil during the recent years. The increasing importance of these 
large emerging market trade partners is even more pronounced for other developing 
countries.  
The productivity gap aims at capturing the potential Balassa-Samuelson effect. It is 
defined as a country’s GDP per capita relative to the weighted average of its trading 
partners’ GDP per capita. The weights of the partner countries are similar to those 
used in the construction of the REER. The so-called Ballasa-Samuelson effect 
assumes that the productivity in tradable sectors grows faster than in non-tradable 
sectors. This results in higher wages in the tradable sectors that spill over to the 
non-tradable sectors and place upward pressure on wages. Since prices in tradable 
sectors are internationally determined and homogeneous across countries, higher 
wages in the non-tradable sectors result in a higher relative price of non-tradables. 
This implies an increase in domestic inflation and an appreciation of the REER. A 
rise in the terms of trade is expected to appreciate the equilibrium REER to the extent 
that it improves the trade balance; the income effect dominating the substitution 
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effect. Trade openness also affects the prices of non-tradables through an income 
effect and a substitution effect. Higher restriction on trade has a negative effect on 
the tradables’ prices through the income effect and a positive effect through the 
substitution effect. The income effect is less likely to dominate the substitution 
effect (Edwards, 1988). It is thus expected that restricted trade will exert downward 
pressure on the relative price of tradable to non-tradable goods, thereby leading to 
an appreciation of the equilibrium REER.  
Assuming that all variables are I(1) and co-integrated, vit is supposed to be I(0) for all 
i and is independently distributed across t. With a maximum of one lag54 for all 
variables, the equilibrium error correction representation of the autoregressive 
distributed lag, ARDL(1, 1, 1, 1, 1) model is: 
, 1 0 1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4
it i i t it it it it
i it i it i it i it it
REER REER TOT PROD TRADE CAPITAL
TOT PROD TRADE CAPITAL
φ θ θ θ θ θ
δ δ δ δ ε
−
 ∆ = − − − − − 
− ∆ − ∆ − ∆ − ∆ +
         (8) 
The coefficients of primary interest are the θ since the study focus on long-run 
relationships. In the first part of the analysis, the interest variable (CAPITAL) will 
be disaggregated into various components to assess the differential impact of each 
type of capital flows on the real exchange rate. The second part of the study, aiming 
to assess the effectiveness of the exchange rate policy as a hedge against real 
appreciation due to capital inflow, will add exchange rate flexibility variable and its 
cross term (with capital variable) in the error correction equilibrium representation: 
equation (8). 
The dataset is based on annual observation for 42 developing countries over the 
period 1980-2006. While data availability guides the choice of the countries, the 
sample gives a representative coverage of developing countries by including 
                                                 
54 The choice of the lag length is based on the empirical literature on the determinants of the real 
exchange rate and confirmed by the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). 
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emerging and lower income countries as well as countries from the main developing 
regions55. Appendix 4.1 summarizes the definitions and sources of all variables.  
5. Econometric Results 
Before presenting the results of the co-integration analysis, we first validate that the 
variables are non-stationary and co-integrated. Appendix 6 presents the unit root 
tests on the real exchange rate and other variables. These tests confirm that almost 
all variables are non-stationary and could be considered as integrated of order one. 
As a second step, we test the existence of a long-term relationship between the 
variables of the baseline specifications. Various co-integration tests (Panel rho, Panel 
ADF, Group rho, Group ADF, etc.) following Pedroni (2000) confirm the existence 
of a co-integrating vector in all cases.  
Using the pooled mean group estimator, table 4.1 presents the long-run coefficients, 
which are of interest in this chapter. It is worth noting that with the co-integration 
analysis, the potential endogeneity between the real exchange rate and the 
fundamentals does not affect the long-run coefficients. The adjustment term is 
always negative and significant, indicating the absence of an omitted variable bias. 
The Hausman tests confirm that the restriction of long-term homogeneity of 
coefficients cannot be rejected at the 1 percent significance level. This indicates the 
preference of the pooled mean group estimator over the mean group estimator that 
supposes heterogeneity in short-term and long-term coefficients.  
First, the estimations present the impact of the aggregated capital inflows on the real 
exchange rate. In a second step, the impacts of public and private flows on the real 
exchange rate are separately estimated, followed by the effects of different 
components of private capital flows on the real exchange rate. 
 
 
                                                 
55 Appendix 2 gives the list of the countries include in the analysis. 
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Table 4.1: Composition of Capital Inflows and Real Exchange Rate 
 Dependent variable: Log Real Effective Exchange Rate 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
EC -0.165 -0.171 -0.122 -0.139 
 (5.38)*** (5.55)*** (4.82)*** (4.91)*** 
Log(Productivity) 0.052 0.050 0.271 0.085 
 (1.03) (0.97) (4.03)*** (1.50) 
Log(Term of Trade) 0.370 0.323 0.761 0.365 
 (8.41)*** (7.91)*** (14.43)*** (8.08)*** 
Log(Trade) -0.081 -0.074 -0.163 -0.099 
 (2.56)** (2.37)** (3.62)*** (2.80)*** 
Total Capital 0.130    
 (2.00)**    
Private Capital  0.181 2.071  
  (2.87)*** (7.07)***  
Public Capital+  0.852 1.580 1.597 
  (3.45)*** (3.84)*** (4.99)*** 
Debt interest Payment   -2.490  
   (2.82)***  
FDI    1.233 
    (2.07)** 
Portfolio Inv.    7.844 
    (7.03)*** 
Private transfers    0.274 
    (2.61)*** 
Bank Loans    0.917 
    (2.05)** 
Hausman Test 4.28 3.58 3.92 1.47 
[p-value] [0.37] [0.61] [0.69] [0.99] 
Co-integration Test     
Kao Test 4.16 -4.21 -5.01 3.71 
 [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
Panel rho 4.16 5.38 4.65  
 [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]  
Panel ADF 1.33 1.40 -13.6  
 [0.16] [0.15] [0.00]  
Group rho 6.09 7.45 6.14  
 [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]  
Group ADF 3.79 3.50 -11.23  
 [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]  
Observations 1073 1073 1073 1073 
No. of countries 42 42 42 42 
Log-likelihood 1344.24 1378.62 1378.62 1464.31 
EC refers to the error correction term. Only long-run coefficients are reported.  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
All specifications include a maximum of one lag. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. Numbers in brackets for 
the Hausman and co-integration tests are p-values. For Co-integration tests, the null hypothesis is the absence of co-
integration. The null hypothesis for the Hausman test is the restriction of long-term coefficients homogeneity.                
+ Except in regression 3, interest payments are excluded from public flows. 
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The estimation results show that capital inflows appreciate the real effective 
exchange rate (REER). A one-percentage point increase in total capital inflows to 
GDP implies a 0.13 percent appreciation of the real exchange rate. The real 
appreciation of the exchange rate due to public flows is statistically higher compared 
to the real appreciation effect of private flows (column 2 in table 1). This result 
could suggest that private flows are more employed for investments that increase 
the productive capacity of the economy, while public flows are relatively more 
directed to government consumption, mainly in the non-tradable sector. The 
difference between the real appreciation effect of public and private flows is, 
however not robust to an alternative specification that includes the payment of debt 
interests as a control variable56. With this alternative specification (column 3 in table 
1), the appreciation effect of private and public capital flows are not statistically 
different. Both types of flows lead to the appreciation of the REER of about the 
same magnitude. Indeed, a one-percentage point increase in private and public 
capital flows lead to an appreciation of the REER of 2.1 percent and 1.6 percent 
respectively. As expected, the payments of interest on debt have a significant 
depreciation effect on the REER.  
The last column of table 4.1 presents the impact of the different components of 
private capital flows on the REER. Public flows still have a significant appreciation 
effect on the REER. With respect to private flows, portfolio investments lead to the 
highest level of real appreciation of the exchange rate. The highest level of 
appreciation from portfolio investments is statistically significant when compared to 
the effect of the other private flows (FDI, private transfers, and bank loans) on the 
REER. A one-percentage point increase of portfolio investments to GDP is 
associated with a 7.8 percent appreciation of the REER. Compared to the other 
private flows, portfolio investments are more volatile and speculative flows, which 
are not generally associated with an increase of productive capacity. 
                                                 
56 Payment of the interests on debts was deduced from public flows in the preceding estimations. 
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Following portfolio investments, FDI inflows appreciate the REER. However, the 
real appreciation stemming from FDI is statistically lower, almost 7 times smaller 
than the real appreciation induces by portfolio investments. Contrary to portfolio 
investments, FDI are more stable flows and increase the productive capacity 
through technology and know-how transfers. FDI are primarily for investment 
purposes and could lead to a higher import of new machineries and equipments 
with limited impact on the real exchange rate.  
Loans from commercial banks also appreciate the REER significantly. The size of 
this appreciation is statistically similar to the real appreciation due to FDI. A one-
percentage point increase in FDI or banks loans leads to an appreciation of the 
REER of about 1 percent. To illustrate the results, an increase of the ratio of FDI to 
GDP of about 4 percentage points as experienced by Ghana or Turkey between 
2002 and 2006 would appreciate the real exchange rate by around 5 percent. One 
could expect a higher appreciation effect from banks loans, since these flows are 
more intermediated through the local banking system. The results suggest that bank 
loans could be more directed to investment financing like FDI, and lead to the 
improvement of the productive capacity. In this context, the inflation potential of 
bank loans could be similar to that of FDI, even though spillover effects are not 
associated with bank loans.  
Private transfers appear to have the lowest appreciation effect on the real exchange 
rate. Indeed, a one-percentage point increase in private transfers leads to a 0.3 
percent appreciation of the REER. An increase between 3 and 4 percentage points 
of the ratio of private transfers to the GDP, as observed in Nicaragua and Senegal 
between 2002 and 2006, would appreciate the REER by only almost one percent. 
This result could justify more counter-cyclical remittances against the pro-cyclical 
hypothesis. By helping households to smooth their consumption during hard times, 
remittances contribute to the stability of economy by avoiding a sharp depreciation 
of the exchange rate that could follow the losses of foreign exchange during a 
macroeconomic shock. In this context, the appreciation effect of remittance flows is 
limited. Remittances could also be disproportionally used for the purchase of 
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imported goods -consumers durables- and thus have a limited impact on the long-
term equilibrium exchange rate (Chami et al., 2008). 
With respect to the other macroeconomic fundamentals, terms of trade and trade 
openness are significant with the expected sign. A ten percent increase of the terms 
of trade appreciates the real exchange rate by almost 4 percent. More liberalized 
trade is associated with a depreciation of the real exchange rate. An increase of trade 
openness by ten percent leads to a real depreciation of the exchange rate of about 1 
percent. These results are similar to those in the empirical literature (Chen and 
Rogoff, 2003; Cashin, Cépedes, and Sahay, 2004; Ricci, Milesi-Feretti, and Lee, 
2008; Saborowski, 2009). The Balassa Samuelson effect, captured by the relative 
GDP per capita, is not always significant, although it has the expected sign. This 
could be due to the fact that the widely used GDP per capita is a poor proxy for the 
Balassa-Samuelson effect. The results are not significantly different for lower 
incomes countries (appendix 7).  
The speed of the adjustment, reflected by the coefficient of convergence is about -
0.2. The movements of the REER within a year correct about a fifth of the gap 
between the REER and the equilibrium REER (as determined by the fundamentals). 
Therefore, the half-life of a REER deviation from the long-term equilibrium value is 
about 3 years. 
6. Exchange Rate Flexibility and the 
Appreciation of the Real Exchange Rate 
Capital inflows could finance a growing current account deficit or contribute to 
reserve accumulation. With low accumulation of reserves, a large current account 
deficit during an episode of capital inflows could become a problem once inflows 
slowdown or reverse. A sudden and unexpected slowdown of capital inflows could 
necessitate a sharp reduction of the current account deficit and trigger a financial 
crisis. Secondly, capital inflows can facilitate macroeconomic overheating and a loss 
of competitiveness due to the appreciation of the real exchange rate. Authorities 
often seek to avoid or limit the appreciation of the real exchange rate with various 
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policies. Exchange rate flexibility is one of the main policy responses that countries 
could implement to manage capital inflows and avoid a real appreciation of their 
exchange rate. The following section discusses and tests the effectiveness of this 
policy response57. 
Independent of the foreign exchange regime, capital inflows associated with higher 
expenditure and a deficit of the current account increase the demand of money. In 
the presence of a fixed exchange rate, authorities’ interventions to maintain the 
parity can lead to the accumulation of reserves and an increase in the supply of 
money. This creates the potential for macroeconomic overheating and vulnerability 
in the financial system. In poor countries with limited productive capacity, the 
increase in demand following the higher supply of money leads to inflation once 
excess capacity is absorbed. Under a free-floating exchange rate regime and no 
government intervention, capital inflows and the associated increase in money 
demand lead to the appreciation of the nominal exchange rate with no impact on 
international reserves and the money supply. In countries with an intermediate 
exchange regime, authorities aim for a specific level of the nominal exchange rate 
and the monetary aggregate. In this context, reserve accumulation is a policy 
instrument. Maintaining a certain level of nominal exchange rate with authorities’ 
intervention through higher reserves accumulation leads to lower pressure on the 
nominal exchange rate and potentially higher inflation. In contrast, small-scale 
interventions of authorities with lower reserve accumulation can lead to higher 
pressure on the nominal exchange rate and lower inflation58. Exchange rate 
                                                 
57 The policy responses to the real appreciation of the exchange rate include fiscal policy, 
sterilization policy, capital control policy, and trade liberalization. These additional policies do not 
fall under the scope of this chapter, which focuses on the flexibility of the exchange rate. 
58 This analysis supposes that most of the capital inflows are spent locally. If the major part of 
capital inflows were used for import purposes (for instance new machineries and equipments), a 
large increase in capital inflows would have little effect on the real exchange rate. That could be the 
case in relatively poor developing countries receiving foreign investment for the exploitation of 
natural resources. 
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flexibility ensures a degree of autonomy of the monetary policy from the capital 
inflows. By introducing uncertainty with a two-way risk, higher flexibility of the 
exchange rate could discourage short-term speculative flows and reduce the 
vulnerability of the financial system, particularly when their supervision and 
regulation are poor (Calvo, Leiderman, and Reinhart, 1996; Lopez-Mejia, 1999). 
Based on cross-sectional regressions in emerging countries, a recent study of the 
IMF (World Economic Outlook, 2007) fails to show that countries with more rigid 
exchange rate have a lower appreciation of their real exchange rate during episodes 
of capital inflows. Using a dynamic GMM model, Saborowski (2009) concludes that 
countries with a more flexible exchange rate regime (following the exchange rate 
regime classification of the IMF) have a lower impact of FDI flows on their real 
exchange rate. 
In this study, we use a de facto measure of exchange rate flexibility. We approximate 
the flexibility of the exchange rate by an index based on the idea of the Exchange 
Market Pressure (EMP). The degree of the EMP is derived from a relationship 
between the nominal exchange rate and the relative level of foreign reserves59.  
1 , , ,% /(% )i t i t i tEMP e e f= ∆ ∆ + ∆                                                     
, , 1
,
, 1
i t i t
i t
i t
er er
e abs
er
−
−
 
−
∆ =   
 
   eri,t is the bilateral nominal exchange rate of country i 
currency with the US dollar during year t and abs denotes the absolute value. 
,
% i te∆  
represents the relative variation of the nominal exchange rate (
,i te∆ ) expressed in 
percentage. 
( ), , 1
,
, 1
i t i t
i t
i t
abs RES RESf
MB
−
−
−
∆ =  RESi,t represents reserve assets and MBi,t the monetary 
base in country i during year t. 
                                                 
59 For more details on the theoretical and practical issues of the EMP indices, see Girton and Roper 
(1977), Tanner (2001), Pentecost et al. (2001), Guimaeres and Karacadag (2004), Cavoli and Rajan 
(2007), World Economic Outlook (2007). 
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In a hypothetical case of pure floating system with no intervention on reserves 
( 0f∆ = ), the EMP index is equal to one reflecting the maximum flexibility of the 
exchange rate that is allowed to float freely. Changes in the EMP index reflect only 
changes in the exchange rate. In the case of hard peg, the exchange rate is constant 
( 0e∆ = ) and the EMP index is equal to zero. Changes in the index reflect only 
changes in reserves through monetary authorities’ interventions. In intermediate 
cases, a low value of the EMP index indicates less exchange rate flexibility or higher 
level of intervention on the foreign exchange market. Higher volatility of foreign 
reserves reduces the EMP. This suggests that the monetary authorities are using 
foreign reserves to limit the variation of the nominal exchange rate60. An alternative 
definition of the EMP index is 2 , ,i t i tEMP e f= ∆ − ∆ . 
During previous episodes of capital inflows (before the debt crisis and before the 
Asian crisis), the high flexibility of the exchange rate reflected large current account 
deficits (figure 3). The recent wave of capital inflows starting in the beginning of the 
2000s is however associated with a lowering of the exchange rate flexibility, 
particularly in 2005, reflecting policy intervention with reserves accumulation (figure 
4.3).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
60 Changes in reserves could also be due to valuation changes and not to policy intervention. 
Availability of data on the currency composition of reserves could help to address this caveat. 
 
Chapter 4: Private Capital Flows and the Real Exchange Rate in Developing Countries 
 
 
119
Figure 4.3: Index of Exchange Rate Flexibility 
.
75
.
8
.
85
.
9
Ex
ch
an
ge
 
ra
te
 
fle
xi
bi
lity
 
in
de
x
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
year
 
Using the index of flexibility of the exchange rate based on the concept of the 
exchange market pressure, this study shows that higher flexibility of the exchange 
rate helps to dampen the appreciation of the REER stemming from capital inflows. 
In countries with a less rigid de facto exchange rate regime, capital inflows appreciate 
the real exchange rate less strongly. This result is also robust for lower income 
countries (table 2). 
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Table 4.2: Capital Inflows, Exchange Rate Flexibility and the Real Exchange 
Rate 
 Dependent variable: 
Log Real Effective Exchange Rate 
 Total sample Lower income countries 
EC -0.239 -0.278 
 (5.32)*** (3.32)*** 
Log(Productivity) 0.088 0.075 
 (2.71)*** (2.51)** 
Log(Term of Trade) 0.189 0.280 
 (4.75)*** (6.89)*** 
Log(Trade) -0.034 0.004 
 (1.67)* (0.24) 
Total Capital 1.802 1.286 
 (3.13)*** (2.36)** 
Exchange Market Pressure (EMP1) -0.727 0.158 
 (8.20)*** (1.15) 
EMP1 x Total Capital -1.666 -1.193 
 (2.87)*** (2.18)** 
Hausman Test 1.23 1.58 
[p-value] [0.97] [0.95] 
Co-integration Test   
Kao Test -5.00 -0.96 
 [0.00] [0.17] 
Panel rho 10.3 6.90 
 [0.00] [0.00] 
Panel ADF 2.65 -3.99 
 [0.01] [0.00] 
Group rho 12.4 8.55 
 [0.00] [0.00] 
Group ADF 3.99 -1.56 
 [0.00] [0.12] 
Observations 932 510 
No. of countries 42 23 
Log-likelihood 1480.75 793.24 
EC refers to the error correction term. 
All specifications include a maximum of one lag. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. Numbers in brackets for the Hausman and the co-integration tests are 
p-values. For Co-integration tests, the null hypothesis is the absence of co-integration. The null hypothesis for 
the Hausman test is the restriction of long-term coefficient homogeneity. 
Lower income countries group includes: Benin, Burkina Faso, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Côte d'Ivoire, Cameroon, 
Republic of Congo, Ecuador, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Sri Lanka, Lesotho, Morocco, Mali, Mozambique, 
Mauritania, Namibia, Nigeria, Nicaragua, Philippines, Paraguay, Senegal. 
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Following the Asian financial crisis, developing countries, particularly in Asia have 
started to accumulate significant reserves for precautionary motives. We control for 
these changes in reserves that do not reflect the management of the volatility of the 
exchange rate. We thus defined an additional measure of flexibility of the exchange 
rate using the difference between the level of reserves and their trend value obtained 
with the Hodrick-Prescott method. This allows for the capture of the change in 
reserves that are only due to the management of the volatility of the exchange rate 
and not to other objectives, such as savings for precautionary reasons. The index of 
flexibility of the exchange rate is also defined using the nominal effective exchange 
rate vis-à-vis each country’s top-ten trading partners, similarly to the definition of 
the real effective exchange rate. The results are robust with these alternative 
definitions of the flexibility of the exchange rate (appendix 8). The flexibility of the 
exchange rate helps thus to dampen the real appreciation effect of capital inflows in 
all cases. 
7. Conclusion 
This chapter has analyzed the impact of capital inflows and different components of 
private capital inflows on the real exchange rate and has assessed the potential role 
of the exchange rate flexibility as a hedge against the real appreciation.  
Using the pooled mean group estimator (Pesaran, 1999) that considers long-term 
homogeneity in the behavior of the real exchange rate across countries, while 
allowing for short-term heterogeneous shocks, the chapter shows that private and 
public capital inflows appreciate the real exchange rate. Disaggregating private 
capital inflows show that the appreciation effect of private flows differs according to 
the type of flows. More volatile portfolio investments have the highest appreciation 
effect on the real exchange rate. Following portfolio investments, FDI and bank 
loans significantly appreciate the real exchange rate. Since these flows are potentially 
related to an increase in the productive capacity, the real appreciation associated 
with FDI or bank loans is almost seven times lower than the real appreciation due 
to portfolio investments. Private transfers (mainly remittances) are the flows with 
the lowest appreciation effect on the real exchange rate. This suggests more 
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counter-cyclical remittances against the pro-cyclical hypothesis. Private transfers 
could help countries to offset the real depreciation of their exchange rate during 
periods of economic slowdown. 
Countries often implement various policies to reduce or avoid the loss of 
competitiveness associated with the appreciation of the real exchange rate following 
capital inflows. This chapter assesses the effectiveness of the policy of exchange rate 
flexibility, one of the main macroeconomic tools available to countries when facing 
significant capital inflows. Using a de facto measure of exchange rate flexibility, we 
find that allowing greater flexibility of the exchange rate helps to dampen the real 
appreciation of the exchange rate due to capital inflows. 
When implementing policies to attract capital flows, developing countries should 
consider the potential to destabilize macroeconomic management with a significant 
appreciation of the real exchange rate. Particular interest should be given to short-
term flows, such as portfolio investments, given their considerable real appreciation 
effect compared to the other types of capital flows. Resisting nominal appreciation 
of the exchange rate through intervention in the foreign exchange market does not 
prove to be a useful method for avoiding a real appreciation of the exchange rate. 
Countries facing episodes of capital inflows should thus allow some flexibility of 
their exchange rate. This would help to cure the appreciation of the real exchange 
rate stemming from capital inflows and avoid a significant loss of competitiveness. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 4.1: List, definition and sources of variables 
Variable Definition Source 
Log(REER) Logarithm of Real Effective 
Exchange Rate, CPI base 
CERDI 
Log(Productivity) Logarithm of GDP per capita 
relative to trading partners. 
CERDI 
Log(Term of Trade) Logarithm of the term of trade World Economic Outlook (WEO) 
Log(Trade) Logarithm of (Export + 
Import)/GDP 
World Development Indicators (WDI) 
Total Capital Total external financing to 
GDP 
World Economic Outlook (WEO) 
Private Capital Private capital inflows to GDP World Economic Outlook (WEO) 
Public Capital Public capital inflows to GDP World Economic Outlook (WEO) 
FDI Foreign Direct Investment to 
GDP 
World Economic Outlook (WEO) 
Portfolio Inv. Portfolio Investment to GDP World Economic Outlook (WEO) 
Private Transfers Private transfers to GDP World Economic Outlook (WEO) 
Bank Loans Banks loans to GDP World Economic Outlook (WEO) 
Debt Interest Payment of debt interest to 
GDP 
World Economic Outlook (WEO) 
Exchange Market 
Pressure 
Index of flexibility of the 
exchange rate 
World Economic Outlook (WEO) and 
World Development Indicators (WDI) 
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Appendix 4.2: List of countries 
Benin, Burkina Faso, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Brazil, China, Côte d'Ivoire, Cameroon, 
Republic of Congo, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Algeria, Ecuador, 
Egypt, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Guatemala, India, Sri Lanka, Lesotho, Morocco, 
Mali, Mozambique, Mauritania, Mauritius, Malaysia, Namibia, Nigeria, Nicaragua, 
Oman, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Paraguay, Senegal, El Salvador, Thailand, Turkey, 
Uruguay, South Africa. 
 
 
 
Appendix 4.3: Summary Statistics 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Log(REER) 1117 4,621 0,409 3,169 7,634 
Log(Productivity) 1117 -2,256 0,923 -4,211 -0,172 
Log(Term of Trade) 1117 4,637 0,248 3,590 5,947 
Log(Trade) 1117 -0,550 0,545 -2,761 0,828 
Total Capital Flows to GDP 1117 0,055 0,197 -3,080 1,592 
Total Private Flows to GDP 1117 0,051 0,108 -0,286 1,230 
FDI to GDP 1117 0,015 0,024 -0,090 0,435 
Portfolio Investment to GDP 1117 0,007 0,060 -0,316 1,179 
Private Transfers to GDP 1117 0,025 0,078 -0,114 0,973 
Bank Loans to GDP 1117 0,005 0,036 -0,236 0,521 
Total Public Flows to GDP 1117 0,024 0,116 -0,347 1,475 
Debt Interest 1117 0,024 0,025 -0,038 0,215 
Exchange Market Pressure 979 0,845 0,338 0 1 
 
 
Chapter 4: Private Capital Flows and the Real Exchange Rate in Developing Countries 
 
 
125
Appendix 4.4: External financing in upper income countries 
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Appendix 4.5: Real exchange rate and capital inflows (selected countries) 
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Côte d’Ivoire 
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Appendix 4.6: Unit root tests 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Level First Difference 
 ADF IPS ADF IPS 
REER 0.83 0.12 0.00 0.00 
Productivity 0.32 0.42 0.00 0.00 
Term of Trade 0.19 0.99 0.00 0.00 
Trade 0.05 0.12 0.00 0.00 
Total Capital 0.05 0.06 0.00 0.00 
Private Capital 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.00 
Public Capital 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 
FDI 0.53 0.60 0.00 0.00 
Portfolio Inv. 0.21 0.91 0.00 0.00 
Private transfers 0.98 0.96 0.00 0.00 
Bank Loans 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Number reported here are p-value. The Null hypothesis is the presence of unit root. 
IPS refers to Im, Peseran, and Shin 
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Appendix 4.7: Composition of capital inflows and real exchange rate (Lower 
Income Countries) 
 Dependent variable: Log Real Effective Exchange 
Rate 
 (1) (2) (3) 
EC -0.175 -0.189 -0.131 
 (3.93)*** (4.14)*** (3.36)*** 
Log(Productivity) 0.105 0.107 0.050 
 (1.73)* (1.85)* (0.65) 
Log(Term of Trade) 0.429 0.336 0.391 
 (9.00)*** (8.05)*** (7.42)*** 
Log(Trade) -0.089 -0.070 -0.133 
 (1.87)* (1.72)* (2.69)*** 
Total Capital 0.167   
 (2.35)**   
Private Capital  0.254  
  (3.16)***  
Public Capital  1.266 1.902 
  (4.03)*** (5.40)*** 
FDI   1.250 
   (1.98)** 
Portfolio Inv.   9.818 
   (7.18)*** 
Private transfers   0.324 
   (2.52)** 
Bank Loans   13.126 
   (4.00)*** 
Hausman Test 0.19 3.80 4.03 
p-value [0.98] [0.58] [0.85] 
Observations 588 588 588 
No. of countries 23 23 23 
Log-likelihood 668.97 686.66 726.56 
EC refers to the error correction term. 
All specifications include a maximum of one lag. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Lower income countries group includes: Benin, Burkina Faso, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Côte d'Ivoire, Cameroon, 
Republic of Congo, Ecuador, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Sri Lanka, Lesotho, Morocco, Mali, Mozambique, 
Mauritania, Namibia, Nigeria, Nicaragua, Philippines, Paraguay, Senegal. 
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Appendix 4.8: Robustness check: Exchange rate flexibility and real exchange 
rate 
 Dependent variable: Log Real Effective Exchange Rate 
 ∆e – ∆f Filtered  
Reserve (HP, 
λ=100) 
Filtered  
Reserve  
(HP, λ=10) 
Nominal 
Effective 
Exchange Rate 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
EC -0.072 -0.214 -0.214 -0.185 
 (5.22)*** (6.23)*** (6.23)*** (5.63)*** 
Log(Productivity) 0.034 0.217 0.217 0.112 
 (0.34) (4.27)*** (4.27)*** (2.04)** 
Log(Term of Trade) -0.296 0.342 0.342 0.374 
 (2.02)** (8.48)*** (8.48)*** (8.04)*** 
Log(Trade) -0.395 -0.096 -0.096 -0.056 
 (8.29)*** (2.90)*** (2.90)*** (1.58) 
Total Capital 0.715 2.840 2.840 1.196 
 (3.58)*** (4.24)*** (4.24)*** (2.09)** 
Exchange Market Pressure (EMP2) -2.749    
 (7.52)***    
Total Capital x EMP2 -15.438    
 (5.92)***    
Exchange Market Pressure (EMP1)  -0.616   
  (6.44)***   
Total Capital x EMP1  -2.613   
  (3.89)***   
Exchange Market Pressure (EMP1)   -0.616  
   (6.44)***  
Total Capital x EMP1   -2.614  
   (3.89)***  
Exchange Market Pressure (EMP1)    0.026 
    (0.25) 
Total Capital x EMP1    -1.019 
    (1.78)* 
Hausman Test 2.07 26.8 26.8 5.58 
p-value [0.91] [0.01] [0.01] [0.47] 
Observations 823 823 823 827 
No. of countries 34 34 34 34 
Log-likelihood 1333.91 1193.85 1193.85 1201.49 
EC refers to the error correction term. 
All specifications include a maximum of one lag. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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1. Introduction 
The abundant recent literature on economic growth embedded a renewed interest in 
the differences in productivity among countries and regions. Productivity, in the 
form of technical progress and technical efficiency, is a key source of long-run 
economic growth and international convergence of economies. The importance of 
Total Factor Productivity (TFP) in explaining differences in countries’ incomes 
levels and performances is indeed well demonstrated and agreed upon (Klenow and 
Rodriguez-Clare, 1997; Hall et Jones, 1999; Easterly and Levine, 2001). These TFP 
differences have been attributed to technological differences across countries 
(Howitt, 2000; Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare, 2005). A recent literature explains 
productivity differences between countries by resources misallocation across firms 
(Banerjee and Duflo, 2006; Bartelsman, Haltiwanger and Scarpetta, 2006; Hsieh and 
Klenow, 2007; Restuccia and Rogerson, 2007; Foster, Haltiwanger, and Syverson, 
2008). Within narrowly defined sectors, dispersion in firms’ TFP may reflect 
distortions that prevent resources from being better allocated -to firms that are 
more productive. Distortions in developed countries are mostly from adjustment 
cost and cost in reallocating factors of production (Hopenhayn, 1992 and 
Hammermesh and Pfann, 1996). For developing countries, investment climate 
variables such as infrastructure, finance, human capital, institutions, or regulatory 
policies are important source of distortions and could be addressed with appropriate 
policies and reforms (Doing Business, 2006). These distortions negatively affect 
countries’ aggregate productivity and efficiency.  
Productivity in the manufacturing industry is central to international 
competitiveness. This competitiveness objective can be achieved by several non-
exclusive means, including an exchange rate policy that modifies relative prices, or 
by specific actions in relation to productive performance. While changes in the 
exchange rate are mainly determined by the macroeconomic context, firm 
productivity is influenced by not only public, but also private factors, reflecting their 
own organizational efficiency, external economic or institutional environments.  
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Over the last decade, thanks to the extension of national microeconomic databases, 
an applied literature has emerged, emphasizing firm productivity determinants 
including those traditionally considered as invariant within a country. This new 
branch of the literature has explored the question of differences in the investment 
climate as a major factor contributing to differences in productivity61. In Dollar, 
Hallward-Driemeier and Mengistae (2005) for instance, the heterogeneity of the 
investment climate variables was tested and not rejected for firms of four 
developing countries in Asia. In the same vein, the World Bank’s World Development 
report (2005) argues that Indian firms in states with poor investment climate have 
40% lower productivity than those where this climate is good. The surveys on the 
Investment Climate Assessment (ICA) have been a good expression of the World 
Bank’s concern to highlight this diversity across countries and across domestic 
regions. Indeed, ICA datasets are now available for a wide range of countries and 
present the valuable advantage to refer to a standardized questionnaire allowing 
international comparisons.  
Investment climate is defined by the World Bank as the policy, institutional and 
regulatory environment in which firms operate (World Bank, 2005). Key factors 
affecting the investment climate are corruption, taxation, regulatory framework, 
legal environment, quality of infrastructure, availability and cost of finance, quality 
of human capital, and technological and innovation support. For instance, countries 
where the property rights are secure and the infrastructure and finance services are 
well developed are considered as having a good investment climate, which in turn 
reduces the cost of doing business and leads to higher and more certain returns on 
investment. The forward-looking nature of investment underlines the importance of 
a stable and secure environment. Deficiencies in the investment climate are also 
seen as constituting barriers to entry, exit, and competition.  
                                                 
61 See at the macroeconomic level Bosworth and Collins (2003), Djankov and al. (2002), Hall and 
Jones (1999) Haltiwanger (2002), He et al. (2003), Loaya, Ociedo and Serven (2004), OECD (2001), 
Rodrik, Subramanian (2004), McMillan (1998 and 2004), World Bank (2003, 2004), Frankel (2002), 
and Rodrik (1999). See also Bastos and Nasir (2004), Dollar and al. (2005), Eifert and al. (2005), and 
Escribano and Gasch (2005) for results on firms’ performances at the microeconomic level. 
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Our study is devoted to the exploitation of ICA datasets for the manufacturing 
sector in five developing countries over the mid 2000s. The data set we use come 
from the pooling of five ICA surveys, giving 4385 firms for which a stochastic 
frontier model can be estimated. These five countries are considered at the moment 
the survey was implemented with only few variations across them as the year in 
parenthesis may demonstrate:  Brazil (2003), Morocco (2004), Pakistan (2002), 
South Africa (2003), Vietnam (2005). The objective of this chapter is threefold:  
The aim of the chapter is to explain firms’ productivity by their business 
environment, evaluate why foreign firms are more productive than local companies, 
and assess vertical spillovers from foreign to local companies. With particular 
attention to the foreign ownership variable, the chapter first explains firms’ technical 
inefficiencies with different groups of variables reflecting organizational as well as 
economic and institutional factors. The results show that investment climate 
variables matter for firms’ productivity and foreign firms are significantly more 
productive compared to local companies. Secondly, the chapter proposes and tests 
for the first time, the better investment climate faced by foreign as major factors 
explaining their higher productivity compared to local companies. Efficiency gains 
prove to be significant if all firms operate in the investment climate faced by foreign 
companies. Lastly, a new firm-level measure of vertical spillovers is introduced to 
highlight vertical (backward) spillovers for local companies supplying multinational 
firms with intermediate inputs.  
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 analyzes the theoretical relationship 
between several dimensions of firms’ economic and institutional environment, 
particularly the presence of foreign ownership in firms’ capital and their productive 
performances. In section 3, we describe the methodology we use to analyze relative 
productive efficiency. This section introduces different concepts of firm-level 
productivity and discusses the advantages and limits of the different measures. The 
stochastic frontier analyses (SFA) incorporating exogenous determinants of 
technical inefficiency are preferred to the early two-stage procedure, where 
predicted values of technical efficiency is regressed upon a vector of potential 
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determinants. The methodological section extends the benchmarking procedure to 
appraise the productivity gains proceeding from firm projections in “best 
operational environments” within the country. . Section 4 briefly presents the 
investment climate (ICA) surveys data and summarizes their main limitations. In 
section 5 we comment on the empirical results, and analyze potential externalities 
for local firms in doing business with multinational companies located in the 
country. Section 6 concludes. 
2. Investment Climate, Foreign Ownership, and 
Productivity 
 Firm productivity depends on a wide range of factors. In the Global 
Competitiveness Report (2007), macroeconomic competitiveness is perceived as the 
set of institutions, policies, and factors that determine the level of productivity of a 
country. A similar definition can be retained in a microeconomic perspective. The 
World Bank uses this distinction in the Investment Climate Assessment (ICA) surveys by 
referring to the external economic and institutional environment on the one hand 
and firm specific factors on the other hand.   
2.1. The external economic environment and 
productivity 
Within a manufacturing sector, it is generally considered that macroeconomic 
policies have a similar impact across organisations producing homogenous goods. 
International trade and exchange rate policies are exogenous parameters and they 
are supposed to affect the activity of all entrepreneurs in the same way. However, 
adding political economy to the equation, discrimination among producers may exist. 
Different treatments may legally apply to firms through taxes and subsidies, 
according to firm size, the year of creation or the regional place where they stand, 
and particularly whether the firms are local or foreign-owned. Moreover, the quality 
of roads, transport, telecommunication and power provision may vary a lot, even 
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within a single country. The ICA questionnaires appraise what these constraints are 
and the magnitude of their severity.  
Unreliable public provision of infrastructure may lead to investments that prove to 
be costly for private manufacturing producers. Infrastructure deficiencies constitute 
an important constraint to private sector development in developing countries 
(World Bank, 1994). By increasing transaction costs, telecommunications obstacles, 
transport failures and power outages increase the distortions in the economy and 
the misallocation of resources. Transport or telecommunication failures for example 
will increase the cost for suppliers to connect with their clients. Infrastructure is 
considered, as well, as a complementary factor to other production inputs. In 
particular, infrastructure stimulates private productivity by raising the profitability of 
the investments62. Furthermore, infrastructure also increases firms’ productive 
performances by generating externalities across firms, industries, and regions63.  
Access to finance is also an important aspect of the business environment and 
allows firms to finance more investment projects, which leads to better productivity 
through higher capitalistic intensity and technical progress embodied in the new 
equipments. Besides, financial development has a positive effect on productivity 
because of better selection of investment projects and higher technological 
specialization through diversification of risk. A developed financial system creates 
more profitable investment opportunities by mobilizing and allocating resources to 
the most profitable projects (Levine, 1997).  
Human capital is also at the origin of positive externalities64. Because skilled workers 
are better at dealing with changes, a skilled workforce is essential for firms to 
manage new technologies that require a more efficient organizational know-how 
                                                 
62 Aschauer (1989), Argimon et al., (1997), Barro (1990), Blejer and Kahn (1984), Murphy, Shleifer, 
and Vishny (1989). 
63 For spatial externalities, see Holtz-Eakin and Schwartz (1995).  
64 Lucas (1988), Psacharopoulos (1988), and Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992).  
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(Acemoglu and Shimer, 1999). New technologies generally involve significant 
organizational changes, which are better handled by a skilled workforce (Bresnahan, 
Brynjolfsson and Hitt, 2002). Human capital also gives to enterprises the 
opportunity to expand or enter new markets. 
Competition is also an important channel that may affect firm-level productivity. 
When producing for external markets, competition is a permanent challenge, hence 
the higher the rate of the production that is exported, the higher the productive 
performance. The situation is quite different when production is dedicated to 
domestic clients and may benefit from high levels of trade protection. In this case, 
the stimulating strength of the market will mainly depend on domestic competition.  
2.2. The institutional environment and productivity 
Effective institutions do matter. They give the rules of the economic game, shape 
the activity and have a strong bearing on the organisation of production as well as 
investment decisions. Institutional environment illustrates the capacity of the 
government to provide an investment-friendly environment and reliable conditions 
to the private sector. Corruption is seen as having an adverse effect on firms’ 
productive performances. This fact is well documented and often considered as one 
of the major constraints facing enterprises in the developing world (World Bank, 
2005). Corruption increases costs, as well as uncertainties about the timing and 
effects of the application of government regulations (Tanzi and Davooli, 1997). 
Although government regulations and taxation are reasonable and warranted in 
order to protect the general public and to generate revenues to finance the delivery 
of public services and infrastructures, over-regulation and over-taxation deter 
productive performances by raising business start-up and firms’ operating costs. 
Unofficial and private payments or benefits to public officials in order to get 
advantages in the applications of governments’ laws or to avoid government biding 
decisions and regulations decrease the aggregate productivity by increasing 
economic distortions and the misallocation of resources across firms in the 
economy. The inefficiency of government in delivering public services (utilities, 
Chapter 5: Investment Climate, Foreign Ownership, and Aggregate Productivity 
 
 
139
security, etc.) and the time spent by managers in dealing with government regulation 
requirements (customs, licenses and registrations) affect firms by increasing their 
allocative inefficiency.  
It is understood that governments play a key role in providing public goods and 
formal rules such as laws that delineate property rights or the judicial institutions 
that enforce these rights. However, through the agency relationships, those who 
represent governments and public bureaus have also been known to be a potential 
source of increasing transaction costs. Potential arbitrariness takes many forms. The 
standard ICA questionnaire stresses this political economy dimension through a wide 
range of items, such as state power and red tape of public administrations, 
corruption, protection of property rights, and the extent of government regulation. 
As The World Development report (2005) pointed out, a single national law can be 
applied differently within a country. The time to transfer property title in Brazil 
varies from 15 days in Brasilia to 65 days in Salvador. Even within a single location, 
the same conditions can affect firms differently across activities and across their 
ownership status.  
Governance exerts a strong influence on the investment climate. On the empirical 
side, several studies have related economic performances to different measures of 
governance65. The role of security of property rights is one of the best documented 
and supported by the data66. Some authors have also tested the role of corruption67 
                                                 
65 Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001); Easterly and Levine (2003); Hall and Jones (1999); 
Knack and Keefer (1995); Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi (2002). 
66 Easterly and Levine (2003), Knack and Keefer (1995), North (1990), Rodrik, Subramanian and 
Trebbi (2002), and Saleh (2004). Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001), Calderon and Chong 
(2000), and Mijiyawa (2008) in the context of growth.  
67 Mauro (1995); Gupta, Davooli and Alonso-Terme (2002); Mo (2001); Tanzi and Davooli (1997).  
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and, to a lesser extent, regulation,68 and bureaucratic quality69. More recently, the 
literature has evaluated firm performance and its determinants using enterprises 
survey data70. Still quite new, this approach aims at strengthening the institutional 
literature by providing microeconomic foundations.  
2.3. Foreign ownership, investment climate, and 
productivity 
Beyond their macroeconomic advantages in terms of financing current account 
deficits or contributing to accumulate foreign reserves, policy makers often seek to 
attract foreign firms to benefit from their expected positive externalities with 
productivity spillovers from foreign companies to local firms. These spillovers could 
be in form of transfers of new technologies, management methods, products, and 
production processes. Positive spillovers will only occur if foreign firms are superior 
to the local ones in terms of productivity performances or technological knowledge. 
Domestic firms could thus learn from foreign companies by observation, by doing 
business with them, or through labor turnover. In the literature on international 
economics, a large number of theoretical and empirical analyses have concluded that 
foreign firms are more productive compared to their local counterparts. In their 
theoretical models, Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple (2004) have predicted that only the 
most productive firms become multinational companies.  
One can reasonably consider that foreign companies or their participation as 
shareholders to the capital of a domestic firm are potentially correlated with more 
efficient productive practices. They also allow saving on the fixed costs of 
producing technological innovations as well as on the marginal cost of their 
replication in the domestic environment. Foreign firms can also be seen as an 
                                                 
68 Kerr (2002); Hernando and Soto (2000).  
69 Evans and Rauch (2000). 
70  Bastos and Nasir (2004); Dollar and al. (2005, 2006); Eifert and al. (2005); Escribano and Gasch 
(2005).  
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instrument to lowering the fixed costs and the transaction costs associated with the 
development of external networks that help the export behavior. External markets 
are more competitive than the domestic ones and as such, they stimulate cost 
minimization behaviors. Foreign firms could also update their production process 
by using foreign expertise and finance -that are not easily available for domestic 
firms- in presence of local constraints such as electricity problems. However, 
foreign firms could be less efficient compared to local companies since they do not 
know specific characteristics of the local markets. In the case of underdeveloped 
financial markets and an economy that is not sufficiently market-oriented, the 
impact of foreign investments on productivity could be limited.  
Empirical results provide rather mixed evidence on the topic. Early evidences on 
spillovers that focus on intra-industry (horizontal) spillovers highlight positive 
correlation between foreign presence and firm performances71. The positive 
correlation between foreign firms and productivity in aggregated cross-sectional 
analyses could arise because foreign firms are more productive, as explained above 
and this affects local firms’ performances after the transfer of ownership. The 
positive correlation could also be because foreign owners simply acquire the best 
domestic firms. This is a major shortcoming in cross sectional studies since 
multinational firms tend to be concentrated in specific sectors. Evidences of 
horizontal spillovers with firm-level studies are much more mixed. In the case of 
developing countries72, Khawar (2003) finds that foreign firms are more productive 
than local enterprises in Mexico but the author does not find evidence of positive 
spillovers from foreign to domestic firms. Using panel data from manufacturing 
industries in China, Liu (2002) also finds a positive effect of FDI on domestic firms. 
By contrast, Haddad and Harison (1993) and Aitken and Harrison (1999) find 
evidence of negative spillovers associated with FDI respectively in Morocco and in 
                                                 
71 See Blomström (1989) for a review. 
72 In the case of developed countries, the positive impact of foreign ownership on firms’ 
performances have been highlighted by a number of authors including Goethals and Ooghe (1997), 
Alan and Steve (2005), Piscitello and Rabbiosi (2005), Temouri et al. (2008).  
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Venezuela. According to Aitken and Harrison (1999), this negative impact is due to 
the competition effect from foreign firms, forcing local firms to produce smaller 
output at higher cost that offset the positive impact of technology transfer with 
FDI. In a study on Bulgaria, Hungary, and Poland, Konings (2001) finds that 
foreign firms are more productive only in Poland. Evidences of the positive vertical 
spillovers are clearer in literarure. Lui (2008) finds positive vertical spillovers with 
backward and forward linkages between industries in China. Javorick (2004) casts 
doubt on positive horizontal spillovers from foreign firms in Lithuania but 
underlines the existence of vertical spillovers from the upstream sector. Javorick and 
Spatareanu (2008) also show the importance of local participation for vertical and 
horizontal spillovers in Romania.  
Multinational firms may have more incentives to transfer knowledge to local firms 
in the upstream sector. Indeed, multinational companies could benefit from this 
knowledge sharing with better performance of their suppliers of intermediate inputs. 
Better productivity of local suppliers could thus be a consequence of deliberate 
knowledge transfer from multinational or higher requirement to local firms in term 
of product quality and time delivery. Recent firm-level studies conclude in favour of 
higher productivity of the industries supplying foreign companies (Blalock and 
Gertler, 2004 in Indonesia; Javorick, 2004 in Lithuania, and Javorick and 
Spatareanu, 2008 in Romania).  
3. Measures of Firm-Level Productivity: 
Methodological Aspects 
The first challenge is to measure firms’ productive performance in a relevant way. 
We propose different approaches and measures. We first consider a non-parametric 
model of productivity, which consists in calculating productive performances 
without estimating a production function. The non-parametric measure of 
productivity constitutes a simple and already meaningful way of assessing for 
example Labor Productivity (LP) and Total Factor Productivity (TFP). Another way 
has been to calculate firms’ productive performance from a parametric production 
frontier. This more sophisticated methodology allows the identification of the most 
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efficient firms of the sample and the comparison of these most efficient firms with 
the other firms in the sample. 
3.1. Non-parametric measures of productivity 
Productivity can easily be calculated as the ratio of an output to a specific factor of 
production, with labor (L) being the main input whatever the industrial sector. 
When all the relevant factors of the production technology are considered, it is 
referred to Total Factor Productivity (TFP). Our analysis focuses on the second 
approach, which gives a more complete picture of firms’ productive performances. 
Labor Productivity (LP) gives a first idea of a firm productive performance. It has 
the advantage of not being affected by measurement errors of the capital stock. 
However, the technology is only partially described and the productivity then suffers 
from an omitted variable bias. The productivity of Labor can be complemented by 
the calculation of a Unit Labor Cost defined as the ratio of firm average wage to 
firm labor productivity. This indicator allows comparisons of the organizational 
competitiveness across countries. Labor Productivity (LP) can be biased by the 
choice of the exchange rate when converting production into US dollars. This is less 
the case of the TFP, because the same rate applies to the output (Y) at the 
numerator as well as the intermediate inputs (ICons), Labor (L) and the capital stock 
(K) at the denominator. Under the hypothesis of constant returns to scale, (i.e., 
perfect competition for goods but also for factors that are remunerated at their 
marginal productivity), weights of Intermediate inputs (ICons) and of Labor (Wages, 
W) are calculated as the ratio of the cost of these factors to the Total Cost of 
Production including profit (Y). The contribution of Capital (K) is then calculated as 
the complement to one.   
The advantage of this approach, based on the Solow residual, is that it does not 
require the inputs to be exogenous or the inputs’ elasticities to be constant. 
However, one inconvenience is that two hypotheses, which prove to be sometimes 
restrictive, have to hold: constant returns to scale and competitive input markets. 
Another limitation is that because productivity is calculated as the residual of the 
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production function, it is considered as a random variable, which makes it difficult 
to justify that some exogenous factors can explain productive differences. In this 
chapter, due to the limited time dimension for the production factors (three years) 
and no time dimension for the Investment Climate (IC) variables, we focus only on 
productivity levels73.  
1 2 1 2(1 )  i i i i
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i
i i i
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3.2. Parametric production functions and production 
frontiers  
In the parametric approach, TFP is calculated as the residual of an estimated 
production function, thus relaxing the hypotheses of constant returns to scale (but 
not automatically of productivity as a random variable). Various hypotheses can be 
made regarding the technology of production. The Cobb Douglas and the 
Translogarithmic production functions are the most commonly used. Although 
both present good mathematical properties, the elasticities of the production to the 
inputs are easier to read and to interpret with the Cobb Douglass technology. In the 
case of a parametric production function, production is derived from the 
optimization problem of the firms, which maximize current and expected profits by 
equating production prices to their marginal costs. This hypothesis does not allow 
any waste of resources or organizational weaknesses. The production frontier 
approach, however, allows for non-optimal behaviors of the firms. Enterprises can 
                                                 
73 Measuring productivity in level, although more restrictive than measuring growth rates (it requires 
for example specific functional forms of the production function) is less demanding in terms of 
data quality conditions. It allows, in particular, unbalanced panels with short term dimension, 
measurement errors, or constant value of IC variables (see Escribano and Guasch, 2005). 
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be positioned relatively to the most efficient firms that define an empirical 
production frontier. Firm-level Technical Efficiency (TE) can then be defined as the 
firms’ productivity gap to the “best practice”, the empirical practice of firms which are 
located on the production frontier.  
The deterministic parametric production function approach can be implemented in 
a rather simple way, under the restrictive assumption that production does not 
suffer from the classical disturbances. The higher positive residual of the regression 
is used as a correction term, to position all the observations of the sample 
comparatively to the most performing ones. The residual of the estimation ( iu ) is a 
random variable, uncorrelated and independent of the right-hand side variables. iu  
can be transformed as an indicator of efficiency of value 1 (or 100% when 
expressed in percent) for the best performers. For the other firms of the sample, iu  
then measures the potential performance gain that these enterprises can achieve. 
In the stochastic model, the likelihood estimation method is typically applied to 
estimate a “composite” error term, which includes two uncorrelated elements. The 
first term (v), which is a random variable, represents the external shocks to the firm. 
These shocks are independently and identically distributed and follow a normal 
distribution, with zero mean and σ² standard deviation. The second term represents 
the Technical Efficiency (-u). In this specification, firms’ productive performances 
are not assimilated to a random variable and can then be explained by exogenous 
factors. The interest of this approach can also be seen in the fact that TEs having a 
relative form, firm productivity can be compared to (or benchmarked by) the most 
efficient ones across countries and regions.   
A complementary approach, after having calculated the Technical Efficiency (TE), 
is to explain firms’ diverse performances. Firms’ inefficiencies can be explained by 
“exogenous” factors, which affect either the technology of production, or the firms’ 
ability to transform inputs into outputs. In the literature, these factors have been 
estimated in two different ways. A simple method consists of estimating the 
stochastic production frontier, and regress the technical efficiency on a vector of 
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explanatory factors. This method is called the two-steps procedure. Different 
estimation procedures can be used in the second step. The simplest way is to run an 
OLS regression. Another possibility is to apply a Tobit model, in order to address 
the question of the distribution of the efficiency.  
The two-steps procedure presents, however, several shortcomings. It has been 
criticised for the restrictive underlying assumption, that econometric determinants 
of productivity or technical efficiencies (“z” factors), that are assumed to be 
identically distributed, are not correlated with inputs (“x”). Unfortunately, there are 
good reasons to believe in such a correlation (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000). In this 
case, omission of the z-factors in the first-step of the stochastic frontier model 
enhances biased estimations. For a long time, the importance of this potential bias 
has been a debated issue with little empirical evidence. In Caudill and Ford (1993), 
this bias does exist, but only for the estimated technological parameters, not for the 
efficiency levels themselves or their relationship to the “z”. Schmidt and Wang 
(2002) have contributed to give deeper insight. By performing Monte Carlo 
simulations, these authors analyse the properties of the two-step method. They find 
that the estimates of inefficiencies in the first stage are seriously biased so long as 
“x” and “z” are correlated. Moreover, they establish that even when “x” and “z” are 
not correlated, the effect of the “z” factors in the explanation of inefficiencies is 
incorrectly estimated. The most efficient solution then consists of estimating a “one 
step” frontier model, as suggested by Huang and Liu (1994) and Battese and Coelli 
(1995). 
3.3. Stochastic Frontier Analysis incorporating technical 
inefficiency determinants 
3.3.1 The “one step” estimation procedure 
Our first objective is to explain firms’ technical inefficiencies through different 
groups of variables reflecting organizational as well as economic and institutional 
factors. The second objective is to evaluate how foreign firms could be affected by 
these factors and the potential positive externalities for the domestic firms in doing 
business with the foreign companies. The empirical analysis follows the “one step” 
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estimation method by which the coefficients of the production frontier and the 
determinants of the firm inefficiency are simultaneously estimated. Stochastic 
Frontier Analysis (SFA) has the advantage to be statistical model with the possibility 
of testing hypotheses underlying the parameters of the production technology. In 
addition, in comparison with a deterministic approach, it accounts for the presence 
of random disturbances. These valuable advantages come at the cost that SFA 
presumes the specification of a specific distribution for the inefficiency term -the 
truncated normal distribution being retained- and a functional form that can be 
restrictive when describing the technology74.  
This model is based on the conditional mean approach. Inefficiency distribution is 
assumed to be truncated with a mean depending on the inefficiency covariates75. 
The estimation of the frontier and its determinants require the maximum likelihood 
technique, which assumes that technology factors “x” and the inefficiency covariates 
(z) are not correlated to avoid a potential endogeneity problem. The stochastic 
frontier model takes the following form: 
     ( , )( , , , , ) csit csit csiV U Zcsit csit c s tY f X D D D e δβ −=                         (3) 
Ycsit is the output of the firm i in country c and sector s during year t. Xcsit is a vector 
of inputs. Dc, Ds, and Dt reflect respectively country, sector, and years dummies 
introduced in order to capture the heterogeneity of the production technology 
across countries and sector76. Labor (L) and technical capital (K) have been retained 
                                                 
74 The results are not very sensitive by considering alternative statistical distributions such as 
exponential, half-normal, etc (Coelli, Prasada Rao and Battese, 1998). 
75 The mean of this distribution depends on some covariates that will be discussed later. According 
to Greene (2005), potential correlation effects with the input vector could be reduced through the 
inclusion of these effects in the mean specification. 
76 The panel data associates both firms and countries. Country, sector, and year dummies are 
introduced to capture the heterogeneity that is not explained by technical inefficiency factors. These 
dummies pick up the effect of country or sector specific factors, such as endowment in natural 
resources, national-level institutions, macro or political instability, trade policy, etc. 
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as inputs and f(.) is a suitable functional form. The stochastic frontier specification 
decomposes the total error term that we denote csitε  into two components: the 
usual random noise Vcsit and the asymmetric error term Ucsit(Zcsit, ), which depends 
on the z-factors affecting the inefficiency distribution denoted U (see, Battese and 
Coelli 1995): 
'
csit csi csitU Z δ η= +                                               (4) 
'Z  is the vector of the p-1 variables jZ , which may affect the inefficiency 
distribution, while η  is a truncated random normal variable N (0, 2Uσ ) and δ  a 
vector of the parameters to be estimated. Several assumptions underlie the 
maximum likelihood estimation of the production frontier. First, X and Z are not 
correlated with the random error terms: V or η , which are themselves not 
correlated. The independence assumption between the Z variables and η  can be 
violated in some cases. Inefficient firms can choose an unfavourable environment 
represented by some variables of the “Z” factors such as: bad geographic location, 
inappropriate skilled workers, etc. In addition, inputs (“X”) can be correlated to the 
vector of technical inefficiency determinants (U) if firms know that they could 
reduce their input consumption. In the framework of time-series productivity 
analyses, one attempt to solve this problem has been the Olley and Pakes (1996) 
semi-parametric solution77. The time dimension in this paper is quite short, not 
allowing the implementation of this procedure.  
With the production frontier being estimated, firm technical inefficiency can be 
derived. Jondrow et al. (1980) conditional method is the commonly used estimator. 
As inefficiency terms (U) are not identically distributed, comparisons across firms 
prove difficult when the Z vector components are not the same. We are reminded 
that in this particular case, it is assumed that if two firms: i and j, have the same 
                                                 
77 The Olley and Pakes (1996) procedure uses firm’s investment decisions to proxy unobserved 
time-varying productivity shocks. Instead of investment decision, Levinshon and Petrin (2003) 
propose to use intermediate inputs to control for productivity shocks. 
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inefficiency level with a different Z vector, the two truncated distributions are 
different.  
3.3.2 Adjusted efficiency measurements for environments 
Coelli et al (1999) have proposed adjusted measures of the inefficiency component by 
predicting scores with the most favourable environment, all with firms sharing the 
same truncated distribution. When dealing with large samples, this procedure may 
suffer from sensitivity to outliers in the observed jz . Then, depending on the 
variable, we project firms by adopting the best environment in the sample. The best 
environment is represented by the 95% quantile when the environmental factor is 
favorable (i.e., workforce education), and by the 5% quantile in the opposite case 
(i.e., electricity constraint). The following formula then applies -subscripts are 
limited to firm level for simplification purposes: 
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where aiZ  is the adjusted vector of the inefficiency determinants. Let us mention that 
the adjustment of the jz variables depends on the sign of the estimated 
coefficient jδ . If jδ <0, the jz  variable has a positive impact on the efficiency score; 
then, we adjust firm’s performance by the upper quantile of that variable. In the 
opposite case, the adjustment is done by the lower quantile: 
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where )(α
jz
q  is the α -quantile of the variable jz . Our adjusted measure of the 
productive performance allows an appraisal of the impact of each of the four 
dimensions of the jz variables: infrastructure, human capital, finance, and 
institution. Coelli et al. (1999) report the following adjusted inefficiency measure: 
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Where (.)Φ denotes the distribution function of the standard Gaussian random 
variable.  i
a
i
a
i Z γεδγµ −−= ')1(  ; )/( ),)(1( 222222* vuuvu σσσγσσγγσ +=+−= . aiZ ' is the 
adjusted vector of systematic influences on technical inefficiencies (6). If we replace 
the adjusted vector aiZ '  by the firm observed vector iZ ' in equation (7), an 
unadjusted inefficiency measure is obtained. 
Finally, five different adjusted technical efficiency measures are proposed by 
distinguishing among five different groups, reflecting infrastructure, human capital, 
finance, property right, and regulation variables. The decomposition allows for the 
identification of the intensity of the effect of each group in promoting firms’ 
efficiency. 
4. The ICA Surveys and data limitations  
The World Bank Investment Climate (ICA) surveys collect data on input and 
output, as well as on various aspects of firms’ characteristics (ownership, export 
share, etc.) and the investment climate at the firm level. The standard questionnaire 
collects data on firm production, investment and employment decisions. It also 
covers information such as public regulation, governance, and access to finance or 
infrastructural services. In all of the five countries, the national sampling procedure 
is supposed to be a random sample, reflecting the distribution of the firm 
population. Although ICA datasets are rich on a wide range of topics, practical 
problems giving rise to potential pitfalls are not negligible. For example, firms do 
not necessarily report the full range of the investment climate variables. The 
problem then arises in knowing whether missing variables are due to a random 
event or not. In addition, the time dimension of the surveys is quite limited. On the 
one hand, firms generally provide information in relation to their production 
technology during three consecutive years, but, on the other hand, they do not give 
a dynamic insight on their external environment over the same empirical period. 
Last, but not least, the standard questionnaire covers objective or “hard figures” as 
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well as perception data from respondents. Therefore, if it is not a white noise 
orthogonal to other variables, subjectivity can mislead the statistical inference.  
4.1. Inefficiency determinants and potential 
endogeneity bias. 
Many variables in the ICA datasets refer to firm “perceptions” 78. Comparisons then 
prove difficult, especially on an international basis. Perceptions make respondents 
prisoners from the environment they know, or they may expect on a normative 
basis. The perception of the scale might be different across firms, industries, 
regions, and countries. Besides, when answering the questions on their investment 
climate, firms may be influenced by the perception they have of their own 
productivity and may attribute their inefficiencies to external factors. High-
performing firms, as well, may be proactive in reducing their investment climate 
constraints, for example by working with the authorities to limit inspections or 
secure more reliable power supply. This means that a given condition, for example, 
a feature of the public governance, can be considered differently across countries 
and regions. The 2004 edition of the World Bank Doing Business has illustrated this 
point, where Belarus and Uzbekistan ranked ahead of France, Germany, and 
Sweden in the firms’ satisfaction with the efficiency of government. Would these 
perceptions have been the same if entrepreneurs have had the opportunity to 
project their business in an international environment other than their own?  Survey 
questions on perceptions do not always elicit meaningful responses because of the 
scaling of responses, unwillingness of respondents to admit their lack of knowledge, 
or their lack of a reference point for answering. Another problem arises with the 
causal inference and the accompanying potential endogeneity bias that may result. 
The risk is that firms blame their external environment, while the main problem 
results from their own organizational behaviour. For this reason, in this analysis, we 
retain only objective variables that are not subject to firms’ subjective judgments. 
Although the use of objective variable reduces endogeneity problem arising from 
measurements errors, simultaneity bias could remain. 
                                                 
78 Firms are asked to quantify their constraints on a scale going from none to very severe. 
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These limitations can be addressed by different means. One solution is the 
instrumentation. The efficiency of this method is dependent on the possibility to 
find exogenous instruments to proxy the suspected variables. Replacing the 
individual responses by regional-sector averages of the indicators is a way to manage 
the problem. Although this approach is not relevant for variables that depend on 
firms’ characteristics, it is considered acceptable for describing their external 
environment (Dollar et al, 2005; Commander and Svejnar, 2008). A main limitation 
of this method occurs if firms self-select their environment according to their ex-
ante calculus. We may expect that efficient enterprises choose to evolve in areas 
such as export promoting zone where they benefit from the best external 
conditions. To address the self-selection bias, one can control for variables such as 
size or ownership, or a robustness analysis can be done on a sample of small local 
firms that are not able to choose their location. The area being given, small 
enterprises are more relevant to reflect the relation between the external 
environment and technical inefficiency under the hypothesis that this area combines 
good as well as poor productive performers (cf Dollar et al, 2005). Incidentally, 
regional averages about characteristics of the external environment can also be used 
to complete firms’ missing information79.  
4.2. Non-respondent firms and potential sub-sample 
selection bias 
Investment Climate Surveys rely on large random samples of firms that are 
supposed to reflect the true sector-based population of each country. However, the 
estimation of the production technology, on one hand, and the incorporation of the 
technical inefficiency determinants on the other hand, can be a source of distortion 
at the level of the initial surveyed population. This distortion depends on the 
econometric specification of the model and the number of non-respondents, which 
varies a lot across country surveys, as well as the type of the investment climate 
indicators. Unanswered questions can be considered too complex or politically 
                                                 
79 Imputation by the mean concerns only the firms who provide complete information on their 
production technology and have some missing observations for the z factors. 
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sensible. Then, the potential presence of self-selection bias can be suspected. A 
priori, one cannot ignore the fact that characteristics and behaviors differ across 
firms depending on whether they are present or not in the final empirical sub-
sample. Our final sample of five developing countries retained for this analysis does 
not suffer from this potential bias. Almost all firms are retained in the empirical 
analysis for these five surveys.  
4.3. ICA surveys and the time dimension  
For production technology, ICA datasets contain the data for the surveyed-year 
and two years before. However, investment climate indicators refer only to the 
current year. Although some countries have been surveyed twice, the “one step” 
frontier model cannot be estimated under the conventional time-series-cross-section 
panel data form as the population of firms differs. In a cross sectional analysis, 
strong assumptions underlie the breakdown of the composed error model. The 
stability of the productivity in line with Aigner et al (1977) specification of the 
stochastic frontier model (i.e., without the factors explaining inefficiency), has been 
tested for three subsequent years. Productivity measures being estimated rather than 
observed, non-parametric kernel estimates of productivity density have been used. 
Kernel distribution graphs show that the three distributions overlap (Appendix 1). 
Therefore, the idea that the frontier with the z-factors is not specific to an empirical 
year seems reasonable.  Moreover, although we do not refer to the standard panel 
frame, combining firms, sectors, and countries has some advantages. First, statistical 
inference can be done on average country-sector distributions of the technical 
inefficiencies, and then in reducing the variance of the residual term, we would 
observe in a pure cross-sectional analysis. Second, in this empirical frame, we can 
control for the time invariant heterogeneity common to all firms in a specific sector 
with country and sector dummies. One can reasonably suppose that while firm 
production could vary slightly within three years, investment climate is a more 
structural factor that could be constant during three consecutive years (Dollar et al., 
2005). There are thus three alternative ways to estimate and explain firm 
productivity. The first one is to consider only production function variables and 
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investment climate variables during the survey year. The second option is to 
estimate the production function for the available three years and explain the 
averages of the productivity during these three years by the investment climate 
variables. This method is not applicable in our case since it refers to a two-steps 
procedure. The last option is to consider the investment climate variables as fixed 
during the three years and allow for some variability in the production function. 
Similarly to Dollar et al. (2005), we retain the last option in this chapter. 
4.4. Exchange rate issue 
The exchange rate constitutes another source of uncertainty, which may lead to over 
or under evaluate firms’ productive performances. This rate is used to convert 
production and production factors into US dollars. Several exchange rates can be 
chosen to calculate and compare firm-level productivity across countries. In this 
study, we considered the current market rate in US dollars, which offers the 
advantage of being the rate that firms use for their economic calculations80.  
                                                 
80 The choice of an adequate exchange rate depends, among other things, on the exchange rate 
regime of the country. In presence of a floating exchange rate regime, the volatility of the current 
exchange rate may affect the perception of the productive performances. This is particularly true 
for the Labor Productivity (LP). For Total Factor Productivity (TFP), this problem is somewhat 
attenuated by the fact that the same exchange rate is used to convert intermediate consumptions 
and capital in the denominator, and production in the numerator. Using current exchange rate 
introduces, as well, a bias for example when fixed exchange rate policy leads to an overvaluation of 
the currency, or when the floating rate suffers from overshooting. Current exchange rate has the 
advantage to represent the rate that firms deal with when making their own economic calculations. 
The producer faces this rate when he competes on external as well as domestic markets. Both, a 
constant exchange rate or the use of a Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) exchange rate with the US 
dollar, are surely more problematic for our analysis. PPP conversion rate is useful when comparing 
purchase power of income per capita. We know that the purchasing power in developing countries 
tends to be higher when GDP per capita is converted using nominal exchange rate. But when 
dealing with production, current rate is more representative of the enterprises’ economic reality. 
The choice of exchange rate does not seem, to change radically the perception of the firms’ 
productive performances. The coefficient of correlation of our two measures of firm-level 
productivity using alternatively current and constant exchange rates is relatively high.  
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4.5. Selected sample and variables 
Based on the ICA surveys, we define the investment climate by four categories: 
quality of infrastructure, institutions, human capital, and finance. Indicators have 
been selected based on availability and objectivity as well as their capacity to capture 
the different key dimensions of the investment climate. The quality of infrastructure 
is captured by electricity problems leading to the use of generators by firms to 
produce their own electricity. This variable captures the electricity problem but also 
the firm response to this constraint. More capitalistic and productive firms could 
indeed rely more on their own generator to produce electricity in a context of 
insufficient and unreliable electricity provision. Human capital is captured by the 
percentage of workforce with secondary education. Financing problems are 
represented by the firms’ lack of access to formal finance such as overdraft facility 
in their activity. The share of informal sources of finance in firms’ working capital is 
used to capture this aspect. The business-government relations or institutional 
factors are represented by the time devoted to regulation management, more 
precisely the percentage of senior managers’ time spent dealing with government 
regulation such as licensing and registration. Institutional factors are also captured 
by the regulation of labor and property rights protection.  
Based on the narrowly defined industries across countries of the enterprises surveys, 
we redefined five aggregated sector using two-digit ISIC Rev.2 classification81. The 
five sectors defined are Textile, Wearing Apparel and Leather; Food, Beverage and 
Tobacco; Wood and Wood Products including Furniture; Chemicals and Plastics 
Products; and Manufacture of fabricated metal products, Machinery, and 
Equipment. This analysis includes 4510 firms from five developing countries over 
the period 2000-2005: Brazil (2003), Morocco (2004), Pakistan (2002), South Africa 
                                                 
81 Two-digit ISIC Rev.2 classification is the closest aggregated sector-level classification to the one 
already defined in data. 
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(2003), Vietnam (2005)82. Countries were chosen according to the availability of the 
nation-based statistical information, which is pooled to constitute an international 
panel on the manufacturing sector. 
5. Empirical results 
The Total factor productivity (TFP) is calculated from a non-parametric relation as 
indicated in section 3.183. Table 1 presents the firm-level TFP by sector under the 
assumption that a sector-based technology leads to more homogenous production 
function.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
82 The number of firms by country is as follow: Brazil: 1474, Morocco: 789, Pakistan: 822, South 
Africa: 432, Vietnam: 993. 
83 The value added is the difference between total sales and total purchase of raw material. The 
number of permanent workers and total wages capture labor and capital is represented by the gross 
value of property, plant, and equipment. 
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Table 5.1: Mean and median of firm-level total factor productivity 
 Period t Period t-1 Period t-2 
 Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Food and Beverage       
Brazil 0,90 0,93 0,85 0,96 0,83 0,91 
Morocco 0,64 0,68 0,30 0,42 0,43 0,57 
Pakistan 0,59 0,44 0,46 0,42 0,44 0,38 
South Africa 1,10 1,23 1,06 1,11 0,83 1,03 
Vietnam 0,22 0,26 0,15 0,22 0,29 0,34 
Textile and  W. Apparel       
Brazil 1,02 0,98 1,08 1,07 1,09 1,08 
Morocco 0,77 0,72 0,75 0,72 0,71 0,68 
Pakistan 0,81 0,65 0,63 0,52 0,50 0,36 
South Africa 1,18 1,06 1,17 1,00 1,12 1,08 
Vietnam 0,23 0,29 0,22 0,25 0,10 0,19 
Wood  incl. furniture       
Brazil 0,92 0,89 0,98 0,96 1,00 1,01 
Morocco 0,22 0,26 1,20 0,67 -0,02 -0,33 
South Africa 1,13 1,02 1,06 1,06 1,06 0,91 
Vietnam 0,47 0,44 0,39 0,38 0,38 0,32 
Chemicals and plastic products       
Brazil 1,10 1,11 0,92 0,92 0,92 0,78 
Morocco 0,80 0,60 0,74 0,63 0,71 0,52 
Pakistan 0,67 0,55 0,52 0,50 0,34 0,34 
South Africa 1,10 1,04 1,26 1,19 1,24 1,16 
Vietnam 0,25 0,28 0,20 0,27 0,22 0,23 
Machinery and Equipment       
Brazil 0,94 0,91 0,97 0,91 0,93 0,86 
Morocco 0,90 0,64 0,81 0,70 0,97 0,86 
Pakistan 0,76 0,77 0,64 0,61 0,60 0,52 
South Africa 1,03 0,95 1,02 0,88 0,97 0,88 
Vietnam 0,31 0,39 0,43 0,44 0,35 0,44 
 
In all industries and periods, South Africa presents the most performing firms 
followed closely by Brazil. Vietnam ranks at the bottom of the sample except in the 
wood and furniture sector, while Morocco and Pakistan have an intermediate 
position. With the exception of Morocco in the Wood and furniture sector, total 
factor productivity is relatively constant across the three observed years with some 
slight increases according to the sector and the country. 
Chapter 5: Investment Climate, Foreign Ownership, and Aggregate Productivity 
 
 
158
5.1 SFA models with technical inefficiency 
determinants 
The Cobb Douglas functional form is supposed to describe the production 
technology. An alternative functional form such as the translog did not reveal 
significant differences for the international ranking across the five countries or the 
national statistical distributions of efficiency measures. The Cobb Douglas 
technology has the valuable advantage to allow an easy interpretation of the 
estimated coefficients84. SFA, with country, sector, and year fixed-effects and the 
determinants of inefficiency are provided in Table 2.  
                      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
84 The use of a more flexible functional form such as the translogarithmic did not reveal any 
significant variation of the coefficients of the technology as well as the coefficients of the 
investment climate variables. With the translogarithmic form, the elasticity of labor and capital is 
respectively 0.75 and 0.18. The elasticity of labor squared, capital squared, and the cross term 
between labor and capital is respectively 0.06, 0.05, and -0.05. The Spearman correlation rank 
between the efficiency with the Cobb-Douglas model and the efficiency with the translogarithmic 
model is 0.98 and statistically significant at 1%. 
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Table 5.2: Investment climate and firm-level inefficiency 
 Dependent Variable: ln(Value added) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Production Function     
Ln(Capital) 0.178 0.179 0.178 0.178 
 (30.30)*** (30.41)*** (30.30)*** (30.25)*** 
Ln(Labor) 0.736 0.736 0.736 0.736 
 (69.30)*** (69.37)*** (69.27)*** (69.05)*** 
Constant 2.162 2.126 2.166 2.210 
 (13.37)*** (13.87)*** (13.16)*** (12.28)*** 
Investment Climate (Investment Climate variables are regressed on firm-level inefficiency) 
Size -0.134 -0.136 -0.133 -0.134 
 (7.66)*** (7.75)*** (7.38)*** (7.48)*** 
Age -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.93) (1.05) (0.94) (0.98) 
Informal Finance 0.002  0.002 0.002 
 (3.13)***  (3.13)*** (3.17)*** 
Informal Finance+  0.003   
  (1.91)*   
Electricity Problem 0.222 0.207 0.222 0.222 
 (4.10)*** (3.75)*** (4.12)*** (4.20)*** 
Workforce Education -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 
 (8.09)*** (8.12)*** (8.01)*** (7.99)*** 
Property Rights Protection -0.035 -0.035 -0.034 -0.034 
 (2.15)** (2.13)** (2.13)** (2.17)** 
Labor Regulation   0.000  
   (0.31)  
Regulation Management    0.006 
    (2.63)*** 
Constant 1.126 1.136 1.113 1.117 
 (6.51)*** (6.66)*** (6.24)*** (6.31)*** 
Observations 8051 8083 8051 8051 
sigma_u 0.26 0.27 0.26 0.26 
 [0.15] [0.15] [0.15] [0.15] 
sigma_v 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.66 
 [0.15] [0.14] [0.15] [0.15] 
Wald chi2 17640.05 17078.41 17168.21 17106.39 
Prob > chi2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses. Number in brackets for sigma_u and sigma_v are standard errors. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
All regressions include year, country, and sector dummies. 
All investment climate variables are industry-region averages by size and capital ownership except informal finance 
variable which is firm-level information. Informal finance+ is industry-region averages by capital ownership and size.  
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Although country and sector dummies are significant in average, year dummies are 
not significant at all, supporting the equality of the distribution of the productivity 
across the three consecutive years for each country. The sum of inputs’ elasticities 
being not significantly different from one, we cannot reject the assumption of 
constant returns to scale. The labor coefficient is about 0.74 which is around the 
usual contribution found in the literature for the relative contribution of wages into 
the value added. The standard error of the inefficiency component uσ  is significant 
and thus does not reject the relevance of the stochastic frontier hypothesis against 
the OLS model where the error term would be the classical random disturbances. 
This result justifies the production frontier model, against the production function 
approach. However, the spearman correlation rank highlights that the distribution 
of efficiency using the stochastic frontier model is close to the non-parametric total 
factor productivity85. 
In regards to the explanation of the inefficiency determinants, the potential 
endogeneity bias has been treated at best by using city-sector averages by size and 
foreign ownership of the investment climate variables86. In the case of financing 
constraints, we use regional averages as well as firm-level information. The results 
are robust to both definitions of which we retain the firm-level information for the 
rest of the analysis. Bigger firms are associated with a higher productivity level87. 
                                                 
85 The spearman correlation rank between the non-parametric total factor productivity and the 
parametric technical efficiency score is high (0.62) and significant at 1% level. 
86 We ensure to get sufficient number of firms by city, sector, size and foreign ownership status and 
the results are robust to alternative way of aggregation of the investment climate variables. 
87 The new literature on international trade associates firms’ size with increasing returns to scale. 
The literature on corporate governance describes the difficulties in inciting and controlling big 
enterprises, although they are more able to reduce transaction costs and facilitate economic 
calculations. Small enterprises are described as less capitalistic and more flexible in a volatile 
environment, in particular in economies characterized by rigidities that encourage the development 
of the informal economy. 
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Except labor regulation, all investment climate variables88 are significant. The 
financing constraint is strongly negatively correlated with firms’ efficiency. 
Overdrafts facilities potentially mean fewer risks of disruptions in the provision of 
raw materials and intermediary consumptions and a better ability to finance the 
working capital. The empirical model also displays the significant impact of public 
utilities through the presence of electricity constraints. The role of this factor was 
similarly evidenced in several studies including in Dollar et al. (2006). The quality of 
human capital, captured by the share of firms’ workforce with secondary education 
is positively and significantly correlated with firms’ efficiency., Firms that are more 
efficient have more skilled workers and are able to absorb new production processes 
and technologies. Various aspects including property rights protection, labor 
regulation, and the time spent by firms’ managers to deal with government 
regulations capture the institutional environment. Better protection of property 
rights is associated with higher technical efficiency and time spent for government 
regulation is negatively correlated with firms’ efficiency. These results highlight the 
importance of regional variation of institutions, consistently with Dollar et al. 
(2005). By reducing transaction costs and ensuring investment projects, secure 
property rights and lower regulatory constraints from government, create a 
business-friendly environment, stimulating firms’ performances.  
Firms can choose a location with better infrastructure and production conditions, 
what relates to the endogeneity of implantation. City or region-sector averages IC 
indicators would not be exogenous regressors if, for example, more efficient firms 
                                                 
88 Investment climate variables are financing constraint, education level of workforce, electricity 
constraint, property rights protection, labor regulation, and management of regulation. Financing 
constraint indicates the percentage of firms working capital coming from informal source. 
Workforce education represents the percentage of workorce with secondary education. Electricity 
constraint is the percentage of firms that own or share a generator. Property rights protection is an 
indicator of protection of property rights by the judicial system scaled from 1 to 6 with higher scale 
indicating better protection. Labor regulation is the percentage of the optimal level of employment 
compared to the current level. Regulation management is the percentage of senior managers’ time 
dealing with government regulation. 
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tend to establish in locations where the investment climate is better. To address the 
issue of endogeneity relating to firms implantation, we restrict the sample to the 
enterprises that are less likely to choose their location. Following Dollar et al. (2005), 
we define this category as domestically owned firms employing less than 150 
workers (henceforth, small local firms) by excluding from the sample the foreign as 
well as large domestically owned firms. Results of this new set of estimations 
confirm the previous findings (see appendix 2). Investment climate constraints still 
reduce significantly firms’ performances. The results show that small and medium 
domestic firms are particularly affected by changes in the different dimensions of 
the investment climate.  
Next to the importance of the investment climate, foreign firms89 are associated 
with higher productivity justifying externalities in terms of new technologies and 
management techniques linked to foreign participation90 (table 3). This finding 
supports the prediction of a large part of the theoretical and empirical literature that 
highlights the better productive performances of foreign firms. The positive and 
significant correlation between foreign firms and efficiency could mean that, 
because of sharing of better management and production practices, foreign 
acquisition increases the productivity of firms. This could also suggest that 
multinational companies are acquiring the most productive local firms, leading to 
simultaneity bias.  
 
                                                 
89 Following the IMF standard definition of FDI, the foreign ownership variable is a dummy taking 
one if at least 10% of the firm’s capital is foreign and zero otherwise. 
90 As in Commander and Svejnar (2008), the impact of export orientation is rejected, when export 
and foreign ownership variables are introduced together in the model. Therefore, non-significance 
of the export variable does not mean that correlation with inefficiencies does not exist at all. In this 
working paper, Commander and Svejnar refer to the 2005 and 2002 Business Environment and 
Enterprise Performance Surveys (BEEPS) collected by the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD) and the World Bank. Firms are from a wide range of sectors across 26 
transition countries. 
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Table 5.3: Foreign ownership, investment climate and firm-level inefficiency 
 Dependent Variable: ln(Value added) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Production Function     
Ln(Capital) 0.184 0.178 0.175 0.175 
 (31.30)*** (30.25)*** (29.55)*** (29.50)*** 
Ln(Labor) 0.744 0.736 0.733 0.734 
 (73.02)*** (69.05)*** (68.91)*** (66.17)*** 
Constant 1.751 2.210 2.232 2.242 
 (13.88)*** (12.28)*** (13.75)*** (8.53)*** 
Investment Climate (Investment climate variables are regressed on firm-level inefficiency) 
Size -0.158 -0.134 -0.138 -0.134 
 (8.64)*** (7.48)*** (8.06)*** (6.84)*** 
Age -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (1.45) (0.98) (1.39) (1.50) 
Foreign Firm -0.287  -0.153 -0.149 
 (4.90)***  (3.68)*** (3.55)*** 
Export (% of sales)    0.000 
    (0.92) 
Informal Finance  0.002 0.002 0.002 
  (3.17)*** (3.12)*** (3.19)*** 
Electricity Problems  0.222 0.211 0.220 
  (4.20)*** (3.88)*** (4.18)*** 
Workforce Education  -0.010 -0.009 -0.009 
  (7.99)*** (8.26)*** (7.02)*** 
Property Rights Protection  -0.034 -0.029 -0.029 
  (2.17)** (1.86)* (1.88)* 
Regulation Management  0.006 0.007 0.006 
  (2.63)*** (2.88)*** (2.94)*** 
Constant 1.169 1.117 1.142 1.191 
 (9.39)*** (6.31)*** (6.42)*** (5.29)*** 
Observations 8272 8051 8036 8008 
sigma_u 0.23 0.26 0.26 0.26 
 [0.17] [0.15] [0.15] [0.16] 
sigma_v 0.68 0.66 0.66 0.66 
 [0.15] [0.15] [0.15] [0.16] 
Wald chi2 19323.41 17106.39 16522.23 15873.94 
Prob > chi2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses. Number in brackets for sigma_u and sigma_v are standard errors. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
All regressions include year, country, and sector dummies. 
All investment climate variables are industry-region averages by size and capital ownership except informal finance 
variable which is firm-level information.  
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This section also offers an analysis of the investment climate as a potential 
transmission channel through which foreign ownership could affect firm 
productivity. The hypothesis being that foreign firm could benefit from a better 
business environment than local firms leading to higher productivity. When the 
investment climate variables are introduced in the regressions, the coefficient of the 
foreign firm variable is significantly reduced, indicating that better investment 
climate of the foreign firms is one transmission channel of the positive effect of 
foreign ownership on firms’ productivity. 
The chapter thus proposes an alternative way to analyze why foreign firms are more 
productive than local ones. Beyond the usual argument of access to better 
technologies and management practices, we suggest that foreign firms could be 
more productive because they benefit from a better investment climate when doing 
business compared to local firms. The investment climate which is supposed to be 
identical across all firms operating in the same area could be different for foreign 
firms or at least affect them differently. Foreign firms could in fact resist more to a 
degradation of their investment climate or even positively influence it, or they can 
locate in areas where the investment climate is more favorable (chapter 3).  
The following graphs confirm that on average, foreign firms benefit from a better 
investment climate. Financing constraints and lack of education of the workforce 
seem to be two major constraints affecting particularly domestic firms compared to 
the foreign ones. Foreign firms rely more on their own generators to produce 
electricity. This situation highlights the unreliable provision of electricity, forcing 
firms to adopt a more costly alternative. Given their higher financing constraints, 
limiting their ability to produce electricity, domestic firms could suffer more from 
electricity problems compared to foreign firms. Institutional problems affect both 
categories of firms in around the same magnitude. The exception is the property 
rights that are more secure for foreign firms. 
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Figure 5.1: Major investment climate variables and capital ownership 
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As explained in section 2.3, foreign firms may face lower investment climate 
constraints because of their ability to raise external finance, to attract the more 
skilled workers or to provide consistent training to their employees. Foreign firms 
can also overcome more easily infrastructure problems such as unreliable provision 
of electricity by using their foreign expertise and finance to develop costly power 
generator systems. In term of institutional factors, the argument could go in two 
opposite directions. Since foreign firms do not know the specific characteristics of 
the local markets like local firms do, they could face more difficulties when dealing 
with official regulations and laws. On the other hand, policy makers in many 
countries -particularly developing countries- often seek to attract FDI with various 
incentives including tax breaks, lowering of administrative burden, and better 
guarantee of property rights protection. These incentives could finally lower the 
administrative cost of doing business and offer better institutional framework to 
foreign firms compared to the local ones.  
A multivariate analysis could provide more credit to these first insights. The 
following section uses cross terms between investment climate variables and foreign 
ownership to assess whether foreign ownership effectively helps firms to dampen 
the negative effect of the investment climate constraints on their productivity.  
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Table 5.4: Foreign ownership, investment climate and firm-level inefficiency 
 Dependent Variable: ln(Value added) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Production Function    
Ln(Capital) 0.175 0.174 0.174 
 (29.54)*** (29.51)*** (29.48)*** 
Ln(Labor) 0.732 0.732 0.732 
 (68.96)*** (67.59)*** (67.89)*** 
Constant 2.206 2.337 2.323 
 (14.18)*** (10.70)*** (10.86)*** 
Investment Climate (Investment climate variables are regressed on firm-level inefficiency) 
Size -0.136 -0.128 -0.129 
 (7.93)*** (7.18)*** (7.15)*** 
Age -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (1.33) (1.55) (1.47) 
Foreign Firm 0.150 0.173 0.050 
 (0.54) (0.92) (0.20) 
Informal Finance 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (3.00)*** (3.17)*** (3.08)*** 
Electricity Problems 0.252 0.273 0.262 
 (4.21)*** (4.76)*** (4.52)*** 
Workforce Education -0.010 -0.009 -0.009 
 (8.16)*** (8.28)*** (8.14)*** 
Property Rights Protection -0.030  -0.028 
 (1.72)*  (1.67)* 
Regulation Management  0.001 0.001 
  (0.23) (0.29) 
Informal Finance*Foreign Firm 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.15) (0.42) (0.40) 
Electricity Problems*Foreign Firm -0.223 -0.257 -0.248 
 (1.86)* (2.43)** (2.30)** 
Workforce Education*Foreign Firm -0.001 0.000 0.000 
 (0.26) (0.03) (0.04) 
Property Rights Protection*Foreign Firm 0.019  0.026 
 (0.46)  (0.66) 
Regulation Management*Foreign Firm  0.013 0.013 
  (3.08)*** (3.03)*** 
Constant 1.086 1.008 1.132 
 (5.98)*** (5.14)*** (5.57)*** 
Observations 8036 8036 8036 
sigma_u 0.26 0.25 0.26 
 [0.15] [0.16] [0.16] 
sigma_v 0.66 0.66 0.66 
 [0.15] [0.16] [0.16] 
Wald chi2 16825.69 15922.96 15978.95 
Prob > chi2 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses. Number in brackets for sigma_u and sigma_v are standard errors. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All regressions include year, country, and sector 
dummies. All investment climate variables are industry-region averages by size and capital ownership except 
informal finance variable which is firm-level information. 
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The results show that on average, investment climate constraints jeopardize firm 
productivity. However, with the exception of regulation management, investment 
climate problems are not significant constraints for foreign firm efficiency. Foreign 
firms also positively influence their own investment climate. This is particularly the 
case for electricity problems were foreign firms handle the use of their own 
generator in a context of unreliable electricity provision to become more efficient 
compared to the average firm. Given their relatively limited knowledge of the local 
markets compared to domestic firms and their more efficient use of time in 
production processes, foreign companies suffer more from the time spent in dealing 
with government regulation.  
This finding shows that foreign firms are more resistant to a degradation of the 
investment climate and confirms that foreign enterprises have the possibility to 
influence positively their investment climate or to establish in locations where the 
investment climate is more favorable. This outcome should be considered as of first 
importance, knowing the potential of job creation of local enterprises in developing 
countries. In accordance with our results, local businesses generally deal with poor 
investment climate. They have, for example, a more difficult and more expensive 
access to the financial system. Additionally, they do not have the same power to 
lobby policy makers to get secure property rights. Local firms also attract less 
qualified people who would prefer higher salaries in foreign enterprises. They have 
less the capacity to compensate deficient infrastructure, buying a generator or paying 
for expensive internet connections (in addition to the fact that they do not choose 
their location). This makes this category of firms a great potential for an 
improvement of the industrial sector performance. This is particularly true for 
developing economies, where small local firms account for a larger share of total 
firms. Improvement of various dimensions of the investment climate could thus 
boost competitiveness of the local and small firms on the world market and 
generate substantial productivity gains in the manufacturing sector. The following 
section assesses the potential gains of aggregate productivity by projecting firms in 
the best investment climate in their country, which is the investment climate faced 
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by the foreign firms. This exercise is firstly made within the sectors of each country 
and then within each country regardless of the sector. 
5.2 Adjusted technical efficiency to better investment 
climate    
Firms’ efficiencies can be projected in common productive conditions, which are 
given by the best environments in either the sector, or national frames. Sectoral 
contexts are likely to be the most realistic ones. By this calculation, we simulate the 
percentage of technical efficiency that could be gained under the hypothesis that 
firms operate with the best sector-wide investment climate as captured by our 
investment climate variables. This reasoning is conducted under the restrictive ceteris 
paribus hypothesis: the performance of firms evolving with the best environment 
remains unchanged.  
For the robustness of these projections, the best 5% firm-environment has been 
considered for each of the investment climate categories. The same method has 
been adopted for projecting firms in the best national environments regardless of 
the sector. On one hand, this second scenario is much more speculative or 
hypothetical as the availability of skilled workers or the importance of electricity 
constraints could vary according to the sector of activity. On the other hand, in the 
context of globalization, with more integrated national and international markets, 
competition is everywhere and firm competitiveness is affected by all the elements 
conditioning relative production costs regardless of the sector or industry. 
Managers, as well as public decision-makers, have to know where the most 
promising interventions are in order to improve firm integration in a national 
context and into the world economy. Adjusted measures for the aforementioned 
environments shed some light on this point91. 
 
                                                 
91 The same exercise has been carried-out with no significant variation with the translogarithmic 
specification. Results are provided in appendix. 
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Figure 5.2: Projection to the best environments by sector within the country 
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From Figure 3, it can be seen that in an industry frame, cumulative efficiency gains 
range from less than 10% in South Africa to about 20% in Pakistan. On average, 
these marked differences reflect statistical dispersion, which tends to be more 
pronounced in the lowest per capita GDP countries. Gains with more skilled workers 
are systematically the most substantial ones, except in Pakistan where the projection 
to the best property rights provides the highest efficiency gain. For all countries, 
projection in the best environment of skilled workers and secure property rights of 
the sector accounts for more than 60% of the total expected gains. When passing 
from the actual to the best formal rule context in the sector, productive efficiency 
does improve significantly. Our results are similar to those of Dollar et al. (2006) 
suggesting that local governance is important and institutions vary for each sector 
across locations within countries. Better access to skilled workers will facilitate the 
adoption of new technologies and new processes of production, increasing 
productivity. Access to the best financing condition in each sector, by improving 
firms’ business relation with their client and suppliers of intermediate goods, 
contributes significantly to higher productive efficiency. Beside the better access to 
finance, which ranks third in terms of contribution to better productivity, more 
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reliable electricity provision also boosts aggregate efficiency. A lower burden of 
regulation management does not significantly improve productive efficiency.  
Figure 5.3: Projection to the best environments within the country (all sector) 
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When efficiency scores are adjusted to the most favorable national (all sectors) 
conditions (Figure 4), the conclusions are similar and consistent with the views 
associated with the role that human capital, institutions, and finance play in the 
development process. Efficiency gains range from less than 10% in South Africa to 
around 25% percent in Pakistan. Among all categories of the investment climate, 
human capital ranks first across all countries. The quality of human capital accounts 
for almost 50% of the simulated improvement in Pakistan. Projections for Morocco 
and Brazil in the best environment lead to aggregate productivity gain of more than 
10% with human capital and institution representing more than half of the gain. In 
Vietnam, the availability of skilled workers overrides everything else. Finally, 
projections are of limited interest for South Africa, where the dispersion in the 
quality of the investment climate is more limited. These last results remind us of the 
hypothesis underlying projections, with all of them being carried out within the 
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methodological frame of the best practice with accompanied implication: the 
conditional results upon the empirical sample we refer to.                                          
Beyond their direct effect on aggregate productivity, foreign firms could also 
improve country-level productivity by improving the performances of local firms. 
This refers to the literature on spillovers effects from foreign firms to the local 
enterprises.  
5.3 Sales to multinationals and spillovers  
The literature distinguishes horizontal from vertical spillovers. Horizontal spillovers 
refer to the increase of a sector aggregate productivity due to the entry of foreign 
firms with higher productivity in this sector. This leads to incentives for other firms 
to increase their productivity in a more competitive environment. Higher 
productivity with horizontal spillovers could be achieved by copying new 
technologies and production processes, or by hiring trained workers and managers 
from foreign firms. Local firms with the lowest productivity performance and that 
are not able to catch-up with the higher performance of the other firms in the sector 
could be crowded-out of the market.  
Firms doing business with foreign companies could benefit from positive 
externalities. This refers to vertical spillovers and affects domestic firms that supply 
goods or services to foreign firms as well as domestic companies that are clients of 
foreign firms. In fact, foreign firms could require higher standards from their local 
suppliers, leading to higher productivity. Foreign firms could also provide higher 
standard products to their domestic clients leading to better productive 
performances.  
Empirical analyses studying spillovers effects from foreign firms use input-output 
matrix to derive sector-based indicators of spillovers. These proxies are, for 
horizontal spillovers, the share of a sector output produced by foreign affiliates. 
Vertical spillovers can be grouped in backward and forward linkages. Backward 
linkages measure the spillovers from the presence of foreign firms downstream and 
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represent the weighted share of foreign capital from all sectors that are supplied by 
the sector considered. Forward linkages measure the spillovers from the presence of 
foreign firms upstream and represent the weighted share of foreign capital from all 
sectors that supply the sector considered. Weights in backward and forward linkages 
are the share of the sector output used as intermediate inputs by another sector.  
Although empirical evidence of the existence of spillovers, particularly horizontal 
spillovers is mixed, a recent literature based on firm-level studies highlights the 
evidence of higher productivity in the supplying industries due to the presence of 
foreign ownership in the downstream sectors (Blalock and Gertler, 2004 in 
Indonesia; Javorick, 2004 in Lithuania, and Javorick and Spatareanu, 2008 in 
Romania). This new literature uses firm-level data for the estimation of productivity, 
but spillovers proxies are still defined at the sector-level. Sector-level information 
could hide significant heterogeneity between firms in the sector. Indeed, interaction 
between foreign firms and local companies could be limited only to the biggest local 
firms, which are, on average, the most productive local firms in each sector. Instead 
of using sector-level information to assess the importance of business between 
foreign and local companies, this chapter uses, for the first time, newly available 
data on the exact sales of each firms to multinational companies located in the 
country to proxy the extent of vertical spillovers, precisely a “backward linkage”92. 
Firstly, we do this for all firms and then restrict our sample to the local firms and 
then to the small-local firms as robustness checks. Information on the share of 
firms’ sales directed to multinationals in the country has the advantage to capture 
the exact extent of cooperation at firm-level with foreign companies located in the 
economy. This allows us to control for potential heterogeneity of spillovers within 
different sectors. The following table gives the results from the analysis of the effect 
of backward linkages on firm productivity.  
 
                                                 
92 This study does not claim to be a substitute to panel data analyses but rather a complementary 
approach proposing a more precise proxy for vertical (backward) vertical spillovers. 
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Table 5.5: Sales to multinationals and firm-level inefficiency 
 Dependent Variable: ln(Value added) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Production Function      
Ln(capital) 0.199 0.178 0.178 0.177 0.173 
 (34.22)*** (29.00)*** (28.95)*** (28.85)*** (28.24)*** 
Ln(labor) 0.797 0.743 0.743 0.742 0.739 
 (98.43)*** (67.01)*** (67.03)*** (66.75)*** (66.39)*** 
Constant 1.892 2.596 2.626 1.962 2.710 
 (12.00)*** (12.88)*** (12.75)*** (14.05)*** (12.59)*** 
Investment Climate (Investment climate variables are regressed on firm-level inefficiency) 
Size -2.535 -0.146 -0.145 -0.149 -0.146 
 (5.57)*** (7.77)*** (7.74)*** (7.84)*** (8.22)*** 
Age -0.045 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (1.44) (0.98) (0.98) (1.07) (1.43) 
Sales to multinational -0.078 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 (2.46)** (3.50)*** (3.51)*** (3.50)*** (3.12)*** 
Informal finance  0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
  (3.35)*** (3.40)*** (3.36)*** (3.40)*** 
Electricity problem  0.218 0.218 0.216 0.212 
  (3.55)*** (3.63)*** (3.48)*** (3.54)*** 
Workforce education  -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 
  (7.16)*** (7.15)*** (6.94)*** (7.34)*** 
Property rights protection  -0.029 -0.029 -0.030 -0.020 
  (1.66)* (1.64) (1.68)* (1.17) 
Regulation Management   0.004 0.004 0.004 
   (1.50) (1.55) (1.82)* 
Export (% of sales)    -0.000 -0.000 
    (0.71) (0.18) 
Foreign Firm     -0.176 
     (3.76)*** 
Constant -4.071 1.199 1.190 1.186 1.218 
 (2.68)*** (6.49)*** (6.44)*** (6.34)*** (6.32)*** 
Observations 7622 7403 7403 7387 7375 
sigma_u 2.27 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.34 
 [0.71] [0.17] [0.17] [0.17] [0.17] 
sigma_v 0.62 0.62 0.61 0.61 0.62 
 [0.10] [0.15] [0.16] [0.15] [0.16] 
Wald chi2 36050.72 14382.33 14121.22 13720.07 13507.58 
Prob > chi2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses. Number in brackets for sigma_u and sigma_v are standard errors. * significant 
at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
All regressions include year, country, and sectoral dummies. 
Sale to multinational is the percentage of firm sales to domestic multinational. All investment climate variables are industry-
region averages by capital ownership except informal finance variable which is firm-level information.  
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Investment climate variables are still significant determinants of firm level 
productivity similarly to the previous sections. The higher are firms’ sales to the 
multinationals in the country, the more productive these firms are. This result 
illustrates higher productivity level of firms supplying the foreign companies. 
Improvement of productivity of foreign firms’ suppliers could be the consequences 
of higher requirement in term of standard, timing and quality of products by foreign 
firms to their local suppliers. Since foreign companies will benefit from better 
productivity of their local suppliers, multinational firms could deliberately transfer 
knowledge, new technologies and production processes to their local partners. The 
positive relationship between firm-level productive efficiency and the share of their 
sales to local multinationals could thus be interpreted as firms improve their 
productive performances by doing business with foreign companies. With the entry 
of foreign firms in the local markets and their higher requirement in term of product 
quality, low-performer local firms that are not able to respond to this new demand 
could be crowded-out from the market. This could be problematic if this market 
selection of firms supplying multinational companies leads to the exclusion of local 
firms or small firms. In this case, aggregate productivity could still increase but big 
and foreign-owned firms will drive this. Given the potential and the importance of 
small and local firms in creating jobs in developing countries, exclusion of those 
firms could have negative impact on local employment. Our baseline regressions 
include firm size as well as a foreign ownership variable to control for these two 
aspects. Regardless of firms’ size and foreign participation in their capital, firms 
selling higher part of their production to multinationals exhibit higher productivity. 
Additional robustness checks based exclusively on a sample of local firms and small-
local firms confirms the results (appendix 4).  
Local firms and small-local firms doing business with foreign firm located in the 
country have on average higher productivity. Even with the restricted sample of 
local and small-local firms, selectivity problem could still arise. Indeed, higher 
competition induced by demand from multinational companies could lead to the 
exit of non-productive local and small firms and the new entry of more productive 
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local and small firms into the market. This possibility highlights the potential 
simultaneity bias in our results. It is worth noting that the direction of the causality 
does not matter in our case. Either local firms are more productive because of 
technology or production processes sharing with foreign firms or because of the 
drop-out of local non-efficient firms and the entry of new, more productive local 
firms, the impact of doing business with foreign firms is positive for the aggregated 
local firms and the aggregate economy at large. 
6. Conclusion 
This chapter has analyzed productive performance for the manufacturing industry 
by considering the “one step” Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) where production 
technology and efficiency determinants are simultaneously estimated. Efficiency 
scores are equivalent to a relative productivity measure, with efficient firms 
providing the benchmark. Across the five countries we investigated using the World 
Bank’s Investment Climate Assessment databases, average productivity scores broadly 
reflect international per capita GDP differences. In other words, South Africa and 
Brazil exhibit the highest average productivity. The variance of inefficiencies 
depends on some factors proceeding from the quality of firm organizations but also 
from the external environment they face with regards to the economic and 
institutional dimensions. Particular attention is given to foreign ownership as the 
aim of this chapter is to use a new approach to explain why foreign firms are more 
productive than local ones. This approach proposes the difference in the investment 
climate faced by foreign and local firms as a main factor contributing to the higher 
productivity of foreign firms. An innovative way to assess the extent of vertical 
spillovers from foreign firms to local companies is also explored. 
The results show that returns to scales are relatively constants, legitimating the 
hypothesis underlying the non-parametric total factor productivity measures. The 
estimations confirm that differences in the investment climate highly contribute to 
the technical efficiency differences. To explain disparity in industrial performances, 
we first focus on the role of four measures of the investment climate. We show that 
differences in the quality of infrastructure, in the level of education of the labor 
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force, in access to finance, as well as in two dimensions of the institutional quality 
significantly explain productivity disparities. Similarly with Dollar et al. (2006), the 
variation across firm location within a country of institutional variables is a 
significant determinant of inefficiency scores. Bigger firms also tend to be the more 
productive. These findings show that, in the global economy where technology 
diffuses more rapidly and capital is more mobile, the persistence of productivity 
differences among countries can be partially explained by differences in the 
investment climate.  
In particular, we show that higher productivity of foreign firms can be explained by 
the better investment climate they face compared to local companies. Indeed, 
foreign firms can influence positively their investment climate or locate where 
investment climate is better. While investment climate matters for firms’ 
productivity on average, foreign firms productive performances are not negatively 
influenced by the local investment climate constraints. Adjusted efficiency to the 
best investment climate in each country -the investment climate faced by foreign 
firms- highlights efficiency gains ranging from less than 10% in South Africa to 
about 25% in Pakistan.  
Based on firm-level information, we also find evidence of vertical spillovers from 
foreign firms to the local ones. Contrary to the past studies in which the spillovers 
effects are estimated at sector-level, we use, for the first time, the share of each 
firm’s sales to multinationals located in the country to assess the importance of the 
spillovers. We find that firms, and particularly local and small-local firms, selling part 
of their production to foreign firms exhibit higher productivity. This confirms the 
existence and importance of vertical spillovers through backward linkages in our 
sample countries.  
The results support the idea that deficiencies in the investment climate can be at the 
origin of a loss of domestic and international competitiveness. The results show, 
therefore, that enhancing investment climate constitutes a powerful engine for 
better productivity and competitiveness of the manufacturing industry, facilitating 
the long-run convergence process. Another interesting finding can be seen in the 
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fact that the impact of the investment climate is statistically stronger for small and 
medium (under 150 workers) domestic firms. Big and foreign firms thus have the 
possibility to positively influence their investment climate, and/or settle in locations 
where the investment climate is better. Improvement of the investment climate of 
small and medium enterprises would generate substantial productivity gains and 
largely boost the competitiveness of this category of firms. This outcome should be 
considered as highly relevant, considering the importance of small enterprises in 
developing countries, as well as their huge potential of job creation. The integration 
of a higher share of foreign firms into the world market also increases the aggregate 
productivity and particularly the productivity of local firms through spillover effect. 
Policies aiming to attract foreign firms thus have beneficial effects not only by 
financing saving gaps in countries but also by boosting recipient countries aggregate 
productivity. The relatively limited number of countries in this chapter (5 countries) 
calls for cautious when interpreting the results for developing countries. 
Developing countries are increasingly concerned about improving their 
competitiveness and productivity, as they face the intensifying pressure of 
globalization. The World Bank firm-surveys provide a standard instrument for 
identifying key obstacles to firm-level performances and prioritize policy reforms in 
order to boost competitiveness and diversify economies. 
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Appendices  
Appendix 5.1: Distribution of productivity across three consecutive years 
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Appendix 5.2: Investment Climate and Firm-level Inefficiency  
(No control for firms’ specific characteristics)  
 Dependent Variable: ln(Value added) 
 All firms Small local firms 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Production Function 
Ln(capital) 0.213 0.213 0.213 0.213 0.204 0.204 
 (43.48)*** (43.57)*** (43.51)*** (43.48)*** (33.54)*** (33.46)*** 
Ln(labor) 0.775 0.774 0.776 0.775 0.738 0.734 
 (123.94)*** (123.97)*** (122.83)*** (123.88)*** (81.92)*** (81.78)*** 
Constant 1.225 1.221 1.220 1.220 1.401 1.380 
 (22.24)*** (21.59)*** (22.08)*** (22.17)*** (19.43)*** (17.85)*** 
Investment Climate (Investment climate variables are regressed on firm-level inefficiency) 
Informal finance 0.043  0.037 0.041 0.056 0.041 
 (5.44)***  (6.19)*** (5.41)*** (4.12)*** (3.72)*** 
Informal finance+  0.059     
  (5.22)***     
Electricity problem 1.560 1.264 1.423 1.388 5.040 3.190 
 (1.96)* (1.78)* (2.12)** (1.72)* (2.79)*** (2.17)** 
Workforce 
Education 
-0.212 -0.208 -0.178 -0.225 -0.386 -0.365 
 (5.25)*** (6.15)*** (5.95)*** (5.92)*** (4.03)*** (4.26)*** 
Property Rights  -2.547 -2.300 -2.120 -2.561 -3.336 -2.879 
 (7.16)*** (9.20)*** (9.04)*** (8.89)*** (5.36)*** (5.82)*** 
Labor Regulation   -0.012  -0.096  
   (1.07)  (3.13)***  
Regulation 
Management 
   0.042  0.057 
    (2.14)**  (2.17)** 
Constant -2.798 -2.281 -1.067 -3.098 -0.240 -7.287 
 (1.86)* (1.73)* (0.68) (2.06)** (0.06) (2.63)*** 
Observations 12650 12697 12647 12650 8741 8746 
sigma_u 2.00 1.91 1.82 2.03 2.35 2.18 
 [0.70] [0.52] [0.50] [0.58] [0.93] [0.80] 
sigma_v 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.70 0.70 
 [0.09] [0.09] [0.09] [0.09] [0.11] [0.11] 
Wald chi2 60808.67 60674.86 59766.51 60685.64 21749.55 21637.58 
Prob > chi2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses. Number in brackets for sigma_u and sigma_v are standard errors. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
All regressions include year, country, and sectoral dummies. 
All investment climate variables are industry-region averages by size and capital ownership except informal finance variable 
which is firm-level information. Informal finance+ is industry-region averages by capital ownership.  
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Appendix 5.3: Investment Climate, Foreign Ownership and Firm-level 
Inefficiency 
(No control for firms’ specific characteristics)  
 Dependent Variable: ln(Value added) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Production Function     
Ln(Capital) 0.217 0.213 0.212 0.213 
 (44.18)*** (43.48)*** (43.32)*** (43.57)*** 
Ln(Labor) 0.777 0.775 0.775 0.767 
 (126.36)*** (123.88)*** (123.62)*** (120.21)*** 
Constant 1.243 1.220 1.232 1.285 
 (23.08)*** (22.17)*** (21.67)*** (23.01)*** 
Investment Climate (Investment climate variables are regressed on firm-level inefficiency) 
Foreign Firm -6.626  -4.292 -2.967 
 (4.22)***  (3.01)*** (2.18)** 
Export (% of sales)    -0.063 
    (4.83)*** 
Informal Finance  0.041 0.041 0.040 
  (5.41)*** (4.82)*** (5.03)*** 
Electricity Problem  1.388 1.426 1.581 
  (1.72)* (1.67)* (1.77)* 
Workforce Education  -0.225 -0.214 -0.227 
  (5.92)*** (4.93)*** (5.65)*** 
Property Rights Protection  -2.561 -2.658 -2.572 
  (8.89)*** (6.82)*** (8.21)*** 
Regulation Management  0.042 0.043 0.043 
  (2.14)** (2.07)** (2.07)** 
Constant -11.439 -3.098 -3.162 -3.582 
 (10.78)*** (2.06)** (1.94)* (2.16)** 
Observations 12898 12650 12635 12527 
sigma_u 2.10 2.03 2.08 2.15 
 [0.55] [0.58] [0.75] [0.63] 
sigma_v 0.68 0.67 0.67 0.67 
 [0.10] [0.09] [0.09] [0.09] 
Wald chi2 66646.59 60685.64 59534.60 58411.08 
Prob > chi2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses. Number in brackets for sigma_u and sigma_v are standard errors. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
All regressions include year, country, and sectoral dummies. 
All investment climate variables are industry-region averages by size and capital ownership except informal finance 
variable which is firm-level information.  
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Appendix 5.4: Projection to the best environments by sector within the 
country 
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Appendix 5.5: Table 4: Sales to Multinationals and Firm-level Inefficiency 
(Robustness for small and local firms) 
 Dependent Variable: ln(Value added) 
 All firms Local Firms Small-Local Firms 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Production Function      
Ln(capital) 0.178 0.177 0.173 0.192 0.168 
 (28.95)*** (28.85)*** (28.24)*** (31.03)*** (22.64)*** 
Ln(labor) 0.743 0.742 0.739 0.792 0.726 
 (67.03)*** (66.75)*** (66.39)*** (90.92)*** (57.82)*** 
Constant 2.626 1.962 2.710 1.813 1.565 
 (12.75)*** (14.05)*** (12.59)*** (11.20)*** (23.18)*** 
Investment Climate (Investment climate variables are regressed on firm-level inefficiency) 
Size -0.145 -0.149 -0.146 -1.746 -0.197 
 (7.74)*** (7.84)*** (8.22)*** (5.16)*** (6.57)*** 
Age -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.011 -0.000 
 (0.98) (1.07) (1.43) (0.53) (0.14) 
Sales to multinational -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.041 -0.005 
 (3.51)*** (3.50)*** (3.12)*** (1.90)* (2.61)*** 
Informal finance 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.019 0.001 
 (3.40)*** (3.36)*** (3.40)*** (1.64) (1.03) 
Electricity problem 0.218 0.216 0.212 0.690 0.060 
 (3.63)*** (3.48)*** (3.54)*** (0.41) (0.50) 
Workforce education -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 -0.183 -0.017 
 (7.15)*** (6.94)*** (7.34)*** (4.47)*** (6.29)*** 
Property rights protection -0.029 -0.030 -0.020 -0.638 -0.087 
 (1.64) (1.68)* (1.17) (1.61) (2.92)*** 
Regulation Management 0.004 0.004 0.004 -0.016 -0.001 
 (1.50) (1.55) (1.82)* (0.20) (0.23) 
Export (% of sales)  -0.000 -0.000 -0.047 -0.109 
  (0.71) (0.18) (1.47) (4.20)*** 
Foreign firm   -0.176   
   (3.76)***   
Constant 1.190 1.186 1.218 -0.366 1.422 
 (6.44)*** (6.34)*** (6.32)*** (0.09) (4.72)*** 
Observations 7403 7387 7375 6786 5022 
sigma_u 0.35 0.35 0.34 1.93 0.30 
 [0.17] [0.17] [0.17] [0.56] [0.14] 
sigma_v 0.61 0.61 0.62 0.60 0.65 
 [0.16] [0.15] [0.16] [0.10] [0.13] 
Wald chi2 14121.22 13720.07 13507.58 29619.19 9186.57 
Prob > chi2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses. Number in brackets for sigma_u and sigma_v are standard errors. * significant at 
10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
All regressions include year, country, and sectoral dummies. 
Sale to multinational is the percentage of firm sales to domestic multinational. All investment climate variables are industry-
region averages by capital ownership except informal finance variable which is firm-level information.  
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General Conclusion 
 
The importance of private capital flows in financing development is crucial, 
particularly in a context of limited and instable public flows. Beyond their economic 
benefits, capital inflows also tend to generate or exacerbate macroeconomic 
overheating, loss of competitiveness and vulnerability to financial crisis. Given the 
contentious conclusions of the empirical literature on these issues, it is important to 
reassess them. This dissertation analyzed the main determinants of private capital 
flows, the consequences of these flows on countries’ competitiveness and a policy 
response in presence of private flows. The dissertation addressed empirically three 
main questions: How developing countries could attract more private capital flows? 
What are the consequences of private inflows on countries’ competitiveness, 
measured by the real exchange rate and firms’ productivity? Can any policy response 
offset the impact of private flows on the real exchange rate? 
 
The first part of the dissertation analyzes the determinants of private capital flows 
(FDI and portfolio investment) from a macroeconomic perspective. Additionally, a 
microeconomic insight, based on firm-level data and focusing on the determinants 
of FDI completes the macroeconomic analysis. The second part of the dissertation 
focuses on the consequences of foreign capital on local economies through two 
chapters. The first one investigates the loss of competitiveness associated with the 
real exchange rate appreciation due to capital inflows and a potential policy response 
to dampen the real appreciation. The second chapter analyzes the positive impact of 
foreign investment on aggregate productivity.  
The analysis of the macroeconomic determinants of private flows (chapter 2) shows 
that physical infrastructure and financial development positively affect FDI and 
portfolio investment in developing countries. The effect of financial development 
on portfolio investment is non-linear, indicating that lax monetary policy and 
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excessive credit provision could severely weaken the financial system and reduce 
portfolio investment inflows. For Sub-Saharan African countries, the analysis 
concludes that better physical infrastructure has a higher impact on FDI. A firm-
level approach of the determinants of FDI reinforces the macroeconomic findings 
(chapter 3). This analysis shows that physical infrastructure problems, financing 
constraints, and institutional problems discourage FDI in the manufacturing sector. 
Foreign firms exporting their production are more affected by human capital 
constraints and physical infrastructure problems while foreign firm supplying the 
local markets are more affected by financing constraints. Trade and customs 
regulations encourage FDI, confirming the theory of horizontal FDI, according to 
which high trade barriers provide protection and price advantages to firms. In 
contrast with other developing countries, tax incentives do not appear to be relevant 
for the manufacturing sector in Sub-Saharan African countries.  
The analysis of the impact of private flows on countries’ competitiveness shows that 
public and private capital flows appreciate the real exchange rate, reducing countries’ 
competitiveness (chapter 4). Among private flows, the real appreciation is higher for 
short-term flows such as portfolio investments compared to long-term flows (FDI 
and remittances). These results highlight the role of FDI in increasing productive 
capacity and more counter-cyclical remittances, smoothing consumption during 
slow economic activity. The flexibility of the exchange is an effective tool to 
dampen the appreciation of the real exchange rate due to capital inflows. Countries’ 
competitiveness is also measured by their aggregate firm-level productivity (chapter 
5). This analysis points out the better investment climate faced by foreign firms as a 
factor that significantly explain their higher productivity (compared to local 
companies). Aggregate efficiencies would considerably increase in a scenario where 
all firms face the investment climate faced by foreign firms. Local firms doing 
business with foreign companies are more productive. This validates the importance 
of vertical spillovers through backward linkages. It is worth noting that compared to 
the other chapters of the dissertation -which are based on a more representative 
sample of developing countries-, the relatively limited statistical base of this chapter 
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(five countries) calls for more caution when generalizing the results to all developing 
countries. 
 
To summarize, this dissertation has showed that in order to attract private capital 
flows and benefit from these flows, developing countries should improve their 
investment climate. This implies promoting better infrastructure, finance, 
institution, and human capital. Particular attention should be given to human capital 
in countries aiming to attract foreign firms exporting their production and to 
financial development in countries looking for foreign firms that will serve the local 
market. A better cooperation between local firms and foreign companies could also 
help to magnify spillovers effects from foreign companies. Given their 
ineffectiveness, Sub-Saharan African countries should avoid tax incentives in their 
manufacturing sector. In defining their strategy to attract foreign capital, developing 
countries should first focus on long-term flows such as FDI and remittances given 
their lower potential of loss of competitiveness compared to short-term flows such 
as portfolio investments. Allowing some flexibility of the exchange rate helps 
countries to avoid the loss of competitiveness associated with capital inflows. 
Developing countries should also avoid lax monetary policy that could weaken the 
financial system and stop or reverse portfolio investments.  
 
The policy responses to capital inflows depend on countries’ characteristics (current 
account position, reserves level, exchange rate regime) and the causes of the inflows. 
This dissertation has analyzed one of the main policy responses: the exchange rate 
flexibility. In practice, developing countries often implement various policies during 
episodes of capital inflows. The management of private capital inflows to avoid a 
hard landing or a financial crisis in the aftermath of the inflows episode requires the 
coordination and the sequencing of diverse policies. These policies include 
macroeconomic measures such as sterilization (in the short-run), increase in reserve 
requirements, exchange rate flexibility, fiscal tightening, as well as structural 
measures such as financial sector reform with better banking supervision and 
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regulation, trade liberalization, and restrictive policies on flows. A comprehensive 
analysis of these policy options is important to understand how developing 
countries could wisely manage capital inflows and avoid the associated loss of 
competitiveness or financial crises. 
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RESUME 
Cette thèse analyse comment les pays en développement pourraient attirer davantage de capitaux 
privés, en bénéficier avec une amélioration de leur productivité, tout en évitant les éventuels effets 
pervers tel que l’appréciation du taux de change réel. La première partie de la thèse analyse les 
déterminants macroéconomiques des capitaux privés. Les résultats montrent que les infrastructures, 
et le développement financier favorisent les investissements directs étrangers (IDE) et les 
investissements de portefeuille (chapitre 2). La politique monétaire expansive réduit à terme les 
investissements de portefeuille. Une analyse des déterminants des IDE à partir de données de firmes 
renforce les résultats macroéconomiques (chapitre 3) en concluant qu’une meilleure qualité des 
infrastructures, des institutions et un développement financier stimulent les IDE dans le secteur 
manufacturier. Les firmes étrangères exportant leur production souffrent davantage des insuffisances 
de capital humain alors que les contraintes de financement sont des obstacles plus importants pour 
les firmes étrangères desservant le marché local. Contrairement aux autres pays en développement, 
les incitations fiscales ne semblent pas être utiles dans le secteur manufacturier des pays d’Afrique 
Sub-saharienne. La seconde partie de la thèse montre que les flux de capitaux privés et publics 
apprécient le taux de change de réel, réduisant la compétitivité des pays (chapitre 4). L’appréciation 
du taux de change réel est plus élevée pour les capitaux privés de court terme tels que les 
investissements de portefeuille relativement aux flux de long terme (IDE et transferts de migrants). 
La flexibilité du taux de change permet aux pays d’atténuer l’appréciation du taux de change réel 
émanant des flux de capitaux. Le climat d’investissement plus favorable des firmes étrangères 
explique significativement leur plus grande productivité par rapport aux firmes locales (chapitre 5). 
La productivité agrégée des pays est significativement améliorée lorsque toutes les firmes font face 
de façon hypothétique au climat d’investissement des firmes étrangères. Les firmes locales 
fournissant les firmes étrangères en matières premières ont une productivité plus élevée. Cela valide 
l’importance des spillovers verticaux au travers des liens fournisseurs-clients. 
Mots clés: Flux de capitaux privés, Investissements Direct Etranger, Climat d’Investissement, Efficience des 
firmes, Spillovers Verticaux, Taux de Change Effectif Réel, Flexibilité du Taux de Change, Données de Panel, 
Triples Moindres Carrées, Frontière Stochastique, Estimateur de Moyenne de Groupe Agrégée, Pays en 
Développement.  
ABSTRACT 
This dissertation analyzes how developing countries could attract more private capital flows and 
benefit from these flows with higher productivity levels while avoiding some negative effects such 
as the appreciation of the real exchange rate. The first part of the dissertation analyzes the 
determinants of private flows from a macroeconomic perspective. The results show that 
infrastructure and financial development positively affect FDI and portfolio investment and that lax 
monetary policy significantly reduces portfolio investment (chapter 2). A firm-level analysis of the 
determinants of FDI strengthens the macroeconomic findings (chapter 3) and shows that better 
infrastructure, finance, and institutions stimulate FDI in the manufacturing sector. Human capital 
constraints are major obstacles for foreign firms exporting their production while financing 
constraints have more effect on foreign firms supplying the local market. In contrast with other 
developing countries, tax incentives do not seem to be successful in attracting capital flows to the 
manufacturing sector in Sub-Saharan African countries. The second part of the dissertation shows 
that public and private capital flows appreciate the real exchange rate, reducing countries’ 
competitiveness (chapter 4). Among private flows, the real appreciation is higher for short-term 
flows such as portfolio investments than long-term flows (FDI and remittances). Exchange rate 
flexibility helps countries to dampen the appreciation of the real exchange rate stemming from 
capital inflows. A better investment climate for foreign firms significantly explains their higher 
productivity compared to local companies (chapter 5). Aggregate productivity would be significantly 
boosted if all firms face the investment climate of foreign firms. Finally, local firms supplying 
foreign companies with intermediate inputs exhibit higher productivity, highlighting the importance 
of vertical spillovers through backward linkages.  
Keywords: Private Capital Flows, Foreign Direct Investment, Investment Climate, Firm-level Efficiency, 
Vertical Spillovers, Real Effective Exchange Rate, Exchange Rate Flexibility, Three Stage Least Square, Panel 
Data, Stochastic Frontier Approach, Pooled Mean Group Estimator, Developing Countries. 
